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American pop culture – Hollywood cinema, television, pop music – 
dominates the rest of the world through its hegemonic presence. 
Does that make everyone a hybridized American, or do these 
elements find mediation within the other cultures that consume 
them? Fabricating the Absolute Fake applies concepts of postmodern 
theory – Baudrillard’s hyperreality and Eco’s “absolute fake,” among 
others – to this globally mediated American pop culture in order to 
examine both the phenomenon itself and its appropriation in the 
Netherlands, as evidenced by such diverse cultural icons as the 
Elvis-inspired crooner Lee Towers, the Moroccan-Dutch rapper Ali B, 
musical tributes to an assassinated politician, and the Dutch reality 
soap opera scene. Fabricating the Absolute Fake is a fascinating 
exploration of how global cultures struggle to create their own 
“America” within a post-9/11 media culture.
Jaap Kooijman is Associate Professor in Media & Culture and 
American Studies at the University of Amsterdam.
“A brilliant, thoroughly enjoyable work of cultural critique, Fabricating the Absolute 
Fake takes seemingly exhausted concepts like ‘Americanization’ and turns them on 
their head. Refusing simple binaries between the fake and the authentic, or between 
cultural imperialism and native resistance, Kooijman demonstrates just how flexible 
the signifiers of Americanness can be when they circulate globally.”
Anna McCarthy, Cinema Studies, New York University
“Most daring and persuasive is Kooijman’s ability to move between and connect the 
most delicious pop and the most searing political events (9/11, the murder of Pim 
Fortuyn), never evading the seriousness of entertainment nor the spectacle of politics. 
A book that is a pleasure for what it conveys of its subject and for its intellectual rigor, 
managing to be at once subtle and straightforward, complex and lucid.”
Richard Dyer, Film Studies, King’s College London
“Fabricating the Absolute Fake shows that pop culture is more 
than ephemeral entertainment. When looked at with Kooijman’s 
cosmopolitan eye, pop culture can be seen as a continuing ritual 
in celebration of national identities, America’s identity for sure, 
but also, intriguingly, a Dutch or even European sense of self.”
Rob Kroes, American Studies, University of Amsterdam
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 Introduction
 Fabricating 
 the Absolute Fake
In 2006, Hasted Hunt  Gallery in New York City hosted the exhibition  Rain 
(2004), a series of six photographs by the Dutch photographer Erwin  Olaf. 
Ken  Johnson, art critic of The New York  Times, described the photographs as 
“mysterious and touching,” suggesting that the pictures present “scenes that 
Norman  Rockwell’s mordantly depressed cousin might have painted.” Yet, 
Johnson singled out  Olaf ’s photograph of a young Boy Scout with his dog 
in a 1950s ice cream parlor (which is also featured on the cover of this book) 
as an example in which “psychological resonance is sacrifi ced for the cheaper 
rewards of satiric faux-Rockwellism,” adding that, if the photographer “intends 
a social or political commentary on American culture, it is unclear what he is 
trying to say.”1 In several interviews, Erwin  Olaf has explained that he made the 
Rain series in response to the terrorist attacks of September  11, 2001. With his 
photographs,  Olaf wants to return to an innocent pre-9/ 11 America, thereby 
making a political statement recognizing the importance of America as a sym-
bol of the  freedom of expression.2 That the Dutch photographer chose to evoke 
the style of Norman  Rockwell is fi tting, as the painter is best known for his 
nostalgic and romanticized pictures of American everyday life, many of them 
published as covers of The Saturday Evening  Post, and often has been recog-
nized as “the most popular American artist of the twentieth century.”3 More-
over,  Rockwell’s depictions of President Franklin D.  Roosevelt’s Four  Freedoms 
in 1943, including the  freedom of expression, have become iconic representa-
tions of American idealism.
 What strikes me in the ice cream parlor photograph is not only the return 
to an innocent America, but also its artifi ciality or fakeness, which Ken  Johnson 
aptly identifi ed as “faux-Rockwellism,” although, unlike Johnson, I would not 
call it “satiric” but rather a form of  pastiche.4 Erwin  Olaf “borrows” from Nor-
man  Rockwell by photographing in the same realist style as  Rockwell’s paint-
9
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ings, bordering on kitsch, including the use of almost artifi cial pastel coloring, 
thereby mimicking the painter’s trademark depiction of an idealistic America 
as well as bringing its artifi ciality to the foreground. By identifying the pho-
tograph’s fakeness, I am not making a negative value judgment, but instead I 
recognize how  Olaf successfully taps into the “artifi cial” character of American 
commercial pop culture, based on clichéd genre conventions, imitation, and 
continuously recycled images which tend to be viewed, particularly by Euro-
peans, as signs of fakeness.5 Identifying the fakeness of American commercial 
pop culture is not an act of dismissal but rather the recognition of one of its 
most attractive and seductive characteristics. This is also why I chose the title 
Fabricating the Absolute Fake, which is a quote from Umberto  Eco who wrote 
that “the American imagination demands the real thing and, to attain it, must 
fabricate the absolute  fake.”6 In  Eco’s defi nition, the absolute  fake is a form of 
 hyperreality in which a cultural artifact is perceived as an improved copy, more 
“real” than its original. Yet, whereas  Eco only discusses American pop culture 
made in the USA as forms of  hyperreality, I will also include non-American 
(and particularly Dutch) pop-cultural artifacts as absolute fakes, such as the 
photograph by  Olaf, as they are often inspired by American pop culture. Such 
a perspective enables me to analyze specifi c cases of  Americanization as forms 
of cultural  appropriation, without reducing them to mere imitations of the 
American original.
 The “America” that is depicted in the photographs by Erwin  Olaf and 
other pop-cultural artifacts is not a representation of the nation-state  USA but 
of an imagined  America. Born in the Netherlands in 1959,  Olaf never physi-
cally experienced the America of Norman  Rockwell’s era. Instead, he “returns” 
to an America that is based on the mass-mediated images of  Hollywood cin-
ema,  television programs, advertisements, and pop music. The same can be 
said for me (born in the Netherlands in 1967), as I too grew up in a culture 
in which American pop culture is omnipresent through media. Such an im-
agined  America is the topic of this book, which includes misconceptions of 
what “America is really like,” as the globally mediated American pop culture 
presents an image of America that often leaves out the diversity of cultures in 
the USA. Moreover, my reading of America is undoubtedly a very subjective 
one, with the danger of “lump[ing] together ‘non-Americans,’ as if … every-
one outside the USA … share[s] some common condition,” or of assuming 
that “the perspective from western Europe can comfortably stand for the many 
different experiences of  Americanization around the globe.”7 Instead of pre-
senting one defi nite reading of how America is depicted in contemporary pop 
culture, Fabricating the Absolute Fake shows possible ways in which “America” 
can be interpreted, thereby developing effective tools to analyze pop-cultural 
10 fabricating the absolute fake
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artifacts as specifi c examples of cultural  appropriation within a broader con-
text of Americanization and  globalization.
 Americanization and Globalization
Traditionally, the  Americanization of European cultures has been perceived in 
two seemingly contradictory ways.8 On the one hand, Americanization has been 
equated with American cultural  imperialism. In this way, European consum-
ers are seen as passive victims of a globally mediated American mass culture 
that threatens local and national cultures. On the other hand, Americanization 
has been equated with an act of liberation. Throughout the twentieth century, 
American popular culture (ranging from  jazz and rock ’n’  roll to  Hollywood 
and hip- hop) has been appropriated by subcultures, often youth subcultures, 
which use American popular culture as a liberating form of expression. Rather 
than denouncing American popular culture as empty and shallow, youth sub-
cultures welcomed the freshness which its emptiness and shallowness embod-
ied. As Rob  Kroes explains, “It was always a matter of younger generations re-
belling against the entrenched cultural order and turning values upside down, 
embracing American forms of culture not for what they lacked but for what 
they offered in terms of vitality and energy.”9 As such, Europeans are seen as 
active consumers who appropriate American popular culture and its connota-
tions to give shape to their rebellion within their own national cultures.
 This distinction between passive cultural  imperialism and active cultural 
 appropriation follows the distinction between mass culture and popular cul-
ture – the fi rst consisting of the mass-produced artifacts of the culture industry, 
a term coined by Max  Horkheimer and Theodor  Adorno, that keep consumers 
passively and uncritically entertained, the second consisting of the very same 
artifacts but then perceived as the “ lowbrow” culture of the common people, in 
opposition to the “ highbrow” culture of the elites, that functions as a potential 
source of social and political empowerment. Recognizing that American mass 
popular culture can work in both ways, and often does so simultaneously, I 
prefer to use the term American lightweight pop culture. I use “lightweight” 
instead of “ lowbrow” not only to avoid the rather unproductive “ highbrow” 
versus “ lowbrow” distinction, but also to emphasize that its accessible charac-
ter makes American pop culture so widely attractive. Lightweight pop culture 
tends to be so effective because its content is “light” (as opposed to “heavy” 
meaning “serious”) and thus is easily taken for granted. Moreover, its lightness 
is meant to entertain, and, as Richard  Dyer argues,  entertainment should be 
taken seriously on its own merits: “The task is to identify the ideological im-
fabricating the absolute fake 11
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plications – good or bad – of  entertainment qualities themselves, rather than 
seeking to uncover hidden ideological meanings behind and separable from 
the façade of  entertainment.”10 Instead of presenting farfetched interpretations 
of pop-cultural artifacts, ascribing more meaning to them than they actually 
contain or produce, I analyze the ideological implications of these pop-cultural 
artifacts within the larger context of an imagined  America. I use “pop” rather 
than “popular” culture to emphasize that its cultural artifacts are commercially 
mass-produced and mass-mediated, intended to make a profi t (in contrast to 
popular culture, which also includes “underground” subcultures and folklore), 
as well as to make an association with the  Warhol-esque pop aesthetic – pop 
art’s use of the language of  advertising and the continuous recycling of com-
mercial images.
 The passive cultural  imperialism versus active cultural  appropriation 
divide also runs parallel to the distinction made in the  globalization debate 
between George  Ritzer’s concept of “grobalization,” resulting in global  homo-
geneity, and Roland  Robertson’s concept of “glocalization,” resulting in glo-
bal  heterogeneity.11  Ritzer argues that the American-style capitalist expansion 
of multinationals has turned the world into one global consumer market, in 
which the very same products are being consumed in very similar surround-
ings around the globe – thus passive consumption and global  homogeneity. 
 Robertson, on the contrary, argues that these global consumer products are not 
consumed passively, but instead are being actively appropriated and translated 
into local contexts and idioms, leading to hybrid forms that may have been 
inspired by American global mass culture, but that also refl ect the experiences 
of local cultures – thus active consumption and global  heterogeneity. Again 
seemingly contradictory, these two different perspectives do not exclude but 
reinforce each other. The strength of global yet American-style  capitalism is its 
ability to incorporate diversity within mass production and mass consump-
tion, and to do so in forms that are widely attractive to a broad range of con-
sumers around the world. Through media such as fi lm and  television, in the 
language and style of mass  advertising, a global pop  culture is formed that is 
not so much intended to produce a mini-version of American pop culture, 
but rather tries, as Stuart  Hall states, “to recognize and absorb those [local] 
differences within the larger, overarching framework of what is essentially an 
American conception of the world.”12
 In this way,  Americanization can include both passive and active con-
sumption of American pop culture, enabling the two perspectives that the re-
ceiving culture either tends to become passively and gradually more American, 
or rather actively appropriates American pop culture, translating the American 
infl ux into a local or national context. In addition to these two perspectives 
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on Americanization, there is a third option: the omnipresence of American 
pop culture that is neither an explicit and direct result of passive American 
cultural  imperialism nor a liberating subcultural act of  appropriation. Writ-
ing about possible responses to the importation of “foreign fi lms” (without 
defi ning these as  Hollywood or American), Andrew  Higson recognizes three 
different results: fi rst, “an anxious concern about the effects of cultural  impe-
rialism, a concern that the local culture will be infected, even destroyed by the 
foreign invader,” second, “the introduction of exotic elements may well have a 
liberating or democratizing effect on the local culture, expanding the cultural 
repertoire,” and third, “the foreign commodity will not be treated as exotic by 
the local audience, but will be interpreted according to an ‘indigenous’ frame 
of reference; that is, it will be metaphorically translated into a local idiom.”13 
In the latter case, the foreignness of the imported culture is taken for granted 
or is no longer recognized.  Higson’s description fi ts the perception of Ameri-
canization as an act of active (yet not necessarily liberating)  appropriation in 
which the local or national culture is not being Americanized, but the Ameri-
can infl ux becomes localized or nationalized; or when Rob  Kroes talks about 
the Netherlands, Americanization is actually Dutchifi cation.14 However con-
vincing this perspective on Americanization may be, it continues to make a 
rigid distinction between what is “foreign” (read American) and what is “local” 
or “national” (read Dutch). The real challenge in the study of Americanization 
is to fi nd a way to recognize the active  appropriation of American pop culture 
without falling back on essentialist notions of what is American and, in the case 
of the Netherlands, what is Dutch. Rather than a foreign commodity, American 
pop culture has become an intrinsic part of global pop  culture, a continuous 
presence that often is no longer experienced as completely foreign. 
 That Andrew  Higson does not refer explicitly to  Hollywood and Ameri-
can pop culture is rather surprising, at least when applied to a western Eu-
ropean country such as the Netherlands, as the “foreign commodities” that 
are subjected to these three different responses tend to be either American or 
perceived as being originally American. Even if a pop-cultural artifact has not 
actually been produced in the USA, it can still be recognized as being Ameri-
can. For example, the reality  television programs Expedition  Robinson (also 
known as Survivor) and Big  Brother, both of which became major commercial 
successes internationally, originally came from, respectively, Sweden and the 
Netherlands. However, as far as I can tell, there is nowhere in the world where 
either of these shows are considered to be a Swedish or Dutch “invasion” of 
local pop culture; instead, if perceived as a foreign commodity at all, these pro-
grams are seen as being American. In these examples, the line between  Ameri-
canization and  globalization has become blurred, suggesting that the language 
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of American pop culture – both the literal use of American English as well as 
audiovisual language in the form of Hollywood and American  television genre 
conventions – functions as a global lingua franca.15
 Moreover, American pop culture produced in the USA is not a fi xed en-
tity, but is itself subject to processes that often tend to be perceived internation-
ally as forms of  Americanization. As the  McDonaldization thesis of George 
 Ritzer shows, the process of the rationalization of pop-cultural consumption 
(eating fast food at  McDonald’s and Burger  King, vacationing at Disney  World, 
going to the movies at multiplexes, shopping at mega-malls, drinking coffee at 
 Starbucks) is not only altering – or threatening, as  Ritzer convincingly argues 
– non-American local cultures, but American local cultures as well.16 A similar 
point has been made about  Disneyfi cation or Disneyization, which Alan  Bry-
man defi nes as “the process by which the principles of the Disney theme parks 
are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society as well as 
the rest of the world.”17 In other words, not only non-Americans but Ameri-
cans as well are subjected to processes of  globalization, McDonaldization, and 
Disneyfi cation, which are not synonymous to Americanization, but do share 
many of its characteristics and are often recognized as such. Although not the 
same, these processes are interrelated and tend to reinforce each other.
 Finally, processes of  Americanization and  globalization encompass more 
than merely the worldwide consumption of American pop-cultural products, 
as they also include the production of “American” pop culture outside of the 
USA. When the “foreign commodity” is no longer recognized as “foreign” but 
has been appropriated and translated into local or national contexts (yet still 
can be associated with “America”), then the question if something “American” 
is actually produced in the USA loses its relevance. The production of “Ameri-
can” pop culture outside of the USA (or more specifi cally, as far as this study 
is concerned, in the Netherlands) reveals important problems of defi nition. If 
the distinction between what is experienced as American or as local has be-
come blurred, how can one recognize specifi c pop-cultural artifacts within 
explicit national or local contexts as examples of Americanization? Moreover, 
such identifi cations may differ among different cultural groups within the lo-
cal society or among different generations (in the Netherlands blue  jeans tend 
to be perceived by older generations as a sign of “America,” whereas to young-
er generations such a connotation no longer seems to hold). In other words, 
whether or not a specifi c pop-cultural artifact is an example of Americaniza-
tion is in the eye of the beholder, often based on subjective associations which 
cannot be “objectively proven” without falling back upon essentialist notions 
of what constitutes Americanness. Rather than making defi nite yet unproduc-
tive claims about which elements of a national or local pop culture are Ameri-
14 fabricating the absolute fake
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canized, I will analyze pop-cultural artifacts produced both within the USA 
and outside (in the Netherlands) that I assume can be perceived as examples 
of Americanization, to show how such a perspective opens up ways to explore 
how forms of Americanization can work.
Analyzing the Object within a Bombardment of Signs
Fabricating the Absolute Fake is made up of two parts, each consisting of text-
based close readings of specifi c case studies. Each chapter takes one specif-
ic case study and theoretical concept as its starting point, and subsequently 
makes a connection to other case studies through association. Part one exam-
ines American pop-cultural artifacts that are produced in the USA but that are 
globally mediated, including in the Netherlands. The fi rst chapter discusses 
the pop song and music  video “We Are the World” (1985) by USA for  Africa 
as an example of  Americanization and  globalization, specifi cally focusing on 
the global dominance of American pop culture through the language of  ad-
vertising. In the second chapter, I use Benedict  Anderson’s concept of imag-
ined  community to make a distinction between the nation-state  USA and an 
imagined  America that became most explicitly visible on American  television 
after the terrorist attacks of September  11, 2001. I discuss specifi c episodes of 
 television programs that commented on 9/ 11 immediately after the attacks, 
based on three case studies: the daily talk  show The Oprah Winfrey  Show and 
two drama series, The West  Wing and Ally  McBeal. The third chapter connects 
the “America” of post-9/11  television to the depiction of “America” in connec-
tion to the fi rst and the second Gulf  Wars by both  television and  Hollywood 
cinema. Based on the concepts of myth by Roland  Barthes and  hyperreality by 
Jean  Baudrillard, I analyze four televised performances of the American na-
tional  anthem at the annual Super  Bowl by, respectively, Whitney  Houston in 
1991, Mariah  Carey in 2002, the Dixie  Chicks in 2003, and  Beyoncé Knowles in 
2004. Subsequently, two of the few Hollywood fi lms explicitly dealing with the 
fi rst Gulf  War are analyzed: Three  Kings (David O. Russell, 1999) and  Jarhead 
(Sam Mendes, 2005). Together, these three chapters show how an imagined 
 America can be recognized, an America which remains intertwined with the 
nation-state  USA yet which does enable the separation of American idealism 
from the actual politics of the USA. In addition, although these pop songs, 
 television shows, and Hollywood movies are made in the USA, they are also 
mediated around the world, thereby helping to shape the way non-Americans 
view “America.”
 Part two of Fabricating the Absolute Fake examines pop-cultural artifacts 
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that are produced and (in most cases) only consumed in the Netherlands, and 
which clearly have been inspired by American pop culture. Building on Um-
berto  Eco’s notion of the absolute  fake as  hyperreality, I analyze these pop-
cultural artifacts as examples of hyper- Americanness to identify their imitative 
character, being copies of the American original. However, to avoid limiting the 
discussion to the question whether or not the Dutch copies are successful imi-
tations, I use two additional concepts. From the multi-media project by Chris 
 Keulemans, I borrow the term “the American I never  was” to specify the ambig-
uous position of those living outside of the geographical borders of the nation-
state  USA yet within a culture in which American pop culture is omnipresent.18 
I apply the concept of karaoke  Americanism, coined by Thomas  Elsaesser, to 
perceive Dutch pop-cultural artifacts not merely as imitations of the Ameri-
can original, but as cases of active cultural  appropriation, or, citing  Elsaesser, 
“that doubly coded space of identity as overlap and deferral, as compliment 
and camoufl age.”19 In chapter four, I apply these two concepts to four different 
case studies of Dutch celebrities who all can be perceived as “Americans they 
never  were” performing karaoke  Americanism, although each in a different 
way: singer Lee  Towers, celebrity couple Adam  Curry and Patricia  Paay, former 
soap actress  Katja Schuurman, and rapper Ali  B. In chapter fi ve, I explore how 
Dutch pop culture can function within an explicitly political context. Similar 
to the way American pop culture has commented on the fi rst and second Gulf 
 Wars and 9/ 11, Dutch pop culture, often inspired by the American example, 
has commented on 9/11 and the assassinations of the controversial politician 
Pim  Fortuyn in 2002 and fi lmmaker Theo van  Gogh in 2004. In this fi nal chap-
ter, I analyze pop songs and music  videos by Dutch pop singers and rappers, 
ranging from tributes to Pim  Fortuyn to rap songs about Dutch multicultural 
society, the special “Dutch  Dream” issue of the glossy magazine LINDA , and
 Dutch hit movies like Shouf Shouf Habibi! (2004, Albert ter  Heerdt), which all 
use the genre conventions of American pop culture to comment on the post-
9/11 political debate about national identity and  multiculturalism. My choice 
to focus exclusively on contemporary Dutch pop culture does not imply that 
the Netherlands is signifi cantly different from other countries in its  appropria-
tion of American pop culture (although comparative studies undoubtedly will 
fi nd cultural differences). Instead, the focus on Dutch pop culture is based on 
my own subject position as “the American I never  was,” a Dutchman who has 
grown up in a culture that is permeated with American pop culture, using the 
Netherlands as just one specifi c example that can make a contribution to theo-
ries of  Americanization.
 At fi rst glance, it may seem that the case studies have been chosen quite 
arbitrarily. Pop culture covers a wide range of different cultural artifacts, and 
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picking one case study over the other appears to be a random act. But the 
choice not to strictly defi ne a body of study objects is made deliberately. Pop 
culture consists of, to use Jean  Baudrillard’s words, a bombardment of  signs, 
which continuously refer to each other.20 By picking these case studies seem-
ingly at random, I mimic the way pop culture works: fi nding the intertextual 
connections between different pop-cultural artifacts through random associa-
tion. Obviously, in practice, the choice of case studies has been far less arbitrary. 
All case studies are connected to the notion of an imagined  America and all are 
commercial pop-cultural artifacts that implicitly or explicitly comment on po-
litical realities, such as the fi rst and second Gulf  Wars and 9/ 11 in the American 
examples and the assassinations of Pim  Fortuyn and Theo van  Gogh in the 
Dutch examples. The advantage of such an approach is that the pop-cultural 
artifact is analyzed in a manner similar to how it is used, namely as an object 
to be consumed in an intertextual relation with other pop-cultural artifacts, 
nothing more and nothing less. Moreover, citing Mieke  Bal, the focus on the 
object and its intertextuality “enrich both interpretation and theory,” allowing 
“theory [to] change from a rigid master discourse into a live cultural object 
in its own right.”21 The disadvantage, however, is that the analysis of the pop-
cultural artifact, like the object itself, tends to remain literally on the surface, 
whereby its historical and economic contexts are easily ignored. Its superfi cial-
ity (here meaning not going beyond the surface rather than a value judgment) 
makes the study of pop culture ambiguous, as one tends to underestimate its 
ideological implications because one takes the objects for granted – after all, 
they are “only  entertainment” – or instead overestimate the ideological impli-
cations by reading more into the objects than the realm of  entertainment really 
allows for.22
 To grasp the superfi ciality of both American pop culture and its imita-
tive counterparts in other countries, the theoretical concept of  hyperreality as 
defi ned by Umberto  Eco and Jean  Baudrillard proves helpful – although the 
two European philosophers each provide different defi nitions. Both  Eco and 
 Baudrillard have identifi ed American pop culture as a form of  hyperreality 
while traveling through the USA, yet whereas  Eco defi nes the  hyperreality of 
America as consisting of artifi cial copies of authentic originals (hence the ab-
solute  fake),  Baudrillard sees America as the ultimate  simulacrum, no longer 
an artifi cial copy of an authentic original but an endless chain of copies refer-
ring to each other.23 The question whether or not  Eco and  Baudrillard are cor-
rect in identifying America as being a form of  hyperreality is in itself irrelevant. 
However, the perspective of  hyperreality opens up ways to analyze an imagined 
 America, both within as well as beyond the geographical borders of the na-
tion-state  USA, and particularly the ways in which such an imagined  America 
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is globally mediated and emulated. Moreover, the two European philosophers 
and their charismatic theories have themselves become part of American pop 
culture, which was recognized in the obituary for Jean  Baudrillard on the  Pop-
Matters website. The celebrity status of  Baudrillard has resulted in the percep-
tion that “his theory [is] more pop – more spectacle than substance,” thereby 
forgetting that  Baudrillard indeed made pop matter: “If this ‘real’ of popular 
culture has become the real of the everyday American, then mining the shiny 
and salacious surfaces of American media becomes more fascinating and eerily 
relevant.”24
 In addition to  hyperreality as defi ned by  Eco and  Baudrillard, Fabricat-
ing the Absolute Fake builds on important studies of pop culture,  Americaniza-
tion, and the relation between  Hollywood and Europe. As mentioned before, 
Richard  Dyer’s Only Entertainment shows the signifi cance of recognizing the 
relevance of pop culture based on its own merits, thereby neither taking it for 
granted as sheer  entertainment nor overemphasizing its political impact. In If 
You Seen One, You’ve Seen the Mall, Rob  Kroes convincingly challenges the cul-
tural  imperialism thesis by arguing that Americanization should be perceived 
as a form of active cultural  appropriation, showing that in the Netherlands the 
infl ux of American pop culture did not make the Dutch more American, but 
that “American models had been Dutchifi ed,” a line of argument that has been 
taken up by Richard  Pells in his book Not Like Us, on “how Europeans have 
loved, hated, and transformed American culture.”25 Yet, these studies predomi-
nantly focus on the European reception of American pop culture, whereas Fab-
ricating the Absolute Fake also analyzes “American” pop culture actually pro-
duced in the Netherlands. The book also builds on European Cinema: Face to 
Face with Hollywood by Thomas  Elsaesser, who effectively goes beyond the con-
ventional binary oppositions that mark the America-Europe divide, showing 
that the seemingly antagonistic oppositions between Hollywood and European 
cinemas do not contradict but complement each other. Moreover,  Elsaesser 
challenges the oft-made claim that Hollywood presents a universal rather than 
an explicitly American conception of values such as  freedom and  democracy 
by recognizing Hollywood as “an engine of global  hegemony.”26 With Fabricat-
ing the Absolute Fake, I expand  Elsaesser’s argument beyond cinema into the 
broader realm of the globally mediated American pop culture.
Conclusion: The Unbearable Lightness of Pop Culture
When analyzing commercial pop culture, one almost automatically comes to 
be perceived as being an exponent of the phenomenon that is being studied. In 
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2004, I was invited to speak at a symposium on how the Dutch media reported 
on the then-current American presidential elections. In my talk, I suggested 
that the media representation of the candidates George W.  Bush and John  Ker-
ry could be compared to the  television talent show American  Idol, as there are 
great similarities in the way the candidates are being judged on their televised 
media performances. Like the American Idol contestants, the presidential can-
didates are continuously tested to see whether or not they succeed in present-
ing the illusion of being their “authentic” selves, reminiscent of Umberto  Eco’s 
words that to “speak of things that one wants to connote as real, these things 
must seem real,” resulting in the absolute  fake.27 I was not claiming that these 
two media events are the same. Obviously, the winner of the American presi-
dential elections has a far more serious impact on the world’s political realities 
than America’s next pop idol. Nevertheless, showing the way these two events 
use similar media strategies helps to understand how pop culture has become 
intertwined with our everyday experience of the political. At the end of the day, 
the host of the symposium publicly thanked me for providing the  entertain-
ment, adding that my presentation gave the audience some breathing room, 
a welcome interruption of the dense and serious discussion of the American 
political system. Certainly well-intended, the compliment reveals how easily 
we continue to take the ideological implications of pop culture for granted as 
being “only  entertainment.”
 I received a similar response to my essay about the performances of the 
American national  anthem at the annual Super  Bowl by Whitney  Houston in 
1991 and Mariah  Carey in 2002, which I interpreted as supporting the Ameri-
can war effort during the fi rst Gulf  War and the War on  Terror, respective-
ly.28 Published in the edited collection Post-Cold  War Europe, Post-Cold War 
America, the essay fi ts the book’s overall pessimistic view on the unilateral-
ist foreign  policy of the USA since 9/ 11. Yet in his review of the book in the 
academic journal American Studies International, Bernard  Mergen comes to 
a quite different conclusion: “Whether the highly stylized rituals of the Su-
per Bowl really reveal anything about the construction of American national 
identity remains, of course, an open question, but Kooijman’s essay brings a 
welcome lightness to an otherwise grim topic.”29 Again, analyzing pop culture 
is equated with its object, judged to be just as light. From the journalistic end of 
the spectrum, however, came an opposite opinion. Commenting on my essay 
on karaoke  Americanism, written for the Dutch weekly magazine De Groene 
 Amsterdammer as a short prepublication of Fabricating the Absolute Fake, jour-
nalist Paul  Arnoldussen called the essay “exceptionally pretentious,” suggesting 
that the lightweight character of the discussed pop culture was taken way too 
seriously.30 Doomed to be either too lightweight or exceptionally pretentious, 
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the academic analysis of pop culture turns out to just as ambiguous as pop 
culture itself. Fabricating the Absolute Fake acknowledges such ambiguity as an 
essential characteristic of pop culture, and of American pop culture in particu-
lar. To grasp the global dominance of American pop culture and the process of 
 Americanization, pop culture needs to be analyzed in all its “light-weightiness,” 
thereby recognizing both its seductive manipulation as well as the signifi cance 
of its triviality.
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Chapter One:
We Are the World:
America’s Dominance in Global Pop Culture
Of all the American pop-cultural products that are being consumed around 
the world, ranging from  Hollywood fi lms and Coca- Cola to  television soap 
operas and hip- hop, the 1985 pop song “We Are the World” by USA for  Africa 
is one of the most blatant examples of America’s dominance in global pop 
 culture. A relatively simple charity pop song recorded by a group of American 
stars named the United Support of Artists (USA) can make such abstract no-
tions as  Americanization and  globalization concrete. “There are people dying,” 
sings Stevie  Wonder, without a doubt genuinely concerned about the starving 
Ethiopians in Africa. However, the American stars are there to provide relief 
with optimism and good cheer. “We Are the World” is not merely a charity pop 
record to raise western awareness of the Ethiopian famine and to collect money 
for aid, but is most of all a showcase of American superstars who function as 
ideological ambassadors of American values such as  freedom and  democracy 
within a free market economy, using a language that is strikingly similar to the 
rhetoric of  Pepsi and Coca-Cola commercials. In this way, “We Are the World” 
can be perceived as part of “an engine of global  hegemony,” presenting these 
American national values of  democracy,  freedom, and open exchange of goods 
and services as universal.1 
 The complexities of  Americanization and  globalization obviously can-
not be covered completely by merely focusing on a singular pop song, notably 
one that was recorded and released more than twenty years ago. Neverthe-
less, “We Are the World” does show how processes of Americanization and 
 globalization work through pop culture, in this case wrapping a potentially 
provocative message about dying people in Africa in sheer pleasure. I clearly 
remember my personal experience of enjoying the song as a teenager, back in 
1985. Although I was not particularly thrilled by the music (as a pop song, “We 
Are the World” seems rather contrived and tepid, easily reduced to elevator 
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music), I was enthralled by the combined star power of all those great Ameri-
can pop stars coming together to sing a song and save the world. The music 
 video added to this pleasure, showing the stars performing together in the re-
cording studio so unselfi shly, all patiently waiting their turn to sing their lines. 
My teenage experience is similar to the one of Greil  Marcus’s daughter, who, 
at that time, explained to her father how “We Are the World” gave her and 
her teenage friends so much pleasure: “The music washes over you and makes 
you feel good – and it’s a game too, trying to identify each singer then check-
ing against the video.”2 The metaphor of American pop culture as a wave that 
“washes over you and makes you feel good” is an oft-used one, not only applied 
to pop music like “We Are the World,” but also to the escapist quality of  Holly-
wood cinema and  television, to the childlike innocence as embodied by  Disney, 
and to the refreshing taste of Coca- Cola.
  As a product of the global pop music industry with its multinational 
forms of distribution and communication technologies, “We Are the World” 
fi ts within a discourse of  globalization that emphasizes  homogeneity and  uni-
versalism. In the assumed free global market, borders are disappearing and 
identities become hybrid, as “we” are all consumers buying the same products. 
Yet, in addition to its universal and global character, “We Are the World” is 
also part of an image of “America” which is broadcast around the world. I will 
discuss “We Are the World” as an example of  Americanization and  globaliza-
tion, without suggesting that my analysis demonstrates the only possible way 
in which these processes can work. Instead, I want to show, by a subjective 
reading of one specifi c case study, how the combination of pleasure, pop star-
dom, and the commercial rhetoric of mass  advertising ends up promoting an 
American conception of the world, thereby presenting the values of democracy, 
individual  freedom, and choice through  consumerism as seemingly universal 
and global ones.
The World as One Great Big American  Family
Produced by Quincy  Jones and written by pop stars Michael  Jackson and Lionel 
 Richie, “We Are the World” is the American follow-up to the British Band  Aid 
charity hit single “Do They Know It’s  Christmas? (Feed the World),” released 
in December 1984 to raise money to fi ght the famine in Ethiopia. On January 
28, 1985, right after the taping of the annual American Music  Awards, a wide 
range of American pop stars, including Stevie  Wonder, Bruce  Springsteen, Tina 
 Turner, Cyndi  Lauper, Bob  Dylan, Willie  Nelson, Billy  Joel, Diana  Ross, and 
Ray  Charles, joined  Jackson and  Richie at the Los Angeles A&M Recording 
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Studios to spread a semi-religious message of human  universalism. “We are all 
a part of God’s great big family,” sings  Turner, followed by  Joel who adds, “and 
the truth, you know, love is all we need.” With the exception of  Wonder’s line 
about people dying, there is no explicit reference to the political reality of Af-
rican famine and poverty, let alone to its causes or possible solutions. Also, no 
images of the African famine are included in the music  video, only the smiling 
faces of the American pop stars recording their message in the studio, singing 
about the promise of a better future, as “we” are all God’s children sharing one 
world as a family. 
 Band  Aid’s “Do They Know It’s  Christmas? ” differs from USA for  Africa’s 
“We Are the World” in two signifi cant ways. First, in its lyrics, written by Band 
Aid’s initiator Bob  Geldof (music by Midge  Ure, produced by Trevor  Horn), 
“Do They Know It’s Christmas? ” makes a strong distinction between “us” cel-
ebrating Christmas in “our world of plenty,” while “they” in “a world outside 
your window” are starving, suggesting that “we” should be grateful that the 
African tragedy is happening to “them” rather than to “us.” As a result, the lyr-
ics seem to invite a cynical interpretation, particularly when U2’s  Bono cries 
out “well tonight, thank God it’s them instead of you,” followed by Paul  Young’s 
call to raise “our” glasses for “everyone,” including for “them, underneath that 
burning sun.” In this way, the message of “Do They Know It’s Christmas? ” 
seems more realistic – aware of the geopolitical reality that divides the world in 
rich and poor sections – than USA for Africa’s one world human  universalism. 
Although the seriousness of Band Aid’s message is undermined by the music 
 video, which shows the white male singers and musicians frolicking around 
in the recording studio, the difference between the two songs remains telling: 
Band Aid’s almost cynical recognition of the discrepancy between “us” and 
“them,” thereby emphasizing global inequality, versus USA for Africa’s rather 
naïve celebration of “we” as part of one world, propagating the notion that 
“we” are all the same.
 Second, although women and non-white men are featured in the cho-
rus, all solos of “Do They Know It’s  Christmas? ” are sung by white men: Paul 
 Young, Boy  George, Wham!’s George  Michael, Duran Duran’s Simon Le Bon, 
 Sting, Spandau Ballet’s Tony  Hadley, and U2’s  Bono. The women, consisting of 
the white girl group  Bananarama and the black (American) singer Jody  Watley, 
and the men of color, consisting of three members of the black (American) 
band Kool & the  Gang, do not appear until more than halfway through the 
song, which is emphasized by the music  video, showing their arrival at the 
studio right after the white men have fi nished recording their solos. USA for 
 Africa, on the contrary, is a true celebration of American  multiculturalism. 
Old and young, male and female, black and white, all are included with their 
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specifi c musical genres, ranging from soul, country, and gospel, to folk, pop, 
and rock. “We Are the World” combines these different genres quite nicely by 
pairing off African-American rocker Tina  Turner with white piano player Billy 
 Joel, white folksinger Paul  Simon with white country star Kenny  Rogers, white 
working-class hero Bruce  Springsteen with African-American  Motown star 
Stevie  Wonder, and African-American soul singer Dionne  Warwick with white 
country legend Willie  Nelson. USA for Africa fi ts the conventional multicul-
tural image of “America” as a mirror of the world, where people of all nations 
come together as one to pursue their common American  Dream. That this 
group of diverse yet united artists is named the United Support of Artists is 
telling, as the name obviously refers to the nation-state  USA.
 To overemphasize the differences between Band  Aid’s “Do They Know 
It’s  Christmas? ” and USA for  Africa’s “We Are the World” is tempting, as it re-
inforces conventional distinctions between Europe and America, including, in 
this case, European art/authorship versus American  entertainment and Euro-
pean realism versus American optimism. The seemingly unrehearsed recording 
of the Band Aid music  video gives the impression that the British white male 
pop singers just happened to show up in the studio to help out their buddy 
Bob  Geldof with his initiative to “do something good” for Africa. The USA 
for Africa music  video, on the contrary, is a slick and professional  Hollywood 
production, recorded at the center of American  entertainment and featuring 
America’s greatest pop stars. This distinction is also refl ected by the lyrics of 
the pop songs. As stated above, “Do They Know It’s Christmas? ” is a rather 
bleak and cynical depiction of the geopolitical state of affairs that, according 
to the promotional media coverage during the single’s initial release, was Bob 
 Geldof ’s (arguably simple yet genuine) personal view of the situation. In stark 
contrast to Band Aid’s message, “We Are the World” is an optimistic fantasy 
of a multicultural world that promises a happy ending to an African tragedy, 
which is emphasized by the fact that USA for Africa is the product of a collec-
tive effort, uniting a group of multiethnic artists, rather than the project of one 
white male rock singer.
 Yet ultimately, the similarities between Band  Aid’s “Do They Know It’s 
 Christmas? ” and USA for  Africa’s “We Are the World” are far more striking 
than the differences. Both pop songs use well-known pop stars to present a 
melodic and rather plain message about famine and poverty in Africa in an 
attempt to raise awareness and money. Both songs make explicit references 
to God, which, particularly in the case of “Do They Know It’s Christmas? ,” 
are clearly based on Christianity. Most importantly, both singles are consumer 
products, turning the act of giving to charity into another form of consump-
tion. The Band Aid and USA for Africa music  videos, both solely consisting of 
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pop star images, function as commercials to sell the charity singles, using the 
surplus value of celebrity (perhaps even more than the musical talent of the 
pop stars) to attract a wide global audience. Recognizing not only the differ-
ences but also the similarities is signifi cant for two reasons. First, as Thomas 
 Elsaesser argues, the distinction between Europe and America in global pop 
production is used to maintain the status quo and keep the non-western world 
out of the equation. Writing about the distinction between  Hollywood and Eu-
ropean cinema,  Elsaesser states, “this usually binary relation of buried antago-
nisms and resentment actually functions not only as a two-way-traffi c, but acts 
as an asymmetrical dynamic of exchange, whose purpose it is to stabilize the 
system by making both sides benefi t from each other, paradoxically by mak-
ing-believe that their regular and ritual stand-offs are based on incompatible 
antagonisms.”3 Applied to the global music industry that produced Band Aid 
and USA for Africa, this means that only looking at the distinctions between 
the European and the American charity single tends to mystify the way the two 
singles are interrelated as part of the same music industry. Second, rather than 
being opposites, “We Are the World” can be seen as a commercially improved 
version of “Do They Know It’s Christmas? ,” better equipped to reach a world-
wide audience. Although both charity singles became global hit songs, the slick 
and professional production, its optimistic and cheerful message of human 
 universalism, and the presence of American superstars, made USA for Africa’s 
“We Are the World” the generic archetype, setting the standard for other char-
ity singles to follow. 
 After the success of Band  Aid and USA for  Africa, artists from different 
countries around the world recorded their own charity singles to raise money 
for Ethiopia, including, to name just a few, the Canadian Northern Lights with 
“Tears Are Not Enough,” the German Band für Ethiopia with “Nackt Im Wind” 
(“Naked in the Wind”), the Belgian “Leven Zonder Honger” (“Life without 
Hunger”), the French Chanteurs Sans Frontières with “Ethiopie,” the Finnish 
Apua! Orkersteri with “Maksamme Velkaa” (“We Are Paying the Debt”), the 
Dutch “Samen” (“Together”), the Yugoslavian Yu Rock Misija with “Za Mil-
ion Godina” (“For a Million Years”), the Australian Australia Too with “The 
Garden,” and the Latin American Hermanos with “Cantaré Cantarás” (“I Will 
Sing, You Will Sing”). While there are national and regional variations between 
these different songs, with language being the most obvious one, their generic 
similarity reveals a global  homogeneity, suggesting that the audiovisual con-
ventions of Band Aid and USA for Africa have become dominant in this new 
global pop genre. As Simon  Frith notes, these multinational charity singles 
share a “global pop sound,” consisting of “an unobtrusive but determined rock 
beat, soul-infl ected sincere vocals, and a balladic chorus line to pluck the heart 
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strings.”4 The dominance of USA for Africa (and, to a lesser extent, Band Aid) 
is thus partially based on its being the global generic archetype that is being 
imitated on national and regional levels, resulting in both global  homogene-
ity (the songs and music  videos all sound and look the same) and global  het-
erogeneity (all songs and music  videos contain specifi c national and regional 
characteristics).5 However, these global-sounding charity singles, national and 
regional variations on USA for Africa, do not reach beyond their geographi-
cal boundaries, because, in addition to language barriers, their appeal is pre-
dominantly based on the use of local rather than global pop stars. “We Are the 
World” (and, again to a lesser extent, “Do They Know It’s  Christmas? ”), on the 
contrary, can reach a worldwide audience, suggesting that USA for Africa has 
become dominant on a global level not only by providing a generic example 
as a lingua franca, but also by effectively transcending its national boundaries, 
using its global pop stars to present a universal message.
The Pop Star Myth and the American  Dream
As argued before, the strength of USA for  Africa’s “We Are the World” is based 
on its combined star power, presenting an image of American  multicultural-
ism by featuring multiethnic pop stars ranging from music legends such as 
Ray  Charles and Bob  Dylan to (at that time) young pop singers such as James 
 Ingram and Huey  Lewis. However, two American stars stand out, both vocal-
ly on the record as well as visually in the music  video: Michael  Jackson and 
Bruce  Springsteen. In 1985,  Jackson and  Springsteen were both at the com-
mercial and popular peak of their singing careers. Michael  Jackson’s  Thriller, 
released in December 1982, had just become the bestselling album of all time, 
whereas the music  videos of the album’s hit singles, “Billie Jean,” “Beat It,” and 
“Thriller,” broke the racial barrier of the then-newly established  MTV music 
 television channel.6 In addition, his 1983 performance of the moonwalk on 
American national  television, broadcast worldwide, skyrocketed  Jackson into 
global mega-stardom.7 Not yet tainted by the controversies that destroyed his 
career in later years (as will be discussed in chapter three), Michael  Jackson be-
came the living example that, by the 1980s, African-Americans could also make 
their American  Dream come true. Around the same time, in June 1984, Bruce 
 Springsteen released his bestselling album Born in the  USA, featuring seven 
hit singles, including “Dancing in the Dark,” “Born in the USA,” “Glory Days,” 
and “I’m on Fire.” While already a critically acclaimed recording artist since the 
mid-1970s, the commercial success of Born in the USA turned  Springsteen into 
a global rock star. His image, music, and popularity fi t the renewed investment 
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in white American working-class masculinity, that, in the early 1980s, became 
embodied by, among others, President Ronald  Reagan, Arnold  Schwarzeneg-
ger, and  Rambo, the latter being the  Hollywood action hero played by Sylvester 
 Stallone.8 In signifi cantly different ways, the star images of Michael  Jackson 
and Bruce  Springsteen both present an image of America, which came together 
in the USA for Africa charity single and music  video. However, before analyz-
ing the way in which these two star images embody an imagined  America, I 
fi rst will discuss how stars can be analyzed as star texts.
 Since the publication of Richard  Dyer’s Stars (1979) and Heavenly Bodies 
(1986), the study of stars has become an essential part of fi lm,  television, and 
media studies.9 As  Dyer and others have shown, stars function in various and 
sometimes contradictory ways. Stars are the products of the culture industry, 
a marketing tool to sell fi lms,  television shows, pop songs, and, in extension, 
soft drinks, fashion, and other consumer products to a large market. The star 
image, however, is constructed by both its industrial production as well as its 
reception and consumption. The construction of the star image can be read 
as a star text, containing meanings that are not only produced by the actual 
performances on screen, record, and stage, but also by promotional material, 
interviews, critical reception, gossip about their private lives in the tabloid 
press, and fan cultures, including fanzines and websites. As a commodity of 
production and consumption, the star image contains a wide range of mean-
ings, which can include confl icting values and fantasies. Stars are constructed 
as being both ordinary, enabling fans to identity with them, and extraordinary, 
enabling fans to admire them. Although stars are the products of the culture 
industry (as the reality  television program Pop  Idol or American  Idol, known in 
the Netherlands as  Idols, makes perfectly clear), they need to have an intrinsic 
individual talent – a star is born, not made – or at least maintain the sugges-
tion that they are naturally talented. The notion that stars used to be ordinary 
individuals, preferably from a less-privileged social background, with an ex-
traordinary talent just waiting to be discovered, is defi ned by Richard  Dyer as 
the star  myth, one which can be read back in countless star biographies, rang-
ing from Marilyn  Monroe and Elvis  Presley to Michael  Jackson and  Madonna. 
 Dyer explicitly connects this star  myth to the American  Dream, another myth 
of  meritocracy which is based on the belief that individual success is attainable 
for anyone, regardless of social background or constraints, as long as one is 
talented and works hard to achieve his or her goal.10
 With its exclusive focus on pop stars, most of them successful examples 
of the American  Dream, USA for  Africa’s “We Are the World” evokes the rheto-
ric of the star  myth, thereby implying that its message of human  universalism 
is based on active individual agency rather than a passive subjection to social 
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and political circumstances. “There’s a choice we’re making,” as the stars ex-
claim, suggesting that even a collective effort is essentially an individual choice. 
While the presence of American pop stars assured that the charity pop single 
would reach a wide and global audience, effectively using the stars as mar-
keting tool, their presence also signifi ed  individualism and self-reliance, pre-
senting an American interpretation of  meritocracy as a universal value. This 
double function of American stardom is made clear by the opening of the “We 
Are the World” music  video, consisting of an animated globe showing the USA, 
followed by the signatures of the featured celebrities. These signatures not only 
convey the capital value of pop stardom (signatures of stars are valuable com-
modities in their own right), but also stress the individual commitment of each 
pop star. In this way, the pop stars become ambassadors of American  ideology, 
representing with their star image a globally mediated example of the Ameri-
can star  myth. This does not mean, however, that there is no room for ambi-
guity. Particularly the star images of Michael  Jackson and Bruce  Springsteen 
show that the representation of America and its values can be contradictory, 
yet reaffi rming at the same time.
 As the most successful pop artist of that time and as co-composer of “We 
Are the World,” Michael  Jackson already stood out among his fellow stars. Both 
the song and the music  video, however, reinforce his special position. While 
Lionel  Richie, his co-composer, sings the opening line,  Jackson is the fi rst to 
sing the song’s chorus – by himself. Throughout the music  video, all stars who 
sing solo lines are fi lmed in close-up, the camera moving horizontally from the 
face of one pop star to another. When Michael  Jackson sings his lines, how-
ever, the camera’s horizontal movement is temporarily interrupted, as  Jackson 
is introduced by a tilt shot, with the camera moving vertically from the bot-
tom (a close-up of his feet) to the top (a close-up of his face), similar to the 
conventional way in which the protagonists of classic  Hollywood westerns are 
introduced. As the camera moves over  Jackson’s body, the trademark elements 
of his star image are highlighted: his Bass Weejun shoes and the white sequined 
socks, the matching single white sequined glove, the black and golden jacket, 
and his carefully made-up face. Almost reduced to an iconic fi gure, Michael 
 Jackson can easily be recognized as the greatest pop star. “People will know it’s 
me as soon as they see the socks,” he allegedly exclaimed. “Try taking footage of 
Bruce  Springsteen’s socks and see if anyone knows who they belong to.”11 As the 
behind-the-scenes documentary reveals, both the vocals as well as the visuals 
of Michael  Jackson’s segment were recorded separately, a fact which reinforces 
his special position within USA for  Africa.12 Right after  Jackson’s introduction, 
the camera returns to its horizontal movement with a close-up of Diana  Ross, 
who sings two solo lines before being joined by  Jackson. Singing together “it’s 
28 fabricating the absolute fake
fabricating.indd   28 27-05-2008   16:52:36
true, we’ll make a better day, just you and me,”  Jackson and  Ross appear in split 
screen, emphasizing the similarities in both their vocals and facial features.
 That “We Are the World” explicitly connects Michael  Jackson to Diana 
 Ross is not a coincidence. Back in 1969, as part of the marketing strategy of their 
record label  Motown,  Ross was announced to be the one who had discovered 
the young Michael  Jackson and his brothers, the Jackson  5. The special connec-
tion between  Jackson and  Ross continued to develop, as they were joined in the 
public’s mind through the myth that  Jackson “really” wanted to become Diana 
 Ross, allegedly altering his face by cosmetic surgery to make himself look more 
like her.13 As lead singer of the popular girl group the  Supremes in the 1960s 
and glamorous solo pop star in the 1970s, Diana  Ross became an American 
success story by making a crossover into white American mainstream culture 
and thereby defying the racial barriers that kept African-American artists from 
broad popular acceptance.14 As several scholars have pointed out, Michael  Jack-
son took  Ross’s crossover strategy a step further by not just making a crossover 
into white mainstream culture, but by becoming the greatest American pop 
star of his times, showing that, in spite of racial boundaries, an African-Ameri-
can man could become a major American mainstream pop star.15 During the 
mid-1980s, the powerful image of Michael  Jackson and Diana  Ross together 
was synonymous with black achievement. “Diana and Michael: They are the 
undisputed king and queen of  entertainment,” announced the African-Ameri-
can magazine  Ebony in November 1983, proudly featuring a picture of the two 
stars on its cover.16
 The second USA for  Africa singer that stands out is American rock star 
Bruce  Springsteen. While  Jackson is the fi rst to sing the song’s chorus as solo, 
 Springsteen is the second. Producer Quincy  Jones had asked  Springsteen to 
sing his solo as if he was “a cheerleader of the chorus,” notes David  Breskin, 
who, as reporter of Life  magazine, attended the recording session. “ Springsteen 
sticks his sheet music in his back jeans pocket. His voice is rough, pained, re-
duced to the essence – perfect for this part.”17  Breskin’s description – “rough, 
pained, reduced to the essence” – fi ts the oft-made comment that Bruce  Spring-
steen adds a rock sensibility to “We Are the World,” thereby providing a sense 
of authenticity often associated with rock music to the alleged artifi ciality of 
pop. Following the bubbly vocals of Al  Jarreau,  Springsteen literally breaks into 
the song, both vocally and visually, by stepping into the frame from the back-
ground, singing “we are the world, we are the children” with a raspy voice, his 
head tilted backwards, and his eyes closed. Once the high-pitched pop vocals 
of Kenny  Loggins take over, the rock moment has passed, only to return again 
at nearly the end of the song. For almost a minute of the song’s seven minutes, 
 Springsteen’s solo recording of the chorus is pasted together with Stevie  Won-
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der’s, resulting in a duet, with their voices alternating and echoing each other’s 
lines. The clear distinction between the raspy rock voice of  Springsteen and 
 Wonder’s soulful vocals is repeated in the visual, as they are presented in split 
screen. While the split screen of Michael  Jackson and Diana  Ross emphasizes 
the similarities between the two singers, the split screen of Bruce  Springsteen 
and Stevie  Wonder places  Springsteen’s white rock in juxtaposition to  Wonder’s 
black soul. Moreover, the face of  Springsteen is presented in extreme close-up, 
fi lling the left side of the screen with whiteness, thereby suggesting that  Spring-
steen not only represents the rock sensibility, but also white American culture 
in general. As a result, the rigid distinction between whiteness and blackness 
seems to symbolize the united effort of USA for Africa, showing that white and 
black can work together to achieve a common goal.
 Here the difference between the star images of Michael  Jackson and Bruce 
 Springsteen comes to the foreground. In the academic literature,  Jackson tends 
to be perceived as a performer who challenges the boundaries of race, gen-
der, and sexuality.18 Kobena  Mercer, for example, argues that “neither child nor 
adult, nor clearly either black or white, and with an androgynous image that 
is neither masculine nor feminine,  Jackson’s star image is a ‘social hieroglyph’ 
as  Marx said of the commodity form, which demands, yet defi es, decoding.”19 
The star image of Bruce  Springsteen, on the contrary, tends to be perceived 
as reinforcing the boundaries of race, gender, and sexuality. Comparing him 
to Ronald  Reagan and  Rambo, Bryan  Garman suggests that “the apparently 
working-class  Springsteen was for many Americans a white hard-body hero 
whose masculinity confi rmed the values of patriarchy and  patriotism, the work 
ethic and rugged  individualism, and who clearly demarcated the boundaries 
between men and women, black and white, heterosexual and homosexual.”20 
Applied to “We Are the World,”  Jackson embodies the crossover American 
 Dream, presenting America as a land where individuals can make their dreams 
come true regardless of their social, racial, or gendered backgrounds, while 
 Springsteen embodies a nostalgic America, based on traditional values, or, as 
Gareth  Palmer has stated, “ Springsteen’s America is a conservative land where 
the [white male] heroes struggle to understand the limits of their horizons but 
can see little beyond them.”21
 Whether Bruce  Springsteen’s embodiment of a nostalgic America should 
be perceived as a sign of  patriotism or instead as a criticism of the nation-
state  USA has been a topic of heated debate among fans, rock journalists, and 
academic scholars, revealing the ambiguity of his star image. Particularly his 
album Born in the  USA could be misinterpreted as a tribute to the nation-state 
 USA. Although most lyrics of the album’s songs are critical of the social, eco-
nomic, and political situation in 1980s America, Born in the USA presents Bruce 
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 Springsteen as a relic of Americana, using the red-white-and-blue signs of the 
American  fl ag, blue  jeans,  baseball, and the hometown to evoke a nostalgic 
image of those “glory days” in small-town America. The album’s promotional 
photographs show him posing in front of an enormous American fl ag (remi-
niscent of the famous image of General Patton), wearing the “uniform” of the 
white working-class male: tight-fi tting blue  jeans and white T-shirt, showing 
off his muscular biceps. The Born in the USA album cover features a close-up 
of his backside in blue  jeans, with a red  baseball cap nonchalantly dangling 
from his right back pocket. This imagery of Americana, including the Ameri-
can fl ag as backdrop, was repeated in the live performances of  Springsteen’s 
Born in the USA world tour of 1984-1985.22 The album’s title song, “Born in the 
USA,” contains a similar ambiguity. While the song’s verses tell the grim story 
of an unemployed  Vietnam veteran, the chorus consists of a patriotic chant 
of the song’s title, raising the question of how the song should be interpreted. 
“Was the song part of a patriotic revival or a tale of working-class betrayal? 
A symptom of  Reagan’s America or antidote to it? Protest song or national 
anthem?”23 As is often the case with up-tempo rock songs, the music tends to 
overpower the lyrics. That many youngsters (including myself as teenager back 
in 1984) perceived “Born in the USA” as a celebration of America rather than a 
critical commentary is therefore not surprising.24
 One year before the recording of USA for  Africa’s “We Are the World,” 
the star images of both Michael  Jackson and Bruce  Springsteen were appropri-
ated by the administration of President Ronald  Reagan. On May 14, 1984,  Jack-
son visited the White  House to receive an award as part of the National Cam-
paign Against Teenage Drunk Driving, which used the music of his hit song 
“Beat It” in one of its public service announcements. The highly publicized 
ceremony consisted of President  Reagan honoring “one of the most talented, 
most popular, and most exciting superstars in the music world today,” praising 
 Jackson’s “years of hard work, energy, tireless dedication, and a wealth of talent 
that keeps on growing,” and concluding that his “success is an American dream 
come true.”25 That he was invited to attend a racially “neutral” occasion rather 
than a specifi c African-American cause (as is often the case with other Afri-
can-American artists who are invited to the White House) shows that Michael 
 Jackson had come to symbolize a multicultural America and that his star  myth 
transcended racial categories. Four months later, on September 19, President 
 Reagan referred to Bruce  Springsteen at a  Reagan- Bush presidential elections 
campaign rally in New Jersey: “America’s future rests in a thousand dreams 
inside your hearts. It rests in the message of hope in songs of a man so many 
young Americans admire – New Jersey’s own, Bruce  Springsteen. And help-
ing you make those dreams come true is what this job of mine is all about.”26 
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Unlike  Jackson, Bruce  Springsteen did not appreciate the presidential endorse-
ment and he publicly distanced himself from the  Reagan administration and its 
conservative policy of Reaganomics. Yet, in spite of his critical stance,  Spring-
steen’s ambiguous star image could nonetheless easily be incorporated within 
President  Reagan’s patriotic rhetoric.
 Although they embody different Americas, both Michael  Jackson and 
Bruce  Springsteen could be turned into symbols of the American  Dream, as 
 Reagan’s speeches reveal. One can argue that  Reagan’s political rhetoric consists 
of hollow words, based on clichés such as “making your dreams come true,” 
one which the president used on both occasions. The rhetoric works, how-
ever, because  Jackson and  Springsteen did make their own dreams come true 
by becoming superstars, thereby reinforcing the star  myth and the American 
Dream. In that sense, the way the  Reagan administration uses the star images 
of  Jackson and  Springsteen does not differ from the way USA for  Africa uses 
them. Moreover, the shared optimism based on these myths of  meritocracy, 
together with a shared belief in the promise of a better future, suggests that 
President  Reagan’s political rhetoric is actually quite similar to USA for Africa’s 
message of human  universalism. That such American rhetoric also befi tted the 
language of global mass  advertising will be discussed below.
The  Pepsi and Coca -Colonization of the World
Twenty years after USA for  Africa, one of its prominent singers made a startling 
revelation that quickly spread across the internet. “I remember most of us who 
were there didn’t like the song, but nobody would say so,” Billy  Joel told Rolling 
 Stone  magazine. “I think Cyndi  Lauper leaned over to me and said, ‘It sounds 
like a  Pepsi commercial.’ And I didn’t disagree.”27 Perhaps Cyndi  Lauper did 
make such a comparison, but  Joel also might have read Greil  Marcus’s fre-
quently cited essay “Number One with a Bullet,” originally published in  Artfo-
rum (May 1985). In his essay,  Marcus not only argues that “We Are the World” 
celebrates American pop celebrity instead of addressing the political reality of 
the African famine, but he also shows that the charity pop single, intentionally 
or not, is intertwined with the global marketing of American corporations. 
As  Marcus points out, at the time “We Are the World” was being composed, 
its two songwriters, Michael  Jackson and Lionel  Richie, were both starring in 
their own Pepsi commercials: the one of  Jackson premiered during the annual 
 television broadcast of the Grammy  Awards in 1984 and the one of  Richie at 
the same event a year later. Coincidentally, “We Are the World” does sound like 
a Pepsi commercial, particularly the oft-repeated line “there’s a choice we’re 
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making,” which echoes the 1980s trademarked Pepsi slogan “The Choice of 
a New Generation.” The choice that USA for Africa makes thus may not be a 
commitment to fi ght famine in Africa, but rather a preference for Pepsi over its 
main competitor Coca- Cola. As  Marcus writes:
As pop music, “We Are the World” says less about Ethiopia than it does 
about  Pepsi – and the true result will likely be less that certain Ethiopian 
individuals will live, or anyway live a little bit longer than they otherwise 
would have, than that Pepsi will get the catchphrase of its  advertising 
campaign sung for free by Ray  Charles, Stevie  Wonder, Bruce  Spring-
steen, and the rest. But that is only the short-term, subliminal way of 
looking at it. In the long-view, real-life way of looking at it, in terms of 
pop geopolitical economics, those Ethiopians who survive may end up 
not merely alive, but drinking Pepsi instead of Coke.28
Marcus’s observation becomes even more poignant by the fact that initially 
the line was “there’s a chance we’re taking” instead of “there’s a choice we’re 
making.” As the behind-the-scenes documentary We Are the World: The Story 
Behind the Song shows, the line was changed during the recording of the demo 
version. Producer Quincy  Jones suggested the change: “One thing we don’t 
want to do, especially with this group, is look like we’re patting ourselves on 
our back. So it’s really, ‘There’s a choice we’re making’.”29 In an ironic twist of 
fate, the producer’s attempt to make the stars of USA for  Africa appear less self-
indulgent resulted in the endorsement of an American soft drink instead.
 Without downplaying the signifi cance of  Marcus’s observation, the fo-
cus on how “We Are the World” seems to promote  Pepsi rather than Coca- Cola 
ignores the fact that, within a global market, both brands signify an imagined 
 America, in uncannily similar ways. Whether “We Are the World” is a com-
mercial for Pepsi or for Coca-Cola is actually irrelevant, as the song shares the 
American-dominated consumer discourse of both. In its rhetorical and emo-
tional content, for example, USA for  Africa’s “We Are the World” is quite similar 
to the popular 1971 “Hilltop” Coca-Cola  commercial. This famous commercial 
features a multiethnic group of smiling youngsters on an Italian hillside, lip-
synching to the words of “I’d Like to Teach the World to Sing,” a hit song by the 
New  Seekers.30 Like USA for Africa, the commercial promotes a human  univer-
salism by suggesting that the world can be taught “to sing in perfect harmony,” 
only to be followed by “I’d like to buy the world a Coke and keep it company.” 
Moreover, “We Are the World” and “I’d Like to Teach the World to Sing” share 
the American value of  individualism within a free market economy, as both 
emphasize the importance of individual agency and also promote human  uni-
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versalism through the act of consumption. The only difference seems to be in 
the explicitness of the message. While, as Greil  Marcus has shown, “We Are the 
World” can only implicitly suggest that Pepsi can make the world a better place, 
the message of the “Hilltop” Coca-Cola commercial is straightforward: “Coke 
is what the world wants today.”
 That the connection between “We Are the World” and the “Hilltop” 
Coca- Cola commercial is not just an arbitrary association made by myself is 
shown by the fact that these two pop-cultural artifacts often tend to be con-
fused. A quick internet search produces three random yet relevant examples 
of the way “We Are the World” is connected to the “Hilltop” Coca-Cola  com-
mercial. First, when in 1997 Jane  Fonda’s husband Ted  Turner, founder and 
former president of the Cable News Network ( CNN), announced to  CNN’s 
Larry King that he was planning to donate one billion dollars to the United Na-
tions, he motivated his decision by stating: “I love that Coca-Cola commercial 
where they all, the kids got on the mountaintop and sang, ‘We are the World.’ I 
like that.”31 Second, the Australian academic Paul Duncum starts his article on 
 globalization with the statement that “Coca-Cola advertisements with young 
people from various nations singing ‘We are the World’ highlight the sense that 
we are now all interdependent.”32 Third, describing the global aspirations of 
the 2004  Olympic Games, National Review  sports columnist Geoffrey Norman 
exclaimed that “We can all drink a Coca-Cola (or is it a  Pepsi?) and sing ‘We are 
the world; we are the people’.”33 These three completely different examples not 
only show that USA for  Africa’s message of human  universalism has become 
indistinguishable from the commercial rhetoric of American-style yet globally 
mediated soft-drink  advertising (promoting both Pepsi and Coca-Cola), but 
also suggest that its American character has indeed come to be perceived as 
universal, shared across the globe.
  “We Are the World” has been compared to Coca- Cola commercials in 
the academic literature as well. In her book Primitive Art in Civilized Places, 
cultural anthropologist Sally  Price argues that the rhetoric of Coca-Cola and 
“We Are the World” expresses an intrinsically western perspective on  globali-
zation. As  Price shows, Coca-Cola commercials present “a many-shaded sea of 
faces, all smiling, and united by their human warmth and shared appreciation 
of the good things in life, including Coke,” which is an expression of multi-
cultural and – seemingly – universal happiness that turns out to be remark-
ably similar to the “brotherly smiles” and “phenotypic diversity” of “We Are 
the World.”34 The act of presenting such an American-style happy  multicultur-
alism (or “ multiculturalism lite”) as a universally shared global value is aptly 
captured by the term Coca- Colonization, a phrase which was initially coined 
during the 1950s French Coca-Cola debates, used to denounce the growing 
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import of American consumer goods that allegedly threatened French national 
culture.35 Coca-Colonization not only implies that the process of  Americaniza-
tion is indeed a form of cultural  imperialism resulting in a homogeneous glo-
bal pop  culture, but also (and more importantly) that such a process is based 
on a paternalistic discourse which tends to reduce its global subjects to a state 
of childlike innocence and pleasure. We are not just the world but, as the cho-
rus of USA for  Africa tells us, also its children, who cannot help but love that 
refreshing taste of Coca-Cola, while saving the world by buying a cheerful pop 
tune performed by our favorite superstars. I deliberately defi ne “us” – consum-
ers of this Coca-Cola and “We Are the World” rhetoric – as its global subjects, 
as the not (yet) consuming Ethiopians obviously are not (yet) included within 
its commercial ideal of human  universalism, or, as Sally  Price rightfully ob-
serves, “The ‘equality’ accorded to non-Westerners … is not a natural refl ection 
of human equivalence, but rather the result of Western benevolence,” of which 
USA for Africa’s “We Are the World” is a telling example.36
 By labeling the multicultural rhetoric of Coca- Cola and “We Are the 
World” as an example of Coca- Colonization, I echo the perspective of  Ameri-
canization as passive cultural  imperialism, suggesting that American pop-
cultural consumer products that are marketed as universal embodiments of 
American values like  freedom and  democracy are passively perceived and con-
sumed as such. Yet, to stay with the example of Coca-Cola, several scholars 
correctly have pointed out that Coca-Cola does not contain the same sym-
bolic value for all people around the world, but instead is actively appropri-
ated within national and local contexts, its possible meanings changing from 
place to place and over time.37 Coca-Cola often is creolized, resulting in hybrid 
forms, mixed both fi guratively (with local myths and superstitions) and liter-
ally (with local drinks like rum or beer). Writing from a historical Cold  War 
perspective, Richard  Pells addresses the difference between the way Coca-Cola 
was introduced and received in western Europe, immediately after World War 
II, and in eastern Europe, after the collapse of  communism in 1989. In many 
western European countries, Coca-Cola was introduced along with the Ameri-
can military presence, symbolizing both the seductiveness of American pop 
culture as well as the American cultural and economic dominance. In eastern 
Europe, on the contrary, Coca-Cola tended to be seen as the symbol of western 
 capitalism and economic progress, a welcome alternative to the ineffi ciency of 
the Soviet-dominated economies.38 Recently, the symbolic value of Coca-Cola 
as the emblem of the capitalist triumph over  communism seems to be decreas-
ing in some eastern European countries, or at least that is suggested by the re-
newed popularity of imitation Coca-Cola brands such as Polo-Cofta in Poland 
and Kofola in the Czech Republic, both former communist soft drinks that are 
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now marketed as trendy nostalgia.39 A more explicitly anti-American political 
challenge to Coca-Colonization has been the highly publicized introduction 
of the “counter-cola” soft drink Mecca- Cola in 2002, a clear case of trying to 
beat the enemy at his own game, as the Arabic imitation of Coca-Cola not only 
copies the actual soft drink, but also its global marketing strategies to promote 
Mecca-Cola’s explicit message of anti-capitalist and pro-Palestinian resistance 
through the act of consumption.40
 While the signifi cance of the creolization and active  appropriation of 
pop culture on national and local levels should not be underestimated, as the 
above examples make perfectly clear, the powerful rhetoric of American pop-
cultural products such as Coca- Cola and USA for  Africa’s “We Are the World” 
on a global level should not be ignored either. The fact that Coca-Cola and 
similar American consumer products can (and have been) perceived differ-
ently around the world, obtaining symbolic values which its manufacturers 
never intended or considered, does not alter the striking resemblance in the 
way these products are globally marketed, heavily invested with American val-
ues and ideology. Writing about the western European perception of Coca-
Cola, Richard  Pells has suggested that the ideological implications of the soft 
drink should not be taken too seriously: “Still, the acceptance of Coca-Cola did 
not mean that Europeans were becoming more ‘Americanized’ or that they had 
abandoned beer and wine. Coke, after all, was a soft drink, not a foreign ideol-
ogy. One could swallow it without giving up one’s cultural loyalties or sense of 
national identity.”41
 Undoubtedly unintended, with this statement  Pells reveals two reasons 
that can explain the rhetorical strength of Coca-Cola and, in extension, USA 
for Africa’s “We Are the World.” First, Coca-Cola effectively functions as a car-
rier of American values and ideology because it is “just a soft drink,” like “We 
Are the World” is “just a charity pop song” (and  Hollywood “just an enter-
taining movie”). I am not suggesting that these pop-cultural artifacts contain 
hidden ideologies or disseminate subliminal messages; quite on the contrary, 
both Coca-Cola and “We Are the World” show that their ideological content 
is rather obvious. However, that pop-cultural artifacts are being produced, 
marketed, and consumed as pleasurable experiences just makes it more easy to 
take their ideological content for granted. Second, Coca-Cola effectively func-
tions as a carrier of American values and ideology because it is not presented 
as “a foreign ideology” (as  Pells rightly notes), and indeed does not replace 
“cultural loyalties or sense[s] of national identity.” Instead, and again like “We 
Are the World,” Coca-Cola presents its “foreign” ideology as a universal one, 
promoting an American interpretation of values like  freedom,  democracy, and 
individual agency, all within a free market economy, as the shared values of 
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global  multiculturalism and human  universalism. Ironically, the notion that 
“we” are not subjecting ourselves passively to the American values promoted 
by Coca-Cola,  Pepsi, and “We Are the World,” but instead actively appropri-
ate these pop-cultural products, reinforces rather than undermines the glo-
bal dominance of the American  ideology of  freedom and individual agency, as 
merely the suggestion that “there’s a choice we’re making” befi ts its American 
rhetoric.
USA for America
On April 23, 1985, at a ceremony honoring the American Peace Corps, Presi-
dent Ronald  Reagan proudly announced: “Today, every few minutes on the 
radio, you can hear the stars of rock, soul, and country music who came to-
gether as ‘USA for  Africa,’ singing the chorus of ‘We Are the World,’ America’s 
recent number-one song hit. Every time a record is sold, more money is raised 
for African famine relief.”42  Reagan failed to mention that “We Are the World” 
also was an international bestseller, topping the pop charts in many countries 
outside of the USA. Three weeks earlier, on April 5, Good Friday (emphasizing 
the song’s being a predominantly Christian act of benevolence), USA for Af-
rica had been launched as a worldwide media event, when “We Are the World” 
premiered simultaneously on more than 5,000 radio stations around the globe. 
 Reagan also failed to mention that “every few minutes on the radio” the world 
was subjected to an American  ideology, promoting  freedom,  democracy, and 
 individualism, although the American president undoubtedly supported its 
message, hence his reference to “We Are the World” at a ceremony honoring 
the American Peace Corps. In addition, by mentioning both the song’s omni-
presence in the media as well as its commercial success,  Reagan revealed that 
the USA for Africa hit single is most of all a bestselling consumer product, 
showing that within the capitalist free market economy, even the act of charity 
can be marketed and sold.
 Now more than twenty years after Band  Aid, USA for  Africa, and Live  Aid 
(the live concert organized by Band Aid’s Bob  Geldof, broadcast globally on 
July 13, 1985), not much has changed in the geopolitical situation. Even if the 
profi ts of these events have provided some relief to the Ethiopian population 
back in 1985, no structural solutions have been found to fi ght – let alone end 
– famine in Africa.43 In 2005, Bob  Geldof organized Live 8, another worldwide 
pop concert bringing together superstars to raise western awareness of glo-
bal inequality. In the meantime, “We Are the World” has become a pop classic 
which continues to be played on the radio and on music  television. During the 
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spring of 2006, when I was writing this chapter, I unexpectedly encountered 
“We Are the World” in different places around Europe, including as back-
ground music to my workout at the Gold’s Gym in Berlin, at my offi ce at the 
University of Amsterdam where the song (played on the radio of the construc-
tion workers outside) came blasting through the window, and at the airport 
of Larnaca, Cyprus, where I arrived to attend the European Association for 
American Studies conference. Listening to the song in these different contexts 
made me realize that its original message about Africa has disappeared. “We 
Are the World” has been reduced to a golden oldie, one of those relentlessly 
repeated classic pop songs that evoke feelings of nostalgia to the times when 
they were hits. However, its message of global  multiculturalism and human 
 universalism is still present, even though its constant repetition has made “We 
Are the World” even more clichéd than it was back in 1985.
 That ultimately USA for  Africa is not about Africa but instead celebrates 
“America” – both the nation-state  USA as well as an imagined  America – as the 
embodiment of  multiculturalism and human  universalism was made obvious 
on January 17, 1993, when “We Are the World” was performed as the grand 
fi nale of the American Reunion concert, in honor of the fi rst inauguration of 
President Bill  Clinton. Produced by USA for Africa’s Quincy  Jones, the concert 
starred Ray  Charles singing “America the Beautiful,” Diana  Ross singing “God 
Bless America,” Aretha  Franklin singing “Someday We’ll All Be Free” and “Re-
spect,” and Kathleen  Battle singing “We Shall Overcome,” the anthem of the 
civil rights  movement. Performed in front of the monumental Lincoln Memo-
rial (a site which not only symbolizes the nation-state  USA, but the civil rights 
 movement as well), the concert was a celebration of a multicultural America, 
as was underlined by the prominent presence of African-American singers and 
the choice of repertoire.44 In the same spirit, Diana  Ross subsequently led an 
all-star choir in the singing of “We Are the World.” With only a few of the origi-
nal pop stars present (including Kenny  Rogers, James  Ingram, and Stevie  Won-
der), the USA for Africa singers were joined by, among others, Debbie  Gibson, 
Kathleen  Battle, Aretha  Franklin, Ashford &  Simpson, and Michael  Bolton. 
Emphasizing the song’s  multiculturalism, a few lines were sung in Spanish. 
Whereas Bruce  Springsteen was conspicuously absent, Michael  Jackson made 
a grand entrance at the same moment as in the music  video, this time accom-
panied by a children’s choir. At the end of the song, Diana  Ross welcomed 
President  Clinton and his family on stage to sing along with the stars: “We are 
the world, we are the children.”
 At fi rst glance, the inclusion of USA for  Africa’s “We Are the World” in 
the celebration of President Bill  Clinton’s inauguration seems commonsensi-
cal. Being the fi rst president of the baby boom generation,  Clinton already was 
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associated with American “youth” pop culture, an image which not only had 
been promoted by him playing the saxophone on The Arsenio Hall  Show, but 
also by the theme song of his presidential campaign: Fleetwood  Mac’s “Don’t 
Stop [Thinking about Tomorrow].” Moreover, after twelve years of Republican 
conservative politics, the election of the Democratic President  Clinton sug-
gested a revival of liberalism and an optimistic future – a multicultural prom-
ise reminiscent of “We Are the World” that was captured by Maya  Angelou 
when she read her poem “On the Pulse of the Morning” at the inauguration 
ceremony. On second thought, however, the inclusion of USA for Africa in an 
offi cial celebration of a new American president, televised worldwide, is at least 
problematic. Not only has Africa disappeared from the picture, but, performed 
within this context, “We Are the World” becomes a patriotic national anthem 
that promotes imperialism. Hypothetically, if sung to honor any other grand 
nation (China, France, Germany, Russia), celebrating its leadership by proudly 
exclaiming that “they” are the world, such a performance could easily be per-
ceived as – potentially dangerous – propaganda. The fact that the song could 
be performed at President  Clinton’s inauguration without causing any major 
concern internationally suggests that USA for Africa’s “We Are the World” in-
deed has come to be accepted globally as being “universal.” While the song’s 
performance at the inauguration does celebrate Americanness, its explicit na-
tionalist character is mystifi ed by its implicit  universalism.
Conclusion: An American Conception of the World
Even after two decades, USA for  Africa’s “We Are the World” continues to pro-
vide an illustrative example of how  Americanization can function on a global 
level. Rather than transforming the world into another USA, thereby replacing 
national, local, and regional cultures, American pop culture presents itself, us-
ing the commercial rhetoric of  advertising, as being universal, while being (to 
cite Stuart  Hall) “essentially an American conception of the world.”45 Whether 
the global omnipresence of American pop culture is passively consumed, ac-
tively appropriated, or even not recognized as being American at all, does not 
alter the way American pop culture promotes its American conception of the 
world as an assumed self-evident ideal of human  universalism. To recognize 
its American character remains signifi cant not so much to prove its Ameri-
canness, but instead to challenge its claim of being universal, as the human 
 universalism presented by American pop-cultural artifacts such as Coca- Cola 
and “We Are the World” tends to depoliticize global politics by reducing social 
economic and political issues (like famine and poverty in Africa) to a personal 
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matter of individual choice. As I have suggested, USA for Africa’s “We Are the 
World” does so in three ways. First, in contrast to Band  Aid’s “Do They Know 
It’s  Christmas? ,” USA for Africa presents a happy world of global  multicultur-
alism, in which “we” are all equal and united by diversity, rather than being 
divided by global inequality. Second, by its exclusive focus on American super-
stars, USA for Africa invests its ideal of global human  universalism with the star 
 myth and the American  Dream, both based on a belief in  meritocracy which 
promotes individual agency and self-reliance. Third, USA for Africa’s message 
of global  multiculturalism and human  universalism is presented using the 
commercial rhetoric of mass  advertising, similar to  Pepsi and especially Coca-
Cola commercials, thereby not only turning the act of benevolence into an act 
of consumption, but also suggesting that world citizenship can be reduced to 
global  consumerism within a free market economy. Here I should emphasize 
that “We Are the World” does present a conception rather than a construction 
of the world, one which can be contested, resisted, or interpreted differently. 
Its power, however, rests in its being a highly entertaining, star-studded, and 
pleasurable pop song, which has been broadcast repeatedly around the globe 
and which fi ts within a broader American-style commercial discourse that 
tends to dominate in the processes of Americanization and  globalization.
  The double bind of Americanness and self-acclaimed  universalism makes 
USA for  Africa’s “We Are the World” exemplary of the American dominance 
in global pop  culture. American pop culture has the capacity to be produced, 
sold, and consumed as being universal, assumed to represent the human expe-
rience in general without being culturally specifi c or bound by national geog-
raphy, even when, and often especially when, its Americanness is made explicit. 
Referring to  Hollywood cinema, Thomas  Elsaesser has called this capacity “an 
engine of global  hegemony,” claiming not only that Hollywood successfully 
presents the American conceptions of  freedom,  democracy, and a free market 
economy as universal values, but also that these values “have, until the end of 
the last century, been widely endorsed and aspired to by people who neither 
share territorial proximity with the United States nor language, faith, customs, 
or a common history.”46 As I have suggested with this chapter, the same can be 
said about American pop culture at large. USA for Africa’s “We Are the World” 
is of course merely a small part of this engine of global  hegemony, but as long 
as we uncritically sing along with the cheery pop tune every time it’s played on 
the radio, eventually we may fi nd “our” world reduced to its American com-
mercial conception.
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Chapter Two:
The  Oprahifi cation of 9/ 11:
America as Imagined Community
On September  11 and 12, 2001, for the fi rst time in its fi fteen-year’ run, The 
Oprah Winfrey  Show was cancelled. The talk  show resumed its daily broad-
cast on September 13 with an episode aptly entitled “America under Attack,” 
which was repeated the next day. The cancellation of Oprah! (as the talk  show is 
most commonly referred to) fi t the state of confusion that American  television 
found itself in right after the terrorist attacks. On the one hand, 9/ 11 was a  tel-
evision event. From the moment the fi rst plane hit the Twin  Towers, millions of 
viewers around the world stayed glued to their  television sets to capture the lat-
est news and to relive the moment again and again. Yet, on the other hand, the 
fl ow of American  television had been interrupted, as its regular programming 
was replaced by nonstop commercial-free news coverage and other “appropri-
ate” content. As Lynn  Spigel has shown, American  television needed just a lit-
tle time to regain its balance between public service and commercial interest, 
quickly returning to the programming that “channeled the nation back to nor-
malcy – or at least to the normal fl ows of  television and commercial culture.”1 
Within two weeks after 9/11, Oprah! too returned to normalcy, with an episode 
of “Oprah’s Book  Club” (24 September 2001) and, four days later, an episode 
on “What Parents Should Know about Ecstasy” (28 September 2001). 
 In this chapter, I will discuss how The Oprah Winfrey  Show presented 
the aftermath of 9/ 11 and the pending war in  Iraq in its episodes. In addition, 
I will analyze two special episodes of the drama series The West  Wing and Ally 
 McBeal, which both explicitly comment on 9/11. These  television shows are 
signifi cant, as they all contribute to the American public debate and present 
“America” as an imagined  community (to use Benedict  Anderson’s concept). 
Although belonging to different genres, namely the daytime talk  show and the 
fi ctional drama series, they share the quality of presenting a more personalized 
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and dramatized account of 9/11, in contrast to the (arguably) factual accounts 
by the conventional news programs. While often considered “only  entertain-
ment” by many, these  television shows enable viewers at home to make sense 
of 9/11 by making a connection to their own daily lives. In addition, the shows 
are watched by millions of viewers outside of the USA. Oprah! is broadcast 
daily in 132 countries around the world, making  Oprah Winfrey arguably one 
of the most infl uential Americans in global media culture.2 The popular drama 
series The West  Wing and Ally  McBeal are not only broadcast on international 
 television, they are also commercially available, and bestsellers, on DVD in 
many countries. In this way, these  television shows help to shape the way non-
Americans view “America” as both a nation-state and an imagined  community, 
specifi cally by representing how the USA deals with the tragedy of 9/11, the 
War on  Terror, and the war in  Iraq.3
America as Imagined Community
To make a distinction between the nation-state  USA on the one hand and an 
imagined  America on the other, Benedict  Anderson’s concept of imagined 
 community proves to be helpful.  Anderson defi nes the nation as “an imag-
ined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sov-
ereign.”4 Since the citizens of a nation cannot know each other individually, an 
imagined  community is created through shared notions of nationhood and 
belonging, using different media (in  Anderson’s historical case study of what 
would become Indonesia, newspapers and novels) to construct a collective na-
tional identity. The imagined  community is limited to exclude those beyond 
the boundaries of the nation and to distinguish one nation from others. The 
nation is imagined as a sovereign state to enable a shared identity among free 
citizens, rather than among subjects to a divine ruler. Most importantly, the 
nation is “imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality 
and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a 
deep, horizontal comradeship.”5 As a result, the collective national identity not 
only transcends identities based on class, race, gender, religion, and sexuality, 
but also conceals the inequality of power that exists between these different 
identities.
 Thomas  Elsaesser has rightfully argued that, in media studies,  Ander-
son’s concept of imagined  community has been applied too easily, providing a 
quick answer to a set of complex and historically specifi c questions.6  Anderson 
spoke of the creation of a future nation-state in colonial times, constructed by 
printed media such as newspapers and novels. In media studies, the concept of 
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imagined  community is most often applied to well-developed nation-states, 
in modern and postmodern times, focusing on fi lm and  television, which are 
audiovisual media that function quite differently than the printed media. To 
assume unquestionably that fi lm and  television construct – or maintain the 
construction of – the nation-state is at least problematic. As  Elsaesser ques-
tions: “Do cinema and  television help foster identities and feelings of belong-
ing, or are they merely parasitic on existing values and attitudes, even under-
cutting them by playing with their visual and verbal representations, as sug-
gested by postmodern  pastiche?”7 In other words, rather than constructing the 
nation-state, fi lm and  television are part of an audiovisual media culture which 
continuously appropriates and reinvents, while at the same time reinforcing 
and undermining, preexisting notions of belonging to a national identity. This 
point becomes even more pertinent when applied to the nation-state  USA as 
an imagined  community, as the mediated representations of America are re-
cycled and reinterpreted on a global level, by both Americans as well as non-
Americans. If “America” is based on allegedly universal values, as the previous 
chapter suggests, who actually belongs to this American imagined  community? 
Are non-Americans part of “America” as well? 
 Rather than to the nation-state  USA,  Anderson’s concept of imagined 
 community should be applied to an America that goes beyond the geographi-
cal boundaries of the nation-state, one that is not so much constructed by, 
but most of all continuously reinvented through, audiovisual representations 
in pop culture, specifi cally  Hollywood fi lm and  television. It is not in spite of, 
but because this reinvention of America is based on recycled and even clichéd 
representations, that the concept of imagined  community becomes an effective 
tool to analyze these representations. These preexisting values, connotations, 
and images of an imagined  America came explicitly to the foreground after the 
terrorist attacks of September  11, 2001. Not the nation-state  USA but “Amer-
ica” was under attack, prompting, among others, Jean-Marie  Colombani, edi-
tor-in-chief of the French newspaper Le  Monde, to boldly declare that “nous 
sommes tous américains” (we are all Americans).8 The terrorist attacks and their 
aftermath became marked by the term “9/ 11,” which attained, as Dana  Heller 
points out in her introduction to The Selling of 9/11, “the cultural function of a 
trademark, one that symbolizes a new kind of national identifi cation – or na-
tional branding awareness.”9 However, unlike  Heller suggests, the identifi cation 
with “America” that came to be marked by “9/11” was actually not that new, but 
rather based on a rhetoric of American  exceptionalism that is easily recog-
nized, by Americans and non-Americans alike. “9/11” as trademark presents an 
America reduced to clichéd representations in audiovisual media culture, often 
referring to assumed self-evident notions and values such as Manifest  Destiny 
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and the American  Dream, and also to familiar artifacts of pop culture, such 
as Irvin  Berlin’s “God Bless America” and Norman  Rockwell’s iconic paint-
ings that visualize President Franklin D.  Roosevelt’s Four  Freedoms.10 Tellingly, 
Berlin’s “God Bless America” was the most frequently performed song immedi-
ately after 9/11, including by both Republican and Democratic members of the 
American Congress who, the very next day, sang the alternative national an-
them on the steps of the Capital building (televised around the world), and, on 
September 21, 2001, by Canadian-born singer Celine  Dion as part of the star-
studded America: A Tribute to the Heroes telethon, and, also on September 21, 
2001, by African-American pop diva Diana  Ross at the fi rst Mets  baseball game 
played in New York City since 9/11. The preference for “God Bless America” 
over “The Star-Spangled Banner,” the offi cial national anthem, suggests that 
not so much the nation-state  USA but “America” was perceived to be under 
attack and in need of defending by rearticulating the values of  freedom and 
 democracy that “America” self-evidently embodied.
 American pop culture responded to 9/ 11 in two distinctively different, 
yet related ways. On the one hand, American pop culture took on the tough pa-
triotic stance of the “Angry American” who was going to teach those terrorists a 
lesson, a masculine rhetoric strongly present on the  Fox News Network and ar-
guably initiated by President George W.  Bush when he described the American 
response to the terrorist attacks as if it were a  Hollywood western, starring the 
USA as John  Wayne: “[The terrorists] will try to hide, they will try to avoid the 
United States and our allies – but we’re not going to let them. They run to the 
hills; they fi nd holes to get in. And we will do whatever it takes to smoke them 
out and get them running, and we’ll get them.”11 Popular country songs such as 
Toby  Keith’s “Courtesy of the Red, White, and Blue” echo  Bush’s cowboy rheto-
ric, warning the terrorists that “You’ll be sorry that you messed with the US of 
A / ’Cause we’ll put a boot in your ass / It’s the American way,” which prompted 
William  Hart to note that many 9/11 country songs use “the threat of forcible 
sodomy as the nation’s preferred method of payback.”12 That such a sexualized 
and gendered (not to mention homophobic) threat was expressed not only in 
country songs has been observed by Jasbir  Puar and Amit  Rai: “Posters that 
appeared in midtown Manhattan only days after the attacks show a turbaned 
caricature of [Osama] bin  Laden being anally penetrated by the Empire State 
building. The legend beneath reads, ‘The Empire Strikes Back’ or ‘So you like 
skyscrapers, huh, bitch?’”13 The expression of a possible American military re-
taliation in the language of American pop culture, whether exclaimed by the 
president, country singers, or anonymous street posters, reveals that there re-
mains a connection between the nation-state  USA and an imagined  America 
inspired by Hollywood and  television.
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 On the other hand, however, American pop culture also took on an al-
most naïve stance of innocence, expressed by President  Bush in his televised 
address to the American Congress: “Americans are asking, why do they hate 
us?”14 This innocent stance is possible, as the “us” does not so much refer to 
the USA as an imperialist nation-state active in international politics, but to 
America as the Land of Freedom and  Opportunity – thus not the nation-state 
 USA but America as imagined  community. In other words, the question that 
“Americans are asking” is based on a strong belief in American  ideology: “[If 
America symbolizes individual  freedom and  democracy, which supposedly are 
universal values shared globally,] why do they hate us?” Subsequently, rather 
than questioning American ideology, American pop culture ended up reinforc-
ing this ideological image of America. One signifi cant example, also given by 
Lynn  Spigel, is the twice-postponed broadcast of the annual Emmy  Awards of 
November 4, 2001. Hosted by the most famous lesbian of American  television, 
Ellen  Degeneres (who quipped, “What would bug the  Taliban more than see-
ing a gay woman in a suit surrounded by Jews?”), its opening sequence showed 
the iconic images of “America,” including the American  fl ag and the Statue of 
Liberty, with a soft female voiceover announcing: “Tonight  television speaks to 
a global audience as we show the world images of an annual celebration. Our 
presence here tonight does more than honor an industry, it honors freedoms 
that set us apart as a nation and a people.”15 Here the double bind of American-
ness and self-acclaimed  universalism becomes visible. While the annual Emmy 
 Awards is an event organized by the American  television industry to promote its 
own programs and stars, a global audience is assumed, which is then subjected 
to a conception of “ freedom” (not only embodied by the American iconogra-
phy, but also by Ellen  Degeneres as a gay woman and by the  television programs 
honored) that is perceived as being universal yet, at the same time, exceptionally 
 American, “set[ting] us apart as a nation and a people.”
 By suggesting that American pop culture celebrates an imagined  Amer-
ica instead of the nation-state  USA, I do not imply that the nation-state is 
completely absent. On the contrary, the nation-state  USA and “America” are 
intertwined, as the opening sequence of the Emmy Awards made perfectly 
clear. An explicit distinction between the nation-state  USA and an imagined 
 America, however, does enable an understanding of the perspective that the as-
sumed universal yet exceptionally  American values of  freedom and  democracy 
remain recognized as being self-evident, regardless of the lack of  freedom and 
 democracy that may exist as a result of the political and military actions by the 
nation-state  USA. In this way, the almost innocent belief in American  ideology 
can maintain its strength, among both Americans and non-Americans, in spite 
of being challenged by such controversial politics as the Patriot  Act, the War on 
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 Terror, Guantánamo  Bay, and the war in  Iraq. “America was targeted for attack 
because we’re the brightest beacon for  freedom and opportunity in the world,” 
exclaimed President George  Bush in his fi rst post-9/ 11 address to the nation, 
televised live on September  11, adding, “And no one will keep that light from 
shining.”16 As will be shown, these words could just as easily have been pro-
nounced by  Oprah Winfrey or by one of the characters on the 9/11 episodes of 
The West  Wing and Ally  McBeal, revealing that the rhetoric of America as imag-
ined  community reaches beyond the political realm into the globally mediated 
American pop culture.
9/ 11 on The Oprah Winfrey  Show
During the fi rst two weeks after 9/ 11, almost all of the episodes of The Oprah 
Winfrey  Show focused on the terrorist attacks and the way American citizens 
should respond to such a tragedy: “America under Attack: Where Do We Stand 
Now?” (17 September 2001), “How to Talk to Children about America under 
Attack” (18 September 2001), “Dr.  Phil Helps Grieving Americans, Part 1 and 
2” (19 and 25 September 2001), “Tribute to Loved Ones Lost” (20 September 
2001), “Music to Heal Our Hearts,” starring Sam  Harris singing “You’ll Never 
Walk Alone” (21 September 2001), “What Really Matters Now?” (26 Septem-
ber 2001), and “Americans Take Action” (27 September 2001). In the months 
that followed, The Oprah Winfrey  Show continued to devote regular attention 
to 9/11 and its aftermath, specifi cally showing how American viewers should 
cope with the threat of  terrorism within their daily lives, educating the Ameri-
can viewers about  Islam within an international context, providing a forum 
for both experts and viewers to discuss international politics, and, most sig-
nifi cantly, restoring the faith in an imagined America and its ideals of  freedom 
and  democracy.
 In her excellent essay on American  television after 9/ 11, Lynn  Spigel has 
criticized the way The Oprah Winfrey  Show tends to personalize and dramatize 
9/11 as an event that needs therapeutic counseling rather than an understand-
ing of international politics.  Spigel specifi cally focuses on an episode which 
features a pregnant widow whose husband died in the September  11 attacks 
and who has not only lost her husband but her voice as well. According to 
 Spigel, “the program implicitly asks viewers to identify with this woman as the 
moral and innocent victim of chance,” and thus “any casual agent (or any sense 
that her suffering is actually the result of complex political histories) is reduced 
to the ‘twist of fate’ narrative fortunes of the daytime soap.”17 Although The 
Oprah Winfrey  Show indeed depoliticizes 9/11 by turning it into an individual 
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personal experience, thereby oversimplifying the social-political context, the 
talk  show does emphasize personal agency, suggesting that its guests and view-
ers are not innocent victims of their circumstances, but are capable of chang-
ing if they choose to do so. In this specifi c episode, the voiceless widow is ad-
vised by The Oprah Winfrey  Show’s regular therapist Dr.  Phil (in his infamous 
quick fi x psychology style) to take back control over her own life. Similarly, in 
all 9/11 episodes, the viewers are challenged to “see what you can do at home” 
to make sense of the terrorist attacks, thereby actively turning the political into 
the personal. To describe such a process, Jane  Shattuc borrows from the main-
stream press the term “ Oprahifi cation,” which originally was used to denounce 
American  television’s sensationalism. As  Shattuc explains, talk shows such as 
The Oprah Winfrey  Show not only connect the private to the public sphere by 
including the perspectives of ordinary people in the public debate (which tra-
ditionally tends to be dominated by certifi ed and mostly male experts), but also 
“translate politics into the everyday experience of the political.”18
 This process of  Oprahifi cation, a characteristic of the talk  show genre in 
general, can be viewed as having both a positive and a negative impact on the 
public debate on  television. Positively, Oprahifi cation has resulted in a more 
open and diverse debate, enabling voices to be heard that before were often 
excluded, including those of women, ethnic minorities, and gays and lesbians.19 
Yet negatively, Oprahifi cation has often resulted in oversimplifi cation, trivi-
alization, and sensationalism, as serious issues tend to be reduced to confes-
sions of personal scandal and sexual lifestyle meant to entertain rather than to 
inform the public. Both this positive and negative side of Oprahifi cation run 
parallel to the  Americanization debate. The talk  show, often considered to be 
originally an American  television genre, presents characteristics that tradition-
ally are associated with American commercial  television in contrast to Euro-
pean public service  television. In such a comparison, American  television is 
perceived as popular  entertainment, while European  television is considered to 
be part of the bourgeois public sphere. European  television, historically rooted 
in public broadcasting, addresses its viewers as citizens (“audience-as-public”) 
who need to be informed to enable a public debate based on rational argumen-
tation, resulting in political consensus. Commercial American  television, on 
the contrary, addresses its viewers as consumers (“audience-as-market”) who 
need to be kept entertained, thereby placing a strong emphasis on emotional 
argumentation and personal choice, resulting in sensationalist confl ict.20 Sev-
eral scholars, including Ien  Ang, Graham  Murdock, and Laurie  Ouellette, have 
rightfully argued that such a distinction is much too rigid, as there are many 
examples, both in the USA and in Europe, which show that the two traditions 
are present in the media cultures on both sides of the Atlantic. Moreover, the 
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distinction tends to become strongly gendered, reinforcing the rationality of 
the public sphere as masculine and the emotionality of the private sphere as 
feminine. However problematic, recognizing this distinction remains signifi -
cant, if only to show how it is being challenged by The Oprah Winfrey  Show, 
which actually merges the two traditions.
  On The Oprah Winfrey  Show, and particularly the 9/ 11 episodes,  Oprah 
Winfrey often explicitly addresses her viewers as citizens who have a right to 
be informed in order to decide for themselves about important political and 
social issues. Noteworthy, and perhaps rather surprisingly, in spite of her large 
global audience (which actually might outnumber her American one), Winfrey 
tends to identify her viewers as American citizens, whose undeniable rights are 
identifi ed as being fundamentally American as well. In addition, The Oprah 
Winfrey  Show provides ordinary Americans with a forum to discuss current 
affairs, not only as featured guests, but also through audience participation 
and discussion boards made available on the show’s website. However, The 
Oprah Winfrey  Show is also a heavily sponsored program, targeting its viewers 
as consumers constituting a large market for a wide variety of commodities 
to be sold, ranging from fashion, fi lm, and pop music, to furniture, food, and 
literature. Products that are featured on Oprah! (including  Oprah as a trade-
marked commodity herself) often become instant bestsellers, a commercial 
impact which became highly visible with the success of Oprah’s Book  Club.21 
Moreover, the effective combination of American citizenship with  consumer-
ism is heavily invested with American  ideology.  Oprah Winfrey herself, as a 
formerly overweight African-American woman who became one of the most 
powerful individuals in the American media industry, embodies an Ameri-
can success story, whose star  myth ( Oprah’s American  Dream) is reinforced 
by each episode of her talk  show. As Eva  Illouz has shown,  Oprah Winfrey 
uses her life biography, including her personal history of sexual abuse, poverty, 
 racism, and being overweight, to make a connection with her audience and to 
help them to make the political personal.22 In addition to using Winfrey’s star 
 myth, The Oprah Winfrey  Show regularly employs American celebrities, who 
appear on the show to promote themselves and their recent products by reveal-
ing a glimpse of their personal lives, suggesting that they too are just ordinary 
people, encountering the same problems as the Oprah! viewers do.23 This use 
of the star  myth is not limited to the celebrities of the  entertainment industry. 
During the presidential elections of 2000, both the Democratic candidate Al 
 Gore and the Republican candidate George W.  Bush visited  Oprah! (respec-
tively, 11 and 19 September 2000). Although the interviews include “serious” 
political topics, most attention is paid to the “person” behind the candidate. Al 
 Gore recalled how the priorities in his life shifted drastically after his young-
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est son had been seriously injured in a car accident, whereas George  Bush, in 
turn, discussed his ongoing battle with alcoholism, revealing that he decided to 
quit drinking while he was jogging. In this way, while reaffi rming the mythical 
American Dream, The Oprah Winfrey  Show combines citizenship with  con-
sumerism, politics with  entertainment, and public issues with private affairs, 
all in one commercially profi table  television show. 
 Although more severe than most of the talk  show’s regular topics, 9/ 11 
does fi t easily within the format of The Oprah Winfrey  Show. Similar to the 
way Oprah! approaches other traumatic experiences, 9/11 is treated fi rst as an 
issue which can be dealt with pragmatically. Practical questions are addressed, 
such as “How to Control Your Fears” (18 and 25 October 2001), “When Will 
You Fly Again?” and “Will You Fly This Holiday Season?” (12 October and 16 
November 2001), “What Does High Alert Mean?” (2 November 2001), and 
“Living with Terrorism” (9 November 2001), the latter episode consisting of 
pre-taped interviews with women living in Northern Ireland and Israel. In the 
twice-broadcast episode “America under Attack” (13 and 14 September 2001), 
Dr.  Phil tells the audience that “it is not a weakness to hurt and feel and cry,” 
and that giving blood and displaying the American  fl ag might help to cope 
with the pain. “We do need to give ourselves permission to grieve.” The epi-
sode “How to Talk to Children about America under Attack” (18 September 
2001) features First Lady Laura  Bush as guest, who explains that 9/11 has made 
her realize that “the people we love, [and] our country” are the most impor-
tant. Answering  Oprah Winfrey’s question if the president is still able to sleep 
at night, Laura  Bush answers: “Yes, we’re both sleeping. … He’s so proud of 
America. … We’ve never been so unifi ed. It strengthens him and it strengthens 
me when we see how people are handling it all over the country.” Like Dr. Phil, 
Laura  Bush emphasizes the therapeutic quality of loving each other and hon-
oring America, as she suggests that, to deal with the fear and anxiety brought 
on by 9/11, American children can “write letters to their own  fi refi ghters and 
policemen in their neighborhood to thank them in honor of those that were 
lost.” By transforming possible feelings of fear, anger, anxiety, and grief into 
acts of explicit American  patriotism, The Oprah Winfrey  Show translates 9/11 
into a personal yet collective experience of the political, albeit with little room 
for political dissent.
 In addition, The Oprah Winfrey  Show provides its viewers with back-
ground information on international affairs, specifi cally on the history of Af-
ghanistan and  Islam, in the episodes “Is War the Only Answer?” (1 October 
2001), “Islam 101” (5 October 2001), and “Inside the  Taliban” (11 October 
2001). Although the role of the USA as nation-state is mentioned, most notably 
the “billions of dollars in weapons supplied by the United States” to Afghani-
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stan in its war with the Soviet Union, the emphasis is placed on the distinction 
between Muslim  fundamentalism and the peaceful character of Islam. That 
the 9/ 11 terrorists do not represent the majority of Muslims, either worldwide 
or within the USA, is the talk  show’s most repeated message. In the episode 
“Where Do We Stand Now?” (17 September 2001),  Oprah Winfrey’s question 
“Why do they hate us?” is answered by Judith  Miller, a reporter of The New 
York  Times specialized in the Middle East: “I fi nd that most Middle Easterners 
admire and envy America. There is only a small minority that hates us and 
resent us for our power and what they perceive as our arrogance.” The episode 
“Islam 101” (5 October 2001) features portraits of two “normal and modern” 
American Muslim women, Manal and Noreen, who explain that their prac-
tice of Islam, including wearing the hijab veil, is an example of the American 
freedoms of religion and choice, rather than an example of religious oppres-
sion. “We’re just leading our lives, practicing our faith, doing everything else 
that normal America does.” Different than in the later episodes that question 
whether on not the USA should invade  Iraq (which will be discussed further 
on in this chapter), there is little room for dissenting voices, as the talk  show’s 
focus is primarily on promoting unity and human  universalism, suggesting 
that, in spite of religious and cultural differences, ultimately all people are the 
same. Thus, although Oprah! touches upon the political reality of American 
foreign  policy, the talk  show does so uncritically by presenting America as the 
embodiment of  freedom and  democracy, thereby justifying rather than ques-
tioning the dominant role the USA plays in international politics. 
 Again, the double bind of Americanness and self-acclaimed  universalism 
comes to the foreground. In an essay written before (but published after) 9/ 11, 
Eva  Illouz argues that The Oprah Winfrey  Show exports an American concep-
tion of suffering around the world, one which “is individual, is located in the 
private sphere, has a psychic character and concerns the self.” By making a 
distinction between “imported suffering” (images of anonymous non-western 
suffering as shown on the western news) and “exported suffering” (narratives 
of suffering by individuals as presented on the globally mediated American talk 
shows),  Illouz suggests that “the fi rst is a daily and perhaps by now routinized 
reminder of the inequality in the distribution of collective resources across 
the globe, [whereas] the second is more democratic in that it includes all and 
invites all of us [both Americans and non-Americans] to join in the commu-
nity of sufferers.”24 In other words, American suffering is individualized and 
personalized in such a way that it becomes widely (even globally) accessible as 
a universal human experience. This notion is made visible by the 9/11 episodes 
of The Oprah Winfrey  Show, which present 9/11 not only as a tragedy that hap-
pened specifi cally to the USA, but also as a collective traumatic suffering that 
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can be shared universally, across national and cultural boundaries. The Oprah! 
episodes “Music to Heal Our Hearts” (21 September 2001), “Dr.  Phil on Decid-
ing What’s Important Now” (9 October 2001), and “Photos That Defi ne Us” (5 
November 2001) use artistic expressions, such as poetry, gospel music, photo-
graphy, and prayers, as inspirational sources for collective healing. Even “Mar-
tha Stewart’s Comforts of Home” (8 November 2001), featuring the latest trends 
in home decoration, is presented as part of this 9/11 healing process, suggesting 
that “staying home is offering a new sense of comfort.” By focusing on the be-
lief that the love for one’s family and home is a globally shared ideal, The Oprah 
Winfrey  Show suggests that cultural differences can be overcome by celebrating 
a universal  multiculturalism, thereby mystifying the social-economic realities 
of international politics. Moreover, these episodes fi t the general way Ameri-
can pop culture tends to universalize explicitly American experiences, as I have 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
 The intertwinement of 9/11 with American pop culture (of which The 
Oprah Winfrey  Show itself is also part) became clear when movie star John 
 Travolta visited Oprah! (29 October 2001) to promote his latest fi lm Domestic 
 Disturbance (Harold Becker, 2001). After recounting his recent visit to 9/11’s 
Ground  Zero to provide moral support to the  fi refi ghters, John  Travolta shares 
with the audience his thoughts on 9/11: “I believe in the human spirit, and I 
believe collectively that we are now stronger. America is the strongest country 
in the world. … Terrorism is supposed to scare us and feel weak, and we’re not 
that. We’re a tough group.” Pronounced by a global movie star who embod-
ies  Hollywood heroism,  Travolta’s statement includes both  universalism (“the 
human spirit”) and American  patriotism (“America is the strongest country 
in the world”). In this way, similar to the Hollywood hero, John  Travolta can 
capture a global audience with American  patriotism, making “us” a collective 
by presenting explicit Americanness as an alleged universality.
 This perspective of American  exceptionalism as universal ideal is rein-
forced by the way The Oprah Winfrey  Show repeats the conventional depiction 
of an imagined  America as the Beacon of Freedom and  Opportunity, which 
provides a safe haven for refugees coming from all around the world. The epi-
sode “Why I Came to America” (31 October 2001) features pre-taped interviews 
with former and recent immigrants who describe how they found “ freedom” 
in America after they escaped from oppressive regimes, including Nazi Ger-
many, the Cambodian Khmer Rouge, and the  Taliban of Afghanistan. The “be-
fore America” segments are shown in black-and-white, with gloomy music as 
soundtrack. However, when the immigrants begin talking about their arrival in 
the USA, the screen returns to color, while the camera zooms in and the sound-
track plays upbeat music, clearly an attempt to invoke the clichéd metaphor of 
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light triumphing over darkness. The episode’s main guest is Mawi  Asgedom, 
who, as a young child, immigrated to the USA with his family. A pre-taped 
video segment describes the family’s “escape” from “their war-torn country of 
Ethiopia after spending years in a refugee camp and trekking through the bru-
tal deserts of Africa.” As Winfrey’s voiceover states: “Mawi has taken full advan-
tage of what America has to offer. … [He] received a scholarship to Harvard 
and was chosen by his class to give the commencement speech at graduation.” 
Although, in the pre-taped segment,  Asgedom mentions the  racism and inhos-
pitality that he and his family encountered in the USA, in the following studio 
interview, Winfrey exclusively focuses on him being an American success story. 
 Asgedom confi rms Winfrey’s view by exclaiming: “Where else but America can 
someone have no money, not know the language, grow up, work hard, respect 
other people, and end up getting a scholarship to go to college? That’s only 
possible in America. That’s the American  Dream that people have been dream-
ing about for years.” In the thread “What kinds of opportunities does America 
offer that might not be found elsewhere?” on the Oprah. com message board, 
this claim of American exceptionalism prompted some disagreement. Cana-
dian viewers point out that in Canada immigrants also live in a free society 
and that they too can make their dreams come true. One viewer, being herself 
an immigrant from Ethiopia living in the USA, explains that Mawi  Asgedom is 
the exception, not the rule. Most Ethiopian immigrants work in low-paid jobs, 
do not have the chance to go to college (let alone Harvard), and encounter 
structural  racism in their daily lives. Such dissenting voices, however, are not 
included in the talk  show’s broadcast, because they do not fi t within Oprah! ’s 
presentation of America as the Beacon of Freedom and Opportunity.
  By using Mawi  Asgedom’s American success story, thereby emphasiz-
ing the values of  meritocracy such as individual agency and self-reliance, The  
Oprah Winfrey  Show not only claims that  freedom is exceptionally  American, 
but also uncritically assumes that the American conception of these values is 
universally shared. Subsequently, the talk  show explicitly connects the Ameri-
can  Dream to 9/ 11, albeit in a subtle way. One of the pre-taped interviews fea-
tures Thida Mam, a refugee from Cambodia who, as Winfrey’s voiceover tells 
us, “walked hundreds of miles to reach  freedom in the United States.” Freedom 
is often taken for granted, Thida Mam explains, except by those who do not live 
in  freedom, adding: “After September  11, we, as Americans, need to protect [our 
American  freedom] because there is no other America to go to.” One could, 
of course, easily dismiss The  Oprah Winfrey  Show as another example of hol-
low American rhetoric, as it continuously repeats outworn clichés of America 
mixed with the therapeutic jargon of self-help psychology. Such a perspective, 
however, would ignore how The  Oprah Winfrey  Show effectively makes indi-
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vidual stories of the American Dream visible. Not only  Oprah Winfrey herself 
but also her featured guests (both celebrities and ordinary Americans) again 
and again are presented as living examples that the American conception of 
 meritocracy, including its values of  freedom,  individualism, and self-reliance, 
is attainable and also – allegedly – universally shared. That such a message is 
not limited to the talk  show genre is shown by two special 9/11 episodes of the 
 television series The West  Wing and Ally  McBeal, as will be discussed below.
9/ 11 on The West  Wing
While The Oprah Winfrey  Show immediately could incorporate the September 
 11 attacks within its regular talk  show format, fi ctional  television programs 
faced the dilemma of whether or not to include 9/ 11 within their narratives. 
Particularly crime series such as Law &  Order (NBC, 1990-present), NYDP 
 Blue (ABC, 1993-2005), and Third  Watch (NBC, 1999-2005), which are all 
set in New York City and feature New York police offi cers as main characters, 
could not ignore 9/11 without losing their credibility as realistic  television 
drama. Law & Order waited twenty-three episodes before referring to 9/11 in 
its episodes “Patriot” (12:24, 22 May 2002) and “American Jihad” (13:1, 2 Oc-
tober 2002). NYDP Blue added two scenes mentioning September  11 in its 
fi rst post-9/11 episode “Lie Like a Rug” (9:175, 6 November 2001), using the 
aftermath of 9/11 to provide an explanation for the high stress level among 
New York police offi cers. Third Watch responded by replacing its new season 
opener with a special nonfi ction episode entitled “In Their Own Words” (3:45, 
15 October 2001), featuring real-life New York police offi cers,  fi refi ghters, and 
paramedics telling about their experiences, and by renaming the season’s fi rst 
episode “September Tenth” (3:46, 22 October 2001). The subsequent episode, 
entitled “After Time” (3:47, 29 October 2001), takes place ten days after 9/11 
and focuses on the ambiguous feelings of the New York rescue workers about 
their newly acquired status as heroes, while they continue to search for missing 
casualties in “the pile” (Ground  Zero). With its next episode “The Relay” (3:48, 
12 November 2001), Third Watch returned to normalcy, dealing with the case 
of a young woman’s suicide.
 The popular drama series The West  Wing (NBC, 1999-2006) faced the 
same dilemma. Set in the White  House of the fi ctional President Jed Bartlet 
(Martin Sheen), The West  Wing has been praised for providing a realistic view 
on the American presidency, in spite of its romanticized dramatization.25 The 
series was created by Aaron  Sorkin, who before had written the romantic com-
edy The American  President (Rob Reiner, 1995), starring Michael  Douglas as 
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the widowed President Andrew Shepherd who falls in love with the environ-
mental lobbyist Sydney Wade (Annette Bening). Like President Shepherd, Jed 
Bartlet is a liberal Democrat of high moral standard, initially functioning as an 
attractive alternative to President Bill  Clinton, whose morality had come to be 
questioned due to the Monica  Lewinsky scandal. After the controversial elec-
tion of President George W.  Bush in 2000, The West  Wing could be viewed as a 
fi ctional shadow administration, presenting a “what if the Democrats were in 
the White House” scenario. Although never referring to actual real-life events, 
the series features fi ctional yet realistic events, thus challenging the  television 
audience to question whether or not President  Bush would act the same as 
President Bartlet in similar circumstances, and vice versa. To sustain its politi-
cal realism, The West  Wing could not ignore the dramatic reality of 9/ 11 and its 
aftermath.
 Just like Third  Watch, the new season opener of The West  Wing, epi-
sode “Manchester 1” (3:1, 10 October 2001), was postponed and replaced by 
a special 9/ 11 episode, entitled “Isaac and Ishmael” (3 October 2001). On The 
West  Wing promotional website, NBC announced that the episode would deal 
“with some of the questions and issues currently facing the world in the wake 
of the recent terrorist attacks on the United States” and, as NBC’s  entertain-
ment president Jeff  Zucker suggested, even would be “helping the dialogue in 
this country and continuing the healing process.”26 Written by Aaron  Sorkin 
and shot in only ten days, the episode presents a fi ctional security alert at the 
Bartlet White  House. Similar to the way 9/11 interrupted the regular fl ow of 
American  television, the fi ctional security alert does not fi t the regular time-
line of the series. As one of the actors explains in its opening sequence, the 
episode is a “storytelling aberration,” breaking with the narrative of the series 
to address the signifi cance of 9/11, without having to include the actual event 
within its storytelling. That “Isaac and Ishmael” is not a regular The West  Wing 
episode but a single “play” dealing with the aftermath of 9/11 is made explicit 
immediately. The usual opening sequence is replaced by close-ups of the main 
characters, fi lmed against a black backdrop, who alternate in explaining the 
episode’s special purpose. The episode is to pay tribute to “New York’s fi nest 
and bravest,” the actors explain, adding that its profi ts will be donated to New 
York Firefi ghters’ 9/11 Disaster Relief Fund and the New York Police and Fire 
Widows’ and Children’s Benefi t Fund. However, the actors reassure the viewers 
that, with the next episode, the series will return to its conventional storylines: 
“We’re in show business. We’ll get back to tending our egos in short order.” 
Subsequently, the introduction becomes a teaser for the coming season, as the 
actors provide a glimpse of some of the upcoming exciting developments, end-
ing with the revelation by Janel  Moloney that her character Donna will fi nally 
get a boyfriend.
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 The “Isaac and Ishmael” episode consists of two separate storylines, 
which both implicitly refer to 9/ 11. The fi rst one focuses on a group of high 
school students who have been selected to visit the White  House. When staff 
member Josh Lyman (Bradley Whitford) is welcoming them in the lobby, a 
security guard exclaims: “Station One. Code Black. Crash.” Not knowing what 
exactly is going on, Josh tells the students that “something’s happened.” At that 
moment, the episode is interrupted by its fi rst commercial break, announcing 
the telephone numbers of the Twin  Towers Fund and the American Red Cross. 
What actually did happen never becomes clear, yet the call for donations con-
nects the “crash” to 9/11. After the commercial break, Josh moves the students 
to the White House cafeteria, where they remain the entire episode, being lec-
tured to by the show’s main characters, including President Bartlet and the 
First Lady, on  terrorism, Muslim  fundamentalism, and  freedom and  democ-
racy, the latter being explicitly presented as American values. The second sto-
ryline concerns the White House employee Rakim Ali (played by Ajay  Naidu, 
an American actor of Hindu South Asian ethnic background), who happens to 
have the same name as a possible suspect of  terrorism. Rakim Ali is fi rst shown 
sitting at the open window of his offi ce, smoking a cigarette, when suddenly 
white security offi cers burst into the room. Ali has become a security risk, war-
ranting an interrogation by Leo McGarry (John Spencer), the White House 
chief of staff. Set in a dramatically dark-lit offi ce, McGarry grills Ali about his 
past and his ethnic identity, prompting Ali to question such a hostile treat-
ment. “I don’t think you understand the seriousness of what’s happening right 
now,” exclaims McGarry, to which Ali responds, “I don’t think you do,” imme-
diately followed by another commercial break. Obviously, “what’s happening 
right now” refers not only to the fi ctional interrogation, but also to 9/11 and 
its political aftermath, including, as Ali’s response suggests, the actual practice 
of racial  profi ling whereby Arab Americans (of assumed Muslim background) 
automatically become suspect of being potential terrorists.
 By turning the White  House cafeteria into a classroom, the episode’s 
main setting, the episode becomes a lecture on  terrorism and  Islam, trying 
to answer the question which the high school students (and, in extension, the 
American public) are asking: “Why does everyone want to kill us?” Not every-
one does, explains Josh: “Islamic extremist is to Islam as KKK is to Christian-
ity. … It’s the Klan gone medieval and global. It couldn’t have less to do with 
Islamic men and women of faith of whom there are millions and millions.” 
Another White House staff member, Toby Ziegler (Richard Schiff), adds that 
the people in Afghanistan are also innocent victims of Muslim  fundamental-
ism, thereby quoting the well-known e-mail by the Afghan American Tamim 
 Ansary, which was published on the Salon. com website and featured on the 
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 Oprah! episode “Is War the Only Answer?” (1 October 2001): “When you think 
of Afghanistan, think of Poland, when you think of  Taliban, think of the Nazis, 
when you think of the citizens of Afghanistan, think of Jews in concentration 
camps.”27 Like the 9/ 11 episodes of The Oprah Winfrey  Show, the “Isaac and 
Ishmael” episode emphasizes that Muslim terrorists do not represent the ma-
jority of Muslims. However, and again similar to Oprah! , the episode does so 
by celebrating the values of  freedom and  democracy that “America” embod-
ies. As the White House staff members tell the students, “[America] is a plural 
society. That means we accept more than one idea. It offends them.” At the 
end of the episode, Josh repeats the message: “Remember pluralism. You want 
to get these people? I mean, you really want to reach in and kill them where 
they live? Keep accepting more than one idea. It makes them absolutely crazy.” 
Instead of opening up the debate, the pluralism argument polarizes the debate 
by making a rigid distinction between “us” and “them,” using, as Lynn  Spigel 
rightly points out, “historical pedagogy to solidify national unity against the 
‘enemy’ rather than to encourage any real engagement with Islam, the ethics of 
U.S. international policy, or the consequences of the then-pending U.S. bomb 
strikes.”28 Thus, the lesson that the “Isaac and Ishmael” episode teaches is not 
one of questioning the role of the nation-state  USA in international politics, 
but instead one of reaffi rming America as an exceptional embodiment of  free-
dom and  democracy.
 The second storyline works in a similar way, as the racial  profi ling of 
Rakim Ali is recognized yet never criticized. Ali makes the issue of racial  pro-
fi ling explicit by noting that “it is not uncommon for Arab Americans to be 
the fi rst suspected when that sort of thing happens,” to which Leo McGarry 
responds with sarcasm: “I can’t imagine why. No, I’m trying to fi gure out why 
anytime there’s terrorist activity, people always assume it’s Arabs. I’m racking 
my brain.” After Ali expresses his discomfort with the situation, McGarry adds: 
“Well, that’s the price you pay.” Not until the end of the episode, after informa-
tion of the Secret Service indicates that Rakim Ali is not a possible terrorist, 
McGarry fi nishes his sentence by stating, “That’s the price you pay for having 
the same physical features as criminals.” One could perceive McCarry’s state-
ment as a criticism of racial  profi ling, suggesting that wrong has been done to 
Ali. It was this storyline that prompted Washington  Post  television critic Tom 
 Shales to state that “even in this moment of pain, trauma, heartbreak, destruc-
tion, assault and victimization,  Hollywood liberals can still fi nd some excuse 
to make America look guilty.”29 Yet, by using the excuse that Rakim Ali has “the 
same physical features as criminals” the episode does not criticize the practice 
of racial  profi ling in itself, but rather suggests that, with the threat of  terrorism, 
racial  profi ling is a necessary evil of which Ali, regretfully yet understandably, 
has become a victim. 
56 fabricating the absolute fake
fabricating.indd   56 27-05-2008   16:52:44
 In their essay “Monster, Terrorist, Fag,” Jasbir  Puar and Amit  Rai argue 
that the American media turn American viewers into docile patriots by pre-
senting the “enemy” as a dangerous Other, by reinforcing racial and ethnic 
stereotypes, and by connecting the “terrorist” to conventional imagery of the 
monster and sexual deviancy. Their analysis of the “Isaac and Ishmael” epi-
sode confi rms their overall argument, particularly in how the settings of the 
two storylines form a “double-framed reality,” thereby placing the normative 
American in juxtaposition to the deviant Other:
On the one side, brightly lit and close to the heart (invoking the home 
and the family), is the classroom, a racially and gender-plural space. … 
A space where the president as Father enters and says that what we need 
right now are heroes; where the fi rst lady as Mother tells the precocious 
and sometimes troublesome youngsters a kind of bedtime story of two 
once and future brothers, Isaac (the Jews) and Ishmael (the Arabs). … 
On the other side of the frame, a dimly lit room, an enclosed, monitored 
space, managed entirely by white men, at the center of which is a racially 
and sexually ambiguous fi gure, a subject who at one and the same time 
is a possible monster and a person to be corrected. … A subject whose 
greatest moment, it seems, comes when, after being terrorized at gun-
point, racially profi led, and insulted, he goes back to work.30
The White  House cafeteria, functioning as a classroom, is the place where 
American values of  freedom and  democracy are taught, presented as a space of 
enlightenment where pluralism (allegedly or perhaps ideally) provides room 
for different opinions and political positions. The offi ce where the interroga-
tion takes place, on the contrary, is a dark space where the foreign and deviant 
threat is isolated, monitored, controlled, and thus excluded from the pluralism 
promoted in the “enlightened” classroom. In this way, the opposition between 
“us” and “them” (American versus foreign), between normative and deviant, is 
reinforced, again expressed through the imagery of lightness triumphing over 
darkness, that clichéd metaphor so common in American 9/ 11 rhetoric. 
  Puar and  Rai’s notion of the docile  patriot is similar to Lauren  Berlant’s 
concept of “infantile  citizenship,” which Lynn  Spigel uses to critique the re-
peated “Why does everyone wants to kill us?” question posed on The West  Wing 
(and other American  television shows, including Oprah! ), allowing “adult view-
ers comfortably to confront the horrors and guilt of war by donning the cloak 
of childhood innocence.”31 Although the “Isaac and Ishmael” episode of The 
West  Wing seemingly attempts to present a nuanced perspective on  terrorism, 
Muslim  fundamentalism, and the practice of racial  profi ling, the show ends 
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up presenting  freedom and  democracy as exceptionally  American values, with 
little room to refl ect critically upon the nation-state  USA and its role in inter-
national politics. As a result, the viewers of The West  Wing are invited to accept 
these American values as being self-evident and uncontested, quite similar to 
the viewers of The  Oprah Winfrey  Show. As my analysis of its 9/ 11 episode will 
show, the same can be said about the viewers of the Ally  McBeal drama series.
9/ 11 on Ally  McBeal
The drama series Ally  McBeal (Fox, 1997-2002) stars Calista  Flockhart as the 
thirty-something post-feminist lawyer whose main goal consists of combining 
her successful professional career with a fulfi lling love life. On fi rst sight, the 
series appears to be groundbreaking, addressing controversial social-political 
issues such as sexual harassment, interracial dating, and euthanasia. The series 
also uses unconventional special effects, cameo appearances by celebrities, and 
innovative adaptation of pop music to create an atmosphere that embodies the 
ambiguities of postmodern life. Yet, in the end,  Ally McBeal proves to be rather 
conventional, often reducing politics to personal dilemmas and individual life-
style choices. Moreover, as several scholars have suggested,  Ally McBeal tends 
to reconfi rm rather than challenge existing gender and racial stereotypes.32 It 
is therefore not surprising that the image of America as presented in its 9/ 11 
episode ends up being quite conventional as well.
 Initially entitled “ Christmas: Now More Than Ever” (5:7, 10 December 
2001), the Ally  McBeal 9/ 11 episode was broadcast by the Fox network three 
months after the September  11 attacks. Although none of the episode’s three 
storylines explicitly addresses 9/11, they do share the theme of healing and 
the restoration of hope and faith. Its substitute title “Nine One One,” used in 
the  television guides and on the show’s website, makes the connection to 9/11 
clear. According to Fox, the special episode touched so many Americans that, 
due to popular demand, it was rebroadcast on Christmas Eve 2001. The “Nine 
One One” episode differs from other Ally  McBeal episodes, as its main focus is 
on the collective national experience rather than the personal experiences of 
the show’s main characters. Even when compared to the previous  Ally McBeal 
Christmas episodes, which all tend to be more refl ective and spiritual than the 
regular ones, the “Nine One One” episode is different in the way the individual 
identities of the characters are overshadowed by a strong sense of collectivity. 
Although the question of how to maintain faith in a time of adversity is pre-
sented as a personal dilemma, the answer – the need to restore hope in all that 
is good – turns out to be a collective one. 
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 Like most Ally  McBeal episodes, “Nine One One” consists of three sepa-
rate but related storylines. The fi rst storyline deals with the preparation for 
the annual offi ce  Christmas party, a recurring event in the  Ally McBeal Christ-
mas episodes. Different than in the previous years, however, none of the law 
fi rm employees seems eager to celebrate. While no particular reason is given as 
to why the Christmas spirit is lacking, employee Corretta (Regina Hall) tries 
to convince her boss Richard Fish (Greg Germann) that the offi ce Christmas 
party should not be cancelled, “as we all need one.” This feeling of desperation 
is widely shared, as becomes clear in a scene set in the offi ce’s unisex bathroom. 
Dressed in an elf costume, John Cage (Peter MacNicol) tells Richard Fish that 
each year he rents an elf costume, as the Santa Claus costumes tend to be all 
rented out. Yet this year, all the Santa Claus costumes have remained in the 
store, suggesting that the entire city lacks in Christmas spirit. “The world seems 
so desperate,” John concludes. “We’ve all fl at-lined.”
 The lack of  Christmas spirit is even more prominent in the second sto-
ryline, dealing with Minister Harrison Wyatt (Tom Berenger) who, after his 
wife Suzanne has been brutally murdered, has lost his faith in God and, sub-
sequently, is fi red by his church. “God no longer believes in us, or if he does, 
he simply no longer cares.”  Ally becomes more personally involved when she 
realizes that the minister’s son Malcolm (Josh Groban), the boy with the an-
gelic voice who, since the death of his mother, can no longer sing, is the same 
boy she accompanied to his high school prom only a few months earlier (4:23, 
21 May 2001). As she reminds Malcolm, “tragedies happen to good people.” In 
other words, Suzanne is not merely an innocent victim, but a symbol of the 
“good” in opposition to the “evil” she encountered. That Suzanne also rep-
resents “America” as an innocent victim of the recent terrorist attacks is sug-
gested by Malcolm’s subsequent question: “Why did she have to be shot in the 
neck, bleed to death on the sidewalk?” The image presented by Malcolm recalls 
the image of the planes fl ying into the Twin  Towers: America is taken by sur-
prise and shot in the neck. This interpretation becomes less farfetched when 
minister Wyatt makes the connection explicit, telling both  Ally and Malcolm 
how his wife reacted after the attack: “After she was shot, she was lying there 
on the sidewalk and she looked up at the man who just mortally wounded her 
and she asked him to dial 911… Nine One One. She looked at the man who 
just shot her and somehow she sees enough good in him that she believes… 
That’s Suzanne.” The reference to the American national emergency telephone 
number 911, and its emphasized repetition in particular, shows that the at-
tack on Suzanne represents the attack on America. After reminding them of 
the “good” that Suzanne symbolizes,  Ally convinces both Minister Wyatt and 
Malcolm that instead of giving up faith, they should honor Suzanne’s soul by 
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continuing to believe that she (“good”) will always prevail. If not, as the minis-
ter admits, “evil will have won.” Thus, the minister returns to his church to lead 
the congregation during the Christmas Eve midnight sermon, where his son 
Malcolm will sing again.
 The third storyline, dealing with the case of the citizens of the small-
town Jackman versus their mayor, makes the connection to 9/ 11 even more 
obvious. The mayor has prohibited the citizens of Jackman from holding their 
annual  Christmas parade, because the local factory that produces Christmas 
decorations has burned down, thereby killing six  fi refi ghters. The case directly 
addresses the dilemma of how to continue holding traditional parades of cel-
ebration in the wake of a tragedy of such collective importance. “People just 
are not in the mood for Christmas this year,” the mayor states, thereby empha-
sizing the overall lack of Christmas spirit. “This is not the time to be throwing 
parades, I’m sorry. It’s disrespectful for a town to be celebrating in the streets. 
… Out of respect for our economy and the loss of those lives, I think we should 
be allowed to mourn out of common courtesy-ism.” The arguments used in 
this fi ctional Ally  McBeal case echo the arguments made in the public debate 
about the New York Columbus Day Parade of October 2001. Eventually, the 
New York parade was presented as a tribute to the 9/11 victims and the rescue 
workers, with a single fi re truck representing both the New York Fire  Depart-
ment and the New York Police  Department. The mayor’s argument is coun-
tered by John Cage, who presents a melodramatic yet (arguably) compelling 
closing argument. Similar to  Ally’s plea to continue believing in “good” over 
“evil,” John argues that “this is no year to be skipping Christmas,” as giving up 
Christmas would equal giving up faith. As he pleads: “The people of Jackman, 
they have been knocked to the ground. When that happens, we get back up. It’s 
who we are. That factory, Jackman’s economy was built on hope and optimism 
and it needs to be rebuilt with those same ingredients. As to the human loss, 
as profound as it very much is, it is no honor to the fallen for the surviving to 
stay down.” The implication that Jackman stands for “America” is suggested 
by John’s shift of using the third person plural to the fi rst person plural. The 
people of Jackman (“they”) have become the American collective (“we”). More-
over, as he continues, John nationalizes the “we” as being the American people 
by presenting Christmas as a national holiday:
Now we are not asking for the right to be out on the streets, slurping 
margaritas, singing “Que Sera Sera.” We just want to go on and some-
times to do that it helps to celebrate. Good will toward men, peace on 
earth, and joy. A lot of things  Christmas stands for in this country. Of 
course everybody hurts for those  fi refi ghters. They are heroes and they 
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represent the best of what we are. But I think that instead going dark, let’s 
let the light shine in their honor. … As a people, this community has an 
emotional need now that they’ve never… It’s not a year to be skipping 
Christmas.
The melodramatic character is emphasized by the soundtrack (which swells 
when John starts talking about the  fi refi ghters), the clichéd use of the light 
triumphing over darkness metaphor, and the tear that runs down John’s face 
during his plea’s climax. In addition, the reference to the  fi refi ghters as heroes 
places the plea within the hero worship of the New York Fire  Department and 
the New York Police  Department, which has become an intrinsic part of the 
American national 9/ 11 remembrance rhetoric.
 The fi nal scene brings the three storylines together. The scene begins in 
the church, with the midnight sermon by Minister Wyatt, whose faith has been 
restored. Moreover,  Ally has convinced Malcolm to sing at his father’s sermon. 
Malcolm, standing behind the catheter and dressed in a red choir gown, sings 
“To Where You Are” (a rather melodramatic pop song written and produced 
by Richard  Marx) while raising his eyes upwards.33 This gesture leaves it open 
to interpretation whether Malcolm is singing to his murdered mother or to 
God in heaven. A close-up of a tear running down the face of  Ally, who is sit-
ting in the audience, emphasizes the melodramatic character of the song. The 
performance is presented in the style of a music  video, as shots of Malcolm 
singing are intercut with shots of the Jackman  Christmas parade and shots (in 
slow-motion) of the offi ce Christmas party. Similar to the real-life New York 
Columbus Day Parade, the Jackman parade turns out to be a vigil in the honor 
of the deceased  fi refi ghters, rather than a celebratory Christmas parade. Uni-
formed policemen march together with citizens, including John Cage, hold-
ing burning candles. The mayor of Jackman wipes away a tear as he watches 
the parade passing by. The overall view is colored by the red-white-and-blue 
fl ashes from the lights of a police car and a fi re truck. A small boy dressed as 
Rudolf the Red-Nosed Reindeer carries the helmet of a deceased fi refi ghter, 
while the boy’s red nose is blinking like a fl ashing light. Intercut with shots of 
the Christmas sermon and the vigil in honor of the fallen  fi refi ghters, accom-
panied by Malcolm’s spiritual song, the slow-motion shots of the offi ce Christ-
mas party also become refl ective, suggesting that celebrating good tidings can 
go together with remembering tragedy. Eventually, in all three storylines, faith 
is restored, coming to the conclusion that, in the wake of 9/ 11, Christmas needs 
to be celebrated, though not as a season to be jolly, but as a time to refl ect and 
remember.
 In the episode’s fi nal shot, right before the “Ally  McBeal was sponsored 
the  oprahification of 9/ 11 61
fabricating.indd   61 27-05-2008   16:52:46
by  Martini” closing message,  Ally places fl owers on Suzanne’s grave where, at 
the beginning of the episode, she fi rst had met Minister Wyatt. This time, how-
ever, the tombstone is shot from the back, suggesting that the grave stands for 
all 9/ 11 victims. In this way,  Ally’s gesture – and in extension, the entire “Nine 
One One” episode – can be perceived as a tribute to the victims of the Septem-
ber  11 attacks, making the episode similar to the “Isaac and Ishmael” episode 
of The West  Wing. Although not explicitly addressing the terrorist attacks of 
September  11, they both respond to the aftermath of 9/11, questioning how the 
American people should cope with tragedy. However, The West  Wing explicitly 
addresses international politics, while  Ally McBeal merely implicitly refers to 
the political reality of 9/11, excluding the issues of  terrorism, Muslim  funda-
mentalism, and anti- Americanism. Instead,  Ally McBeal presents a national 
collective identity of being American based on fi ctional stories of personal and 
local tragedy, one which takes its Christian character for granted ( Christmas 
is celebrated as both a national and religious holiday), using a melodramatic 
and therapeutic narrative of restoring faith and hope. In this way, similar to 
The  Oprah Winfrey  Show,  Ally McBeal translates the political into a personal 
experience of the political, yet one that mystifi es issues of international politics 
in favor of celebrating that eventually good – read American idealism – will 
triumph over evil.
 Iraq on The  Oprah Winfrey  Show
During the year following 9/ 11, The Oprah Winfrey  Show continued to pay 
attention to the aftermath of the terrorist attacks with episodes focusing on 
personal experiences, such as “Lauren Manning’s World Trade  Center Survival 
Story” (11 March 2002), and episodes remembering the victims of 9/11, such 
as “A Tribute to the Mothers of September  11” (10 May 2002) and “A Tribute 
to the Fathers of September  11” (14 May 2002). However, The Oprah Winfrey 
 Show also addressed the political debate, specifi cally during the end of 2002 
and the beginning of 2003, questioning whether or not the USA should in-
vade  Iraq, including episodes such as “Is War the Only Answer?” (22 October 
2002), “Should the U.S. Attack  Iraq?” (6 February 2003), “What You Should 
Know About  Iraq” (6 March 2003), and “Anti- Americanism: Why Do So Many 
Dislike the U.S.?” (18 March 2003). These episodes received an ambiguous 
response, as proponents of the war effort have criticized  Oprah Winfrey for 
promoting “non-patriotic” and “anti- Bush” views on national  television, while 
the opponents criticized her for using  Oprah! to “market the war” to a mass 
audience, conform to the “propaganda” of the  Bush administration.34 Once the 
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USA had invaded  Iraq, Winfrey did follow-up shows, such as “Reporters on the 
Front Lines in  Iraq” (27 March 2003) and “War Stories” (15 April 2003).
 Similar to the 9/ 11 episodes, the  Iraq episodes fi t within the regular for-
mat of The Oprah Winfrey  Show. Winfrey talks with both experts and the stu-
dio audience about the necessity of an American attack on  Iraq, the political 
position of the USA in the world, and the personal consequences for Ameri-
cans in the military and their families back home. Expert studio guests include 
Daniel  Benjamin, co-author of The Age of Sacred Terror (22 October 2002), 
Fawaz  Gerges, author of America and Political  Islam (6 and 18 March 2003), 
and Kenneth  Pollack, author of The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading 
 Iraq (22 October 2002 and 6 March 2003), all of whom appear on Oprah! not 
only to inform the audience about their expertise and political standpoints, but 
also to promote their books. In addition, The Oprah Winfrey  Show features pre-
taped segments featuring well-known opinion makers and politicians, ranging 
from documentary maker Michael  Moore explaining how American military 
actions in the past have resulted in a growing anti- Americanism around the 
world (18 March 2003) to Condoleezza  Rice, introduced by  Oprah Winfrey 
as “our cool, collected national security advisor,” who justifi es an American 
invasion of  Iraq by stating that the USA is “helping to free the Iraqi people” (15 
April 2003).
 Conventionally, the public debate on war and foreign  policy tends to be 
dominated by (often male) experts who use technical and military jargon. The 
Oprah Winfrey  Show breaks with this mode by including both male and female 
laymen within the debate. The invited experts are encouraged by Winfrey to 
translate the debate into terms that can be understood by the average viewer at 
home. Moreover, as the implied viewers of The Oprah Winfrey  Show are female 
(more specifi cally, as Winfrey often points out in her show, housewives and 
mothers), other voices are included within the traditionally masculine debate 
on warfare. In other words, by including the “housewife” in the discussion, 
the distinction between the masculine public and feminine private sphere is 
bridged. By combining political and personal arguments, Oprah! shows the 
potential for a broader and inclusive debate. A wide range of arguments are 
voiced by the audience members, both approving and opposing the war in  Iraq, 
using both “rational” and “emotional” arguments, ranging from “we are only 
involved in  Iraq because of the oil and the economic interests of big business” 
to “I don’t want my son to go to war.” The debate continues in the “After the 
Show” segment, which is not broadcast but can be viewed on the Oprah. com 
website, where viewers are invited to send in comments.
 The episode “Is War the Only Answer?” (22 October 2002) is telling in 
the way in which gender plays a signifi cant role in changing the political into a 
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personal experience of the political. The aforementioned Daniel  Benjamin and 
Kenneth  Pollack are present as experts in the studio. Both see the war (then still 
pending) in  Iraq as a necessary evil. Saddam  Hussein needs to be disarmed to 
guarantee American national security. While  Benjamin and  Pollack are being 
interviewed in the studio, their comments are alternated by pre-taped inter-
views with two female experts, Helen  Caldicott and Jody  Williams, who, un-
like  Benjamin and  Pollack, oppose the war.  Caldicott fears that a war in  Iraq 
will lead to nuclear war; Williams warns that “pre-emptive self-defense” will 
set a dangerous precedent. Different than the studio interviews, the pre-taped 
segments are melodramatically edited through the use of close-ups, Winfrey’s 
voiceover, added images of warfare, and a swelling soundtrack. Whether or not 
intentionally, the juxtaposition of the male studio experts and the female pre-
taped experts suggests a gender divide between male proponents and female 
opponents of the war, which is emphasized by the melodramatical editing of 
the “feminine” argument (although both female experts use the conventional 
masculine jargon to question the necessity of war). This gender divide is chal-
lenged by the pre-taped – and again melodramatically edited – interview that 
follows. Peggy  Noonan, journalist of The Wall Street Journal, former speech-
writer of President Ronald  Reagan and consultant to The West  Wing  television 
drama series, emphasizes the distinction between a male and female perspec-
tive on warfare. In principle, as  Noonan tells the Oprah! audience, women are 
against war, as they pass on life. However, women are also caring and want to 
protect their children. At the moment when “children are being threatened” 
(thus not something abstract like “national security”), women “naturally” will 
support the war. As  Noonan continues:
Is war the only answer? I am not completely convinced at this point that 
it is in America’s interest to move the war to  Iraq and remove Saddam 
 Hussein. As a mother, you do not want your kids to go to war, and you 
don’t want your kids to live in wartime. You want your kids to live in 
peace. … My big question is: Do we have to go to war now to make 
ourselves safe? Is moving on  Iraq going to make the world safer? War is 
brutal. It is full of waste. It is full of cruelty. Inevitably, children and civil-
ians are harmed. But it is not the worst thing. Sometimes wars have to 
be fought to protect people, and to protect the world. Not protecting the 
world is the worst thing.
With her argument, Peggy  Noonan personalizes the debate by addressing the 
audience as mothers, playing on their assumed emotions of “maternal instinct” 
in stark contrast to the “rational” arguments by the other (both male and fe-
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male) experts.  Noonan cleverly appropriates the anti-war stance to eventually 
present a pro-war position, justifi ed not by the conventional masculine jargon 
of warfare but by evoking the image of a mother protecting her children. 
 As shown by the contradictory reactions of both the proponents and the 
opponents of the war in  Iraq, accusing  Oprah Winfrey of either opposing or 
promoting the war effort, the  Iraq episodes of The Oprah Winfrey  Show can be 
perceived in different ways. On the one hand, the talk  show has broadened the 
public debate by including both supporting and opposing arguments, made by 
both experts and ordinary audience members. Moreover, Oprah! has enabled 
the inclusion of personal “emotional” arguments that tend to be excluded from 
the political “rational” debate, thereby bridging the gap between the public and 
the private sphere. On the other hand, by turning the political into a personal 
experience of the political, The Oprah Winfrey  Show seems to suggest that po-
litical positions are predominantly an individual and personal choice, thereby 
mystifying the way Oprah! structures the debate through its choice of guests 
and the way their contributions are edited, as is shown by the segment with 
Peggy  Noonan. In addition, the emphasis on individual and personal choice 
tends to hide other social-economic and political interests, including (but not 
limited to)  Oprah Winfrey’s own economic interest as a commercial  television 
maker.
Conclusion: The  Oprahification of America
On September 20, 2002, one year after 9/ 11, global megastar  Bono of the Irish 
rock group U2 visited The Oprah Winfrey  Show to tell the American public 
(and in extension, the global audience) about famine, poverty, and  AIDS in 
Africa. How,  Oprah asks, does this relate to the average American woman at 
home, who worries about her own family? “What does this have to do with 
her life?” “Wow,” Bono answers: “See, there’s the country of America, that you 
have to defend, but there’s also the ideal of America. America is more than just 
a country. It’s an ideal, okay … an ideal that’s supposed to be contagious.” “I 
love that,”  Oprah responds, “I wanna cry right now. I do, I love that.” Although 
unmentioned by Bono, he is paraphrasing his good friend Wim  Wenders, the 
German fi lmmaker, who once wrote: “AMERICA, always means two things: 
a country, geographically, the USA, and a concept of this country, its ideal.”35 
That it takes an Irish rock star echoing the words of a German fi lmmaker on 
a talk  show hosted by America’s most popular  television personality to make 
such a distinction explicit reinforces the notion that America as imagined  com-
munity transcends the geographical boundaries of the nation-state  USA. Bo-
no’s reference to American idealism in his fi ght against African poverty harks 
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back to the rhetoric of “We Are the World” as discussed in the fi rst chapter. Yet, 
it also connects to 9/11 and its aftermath, to  television shows like The Oprah 
Winfrey  Show, The West  Wing, and Ally  McBeal, which use the same rhetoric 
to make sense of 9/11, thereby mystifying the role of the nation-state  USA in 
international politics in favor of celebrating the alleged universal yet – equal-
ly alleged – exceptionally  American values of  freedom and  democracy which 
“America” as “contagious ideal” embodies. 
 Commenting on the large number of American fi ctional  television 
shows which have included 9/ 11 in their narratives, ranging from, in addition 
to the shows mentioned in this chapter, The Education of Max  Bickford (CBS, 
2001-2002) and Boston  Public (FOX, 2000-2004) to 7th  Heaven (CBS, 1996-
2007) and American  Family (FOX, 2002-2004), Amanda  Lotz claims that “the 
plurality of series enacting these stories and the audience size of any of these 
series makes analysis of one ‘9/11 episode’ incomplete in seeking to address 
how ‘ television’ explored these events and their aftermath.”36 True enough, with 
my analysis of the 9/11 episodes of The Oprah Winfrey  Show, The West  Wing, 
and Ally  McBeal, I have not intended to present one singular way in which 
American  television has dealt with 9/11, nor do I suggest that the viewers, both 
American and non-American, all share the same perspective after watching 
these  television shows. Not all American viewers will be hailed successfully into 
the position of “docile  patriot” or “infantile  citizen” and not all non-American 
viewers will be seduced by the uncritical portrayal of America as the Beacon of 
Freedom and  Democracy. Moreover, as Lynn  Spigel has pointed out, there are 
other  television shows and other media that provide counter-narratives, pre-
senting a more critical perspective on the role of the nation-state  USA.37 The 
signifi cance of the 9/11 episodes analyzed in this chapter can be found in the 
way all of them take the acceptance of American idealism for granted, each of 
them assuming that viewers will uncritically recognize these American values 
as being self-evident and universal. By celebrating the values that an imagined 
 America embodies, these  television shows can ignore the actual politics of the 
nation-state  USA.
 The political power of such an uncritical perspective has been recognized 
by the  Bush administration. When, at a press conference on October 11, 2001, 
President George W.  Bush again was confronted with the “Why do they hate 
us?” question, his answer assumed the docile  patriotism and infantile  citizen-
ship which the 9/ 11 episodes of the analyzed  television shows generate: “How 
do I respond when I see that in some Islamic countries there is vitriolic hatred 
for America? I’ll tell you how I respond: I’m amazed. I’m amazed that there is 
such misunderstanding of what our country is about, that people would hate 
us. I am, I am – like most Americans, I just can’t believe it. Because I know how 
good we are, and we’ve got to do a better job of making our case.”38
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Chapter Three:
The Desert of the Real:
America as Hyperreality
On November 22, 1990, during the fi rst Gulf  War, President George H.W.  Bush 
gave a pep talk to the American soldiers stationed near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. 
“Now, look, look, we know that the days can get pretty long out here, and you’ll 
be glad to know that if it goes on too long we have a secret weapon in reserve,” 
 Bush joked. “If push comes to shove, we’re going to get Roseanne  Barr to go to 
 Iraq and sing the national anthem. Baghdad Betty, eat your heart out.”1  Bush 
was referring to the controversial performance of the American national  an-
them by comedian and  television  sitcom star Roseanne  Barr. On July 25, 1990, 
in between two games of the San Diego Padres  baseball team, she had sung an 
extremely off-key a cappella rendition of “The Star-Spangled Banner.” Adding 
insult to the injury, she also grabbed her crotch and spat on the ground. Many 
viewers were not amused. Roseanne  Barr was booed by the audience, strongly 
criticized by the press, and denounced by  Bush, who called her performance 
“disgraceful.”2 President  Bush’s true secret weapon, however, proved to be not 
Roseanne  Barr, but African-American pop diva Whitney  Houston, whose rous-
ing rendition of “The Star-Spangled Banner” at the 1991 Super  Bowl became a 
symbol of American unity and  patriotism. Broadcast live on  television by ABC 
on January 27, 1991, only ten days after the offi cial beginning of Operation 
Desert  Storm, Houston’s performance turned the Super Bowl into a pep rally 
to cheer on the American army in its war against  Iraq.
 Both President  Bush’s reference to Roseanne  Barr and the Super  Bowl 
performance by Whitney  Houston show how American pop culture has be-
come intertwined with American politics. In this chapter, I will look at ex-
plicit moments of such intertwinement. First, I will discuss the Super Bowl 
performances of the American national  anthem by Whitney  Houston in 1991 
during the fi rst Gulf  War, by Mariah  Carey in 2002 during the American inva-
sion of Afghanistan after 9/ 11, by the Dixie  Chicks in 2003 during the pending 
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American invasion of  Iraq, and by  Beyoncé Knowles in 2004, nine months after 
President George W.  Bush had announced the invasion of  Iraq to be a “Mis-
sion Accomplished.” Second, I will look at the role of American pop culture in 
two of the few  Hollywood fi lms that deal with the fi rst Gulf  War: Three  Kings 
(David O. Russell, 1999) and  Jarhead (Sam Mendes, 2005), the latter based on 
the bestselling memoirs by fi rst Gulf  War veteran Anthony  Swofford. Before 
analyzing these pop-cultural artifacts, I will introduce the concept of myth, as 
defi ned by Roland  Barthes, and the concept of  hyperreality, as defi ned by Jean 
 Baudrillard, both of which are helpful in understanding how American pop 
culture not only enables the popular translation of American military actions, 
but simultaneously invites a justifi cation of the American political position, 
even if some of these expressions (like Three Kings) may appear to be criti-
cal of the nation-state  USA. Although the televised Super Bowl performances 
and the Hollywood movies Three Kings and Jarhead belong to different genres, 
they all effectively combine American politics and pop culture by applying the 
connotations of an imagined  America to explain and often justify the politics 
of the American nation-state. Moreover, as these  television and fi lm perform-
ances by American pop and movie stars are globally mediated, they not only 
present a national self-image to American viewers, but an ideological image of 
America to an international audience as well.
Barthesian Myth and Baudrillardian Hyperreality
In his essay “Myth  Today” (originally published in 1957), Roland  Barthes uses 
a 1955 Paris  Match cover depicting a young black soldier as an example of 
how myth is constructed. To analyze its construction,  Barthes recognizes two 
levels of signifi cation:  denotation and connotation. On the level of  denotation, 
the primary level of signifi cation, the cover shows a young black soldier salut-
ing the French fl ag, the latter not present but implied through the cover’s use 
of the national tricolor red, white, and blue. On the level of connotation, the 
secondary level of signifi cation, the magazine cover offers a positive image of 
French imperialism and  patriotism. Placed within the historical context of the 
then recent defeat in  Vietnam and the raging war in Algeria, the depiction of a 
black soldier implies that French imperialism is justifi ed and widely supported, 
including by the non-white population of the French empire. More important, 
the myth that French imperialism is positive is presented as self-evident and 
uncontested. As  Barthes explains: “Myth does not deny things, on the contrary, 
its function is to talk about them; simply, it purifi es them, it makes them in-
nocent, it gives them a natural and eternal justifi cation, it gives them a clarity 
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which is not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact.”3 In other 
words, through connotation the meaning of representation is reduced to seem-
ingly self-evident and uncontested myth, inviting an uncritical reading.
 The 1955 Paris  Match cover used by  Barthes immediately comes to mind 
when looking at two 2003 magazine covers featuring the same picture of Jes-
sica  Lynch, the American soldier who was heroically rescued by the American 
Special Forces after being captured by the Iraqi army. Both  Newsweek (14 April 
2003) and People  magazine (21 April 2003) use an undated army picture of 
 Lynch in uniform in front of the American  fl ag, an image which has become 
iconic by now, showing her face in close-up, smiling directly into the cam-
era. There are great similarities between these two covers and the Paris Match 
cover. In both cases, the national fl ag is present in the left corner. The French 
fl ag is implied through the use of its colors, while the American fl ag is explic-
itly present. Moreover, the gender of the American soldier works similarly to 
the racial identity of the French soldier. As the blackness of the French soldier 
implied wide solidarity for French imperialism, the smiling face of the female 
soldier suggests broad support for the American war effort.4 Yet, there are also 
important differences. The French soldier remained anonymous, while the 
American soldier has a name: Jessica  Lynch, an innocent young woman who 
ends up being a soldier on duty in  Iraq. More than just a name, Jessica  Lynch 
has become an adventurous tale. As the headline of the People magazine cover 
reads: “POW Jessica  Lynch – Her Incredible Story: An inside account of the 
young soldier’s midnight rescue, her joyful family reunion, and the long road 
home.” The cover of  Newsweek uses fewer words to achieve a similar result by 
presenting the headline “Saving Private  Lynch,” an obvious reference to the 
 Hollywood blockbuster Saving Private  Ryan (Steven Spielberg, 1998). Thus, in 
stark contrast to the anonymous soldier on the 1955 cover of Paris Match, the 
American soldier on the 2003 covers of  Newsweek and People magazine is not 
only personalized but also transformed into a highly dramatized “true” story, 
a dramatization which has been taken a step further by the NBC  television 
movie Saving Jessica  Lynch (Peter Markle, 2003). Through her passive heroism 
by being both a brave soldier and an innocent victim, Jessica  Lynch not only 
becomes the “face” of the second Gulf War, she also embodies an uncontested 
positive justifi cation of the American military presence in  Iraq.
 In his essay “Culture, US Imperialism, and Globalization,” John Carlos 
 Rowe compares the “story” of Jessica  Lynch – as constructed by the Ameri-
can media, both the factual news and the fi ctional  television fi lm – to the 
 Hollywood fi lm Wag the  Dog (Barry Levinson, 1997), in which a Hollywood 
producer helps to cover up a presidential sex scandal by inventing a war 
with Albania, a fabricated story which includes the saving of an American 
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soldier who is left behind enemy lines. As  Rowe argues, Wag the Dog “sati-
rizes Americans’ chronic ignorance of world events, thanks to news struc-
tured around  entertainment and commercialism, but it also reinforces the 
assumption that the US is the center of the world and that even a ‘fi ctional’ 
war can have meaning and value, as long as it is waged by the US.”5 The me-
dia coverage of the second Gulf  War, and the saving of Private Jessica  Lynch 
in particular, reconfi rms the fi ction of Wag the Dog, especially after the Brit-
ish BBC documentary War  Spin (originally broadcast on May 18, 2003) re-
vealed that the spectacular rescue of  Lynch, which was fi lmed, appeared to 
have been scripted by the  Pentagon.6 However, whether or not the saving of 
Jessica  Lynch was “real” is beside the point. When Roland  Barthes speaks of 
myth, he does not imply that myth is by defi nition untrue or unreal. Myth 
works because its connotations remain uncontested and uncritically ac-
cepted. The smiling face of Jessica  Lynch in the media continues to provide 
an innocent justifi cation of the American invasion of  Iraq, in spite of the 
critical reading that the fi ctional Wag the Dog scenario may invite. As  Rowe 
suggests: “Rather than Wag the Dog’s satire overwhelming and thus neutral-
izing the Jessica  Lynch story on the evening news, Jessica  Lynch’s narrative, 
now made into a  television biopic, has undone the irony of Barry Levinson’s 
fi lm, especially its ‘rescued soldier’ device.”7 Even if the Jessica  Lynch story 
is recognized as a real-life enactment of the Wag the Dog scenario, that does 
not undermine the effectiveness of the mechanism which the fi lm satirizes. 
 Neal  Gabler also refers to Wag the  Dog when discussing the way in which 
the administration of President George H.W.  Bush staged the fi rst Gulf  War as 
a “multibillion-dollar movie blockbuster,” broadcast by the  television networks, 
featuring heroic soldiers, dark mustachioed villains, and spectacular visual ef-
fects of “smart bombing,” with a triumphant parade of the homecoming troops 
in the streets of New York as grand fi nale.8 Aptly titled Life: The Movie,  Gabler’s 
study builds on David  Boorstin’s The Image (1961), in which  Boorstin argues 
that the fantasy of  advertising,  Hollywood, and  television has replaced reality 
in American culture, becoming more “real” than reality itself. Life: The Movie 
also shares the rather cultural pessimism of Neal  Postman’s Amusing Ourselves 
to Death (1985), suggesting that, particularly because of commercial  televi-
sion, American culture has been reduced to  entertainment. Moreover, Life: The 
Movie can be read as a popular adaptation of Jean  Baudrillard’s concept of 
 hyperreality, suggesting that reality merely exists as  a simulacrum, constructed
 through its simulation: “The real is hyperrealized. Neither realized, nor ideal-
ized: but hyperrealized. The hyperreal is the abolition of the real not by violent 
destruction, but by its assumption.”9  Baudrillard’s  hyperreality is not the op-
posite of reality (“unreal”) but a continuous simulation that creates the real 
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as just another sign in a chain of signs which endlessly refer to each other. If 
indeed American life is a movie rather than being like a movie, American life 
can be perceived as a  hyperreality, in which the actual reality of life has be-
come part of the stream of images mediated by Hollywood and  television, as 
Jean  Baudrillard convincingly shows in America, his fascinating account of his 
travels through the USA. “In America cinema is true because it is the whole of 
space, the whole way of life that are cinematic,” he writes. “The break between 
the two … does not exist: life is cinema.”10
 The signifi cance of  Baudrillard’s America lies not so much in the claim 
that America is the ultimate  simulacrum, which can be contested. Conclud-
ing whether or not America is in fact a  hyperreality is less relevant than try-
ing to understand the way American culture works by perceiving America as a 
 hyperreality. From a Baudrillardian perspective, America is a space where the 
myth of the American  Dream does not come true but is true already through 
its mythic construction. In a paradoxical way, America is a “utopia achieved,” 
the impossible made possible, because of its fi ctional character. As  Baudrillard 
explains: 
When I speak of the American “way of life,” I do so to emphasize its uto-
pian nature, its mythic banality, its dream quality, and its grandeur. That 
philosophy which is immanent not only … in the reality of everyday life, 
but in the  hyperreality of that life which, as it is, displays all the charac-
teristics of fi ction. It is this fi ctional character which is so exciting. Now, 
fi ction is not imagination. It is what anticipates imagination by giving 
it the form of reality. … The American way of life is spontaneously fi c-
tional, since it is a transcending of the imaginary in reality.11
Here  Baudrillard’s  hyperreality and myth overlap, as the fi ction that shapes 
American reality is constituted by myth in the  Barthesian sense. In this man-
ner, the American  Dream turns out to be an uncontested  hyperreality rather 
than an idealized or imagined desire. American pop culture is instrumental in 
the shaping of  hyperreality through fi ctionalization, as movie and pop stars are 
the mythical embodiment of the American Dream, its living examples.
 In The Gulf  War Did Not Take Place, composed of three essays origi-
nally published before, during, and immediately after Operation Desert  Storm 
in the British  Guardian and the French  Libération,  Baudrillard proposes that, 
similar to his reading of America, the fi rst Gulf  War should be perceived as a 
 hyperreality, a  simulacrum which transforms the actual war into a virtual one, 
a spectacle of information. This simulation of the Gulf  War, broadcast live on 
 television, is made out of symptoms, images of reality which can no longer be 
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recognized as either true or false, real or fake. “We must learn to read symp-
toms as symptoms, and  television as the hysterical symptom of a war which 
has nothing to do with its critical mass.”12  Baudrillard’s claim that the actual 
Gulf  War had not taken place provoked strong objections, most explicitly by 
Christopher  Norris who accused  Baudrillard of being nihilistically uncritical, 
as by reducing the war to a hyperreal event,  Baudrillard escapes the ethical 
responsibility of speaking out against the physical reality of the Gulf  War.13 
However,  Baudrillard never suggests that the Gulf  War is not real in the sense 
of denying its materiality of real Iraqi civilians and soldiers being killed by real 
bombs. Quite the contrary, he strongly criticizes that the “100,000 Iraqi dead” 
are being misused to recognize the Gulf  War as a real war: “What is worse is 
that these dead still serve as an alibi for those who do not want to have been 
excited for nothing, nor to have been had for nothing: at least the dead would 
prove that this war was indeed a war and not a shameful and pointless hoax, 
a programmed and melodramatic version of what was the drama of war.”14 
Rather than being nihilistically uncritical, Jean  Baudrillard’s The Gulf  War Did 
Not Take Place forces us to recognize that the symptomatic images of compu-
terized warfare and smart bombing as broadcast by  television are not merely 
representations that can be judged to be either real or fake, but images that 
construct the Gulf  War as a  hyperreality, thereby not denying the physical real-
ity of the Iraqi victims but rendering them invisible.15
 Although critical of  Baudrillard’s claim, Ella  Shohat and Robert  Stam 
have described the Gulf  War as a multigeneric  television miniseries, drawing 
“on the codes of the war fi lm (soldiers silhouetted against the sky, thrilling 
martial music, Top  Gun visuals); of the PBS educational show (military ped-
agogs with pointers, maps, and video blackboards); of  sports programming 
(instant replay, expert-running commentary); and of the western (lines were 
drawn in the sand, the implacable logic of the showdown).”16 Not only the im-
ages of computer warfare and smart bombing themselves but also the way they 
were broadcast shape the fi ctionalization of the Gulf  War into  hyperreality, 
based on the conventions of pop culture. As I will show in the remainder of this 
chapter, the fi ctionalization was not limited to the news coverage by  television 
news programs, but also occurred through the ritualistic annual performances 
of the national anthem at the Super  Bowl, and in fact still continues today 
through  Hollywood fi lms such as Three  Kings and  Jarhead. My analysis of these 
pop-cultural performances by pop and movie stars will suggest that the Gulf 
 War that did not take place presents and reconfi rms America as an uncontested 
mythical  hyperreality.
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America at the Super  Bowl during the First Gulf  War
Whitney  Houston was not the fi rst internationally famous pop star to sing 
“The Star-Spangled Banner” at the Super  Bowl. Since the early 1980s, it has 
become a Super Bowl tradition to invite pop music stars to sing the nation-
al anthem, including performances by Diana  Ross (1982), Billy  Joel (1989 
and 2007),  Cher (1999), Faith  Hill (2000), and American  Idol’s Jordin  Sparks 
(2008). Unlike some of the performances by pop stars at other occasions, none 
of the Super Bowl performances have been considered controversial. In addi-
tion to the earlier-mentioned rendition by Roseanne  Barr, controversial per-
formances of “The Star-Spangled Banner” range from José  Feliciano’s slow and 
melancholic rendition at the 1968 World  Series and Jimi  Hendrix’s guitar solo 
at the 1969 Woodstock festival, to the soulful renditions by Aretha  Franklin 
at the 1968 Democratic National  Convention and Marvin  Gaye at the 1983 
National Basketball Association All-Star Game. In 2001, at the start of the In-
dianapolis  500 racing event, Steven  Tyler of the rock band Aerosmith caused 
controversy by changing the words “the home of the brave” into “the home of 
the Indianapolis 500.” Such controversies have been absent from the annual 
Super Bowl performance of “The Star-Spangled Banner,” which emphasizes its 
status as the performance of the national anthem. Each year the performance 
is tightly scripted and monitored, the vocals often pre-recorded, to ensure that 
no unwelcome surprises interfere with its almost ritualistic status, different 
than can happen during the extravagant halftime performances that are more 
susceptible to controversy, of which the 2004 performance by Janet  Jackson 
and Justin  Timberlake (as discussed later on in this chapter) is the most obvi-
ous example.
 Several scholars have pointed out the signifi cance of  sports events, and 
the Super  Bowl in particular, in the construction of a national identity.17 Being 
the “crucible of [the] nation,” to quote Toby  Miller,  sports are often used as a 
metaphor for the nation.18 Not only is nationhood essential to international 
 sports events such as the World Cup Soccer and the  Olympics, and also Ameri-
can national events such as the Super Bowl and the World  Series, the rhetoric 
of  sports and the military are intertwined and often interchangeable. Football 
coaches use military metaphors to plan the strategies that will lead their uni-
formed athletes to victory, while army offi cials, politicians, and journalists talk 
about military operations – led by generals coaching their uniformed soldiers 
– by referring to  sports. Similar to the way a national identity can be reinforced 
through the patriotic sentiments of war,  sports events can bring national 
communities together in  patriotism and  nationalism. Perhaps this “natural” 
connection between the military and  sports explains the relatively easy way, 
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without any resistance or commentary, in which the Super Bowl performances 
bring together  sports and explicit expressions of military power.
 Whitney  Houston herself recognized the patriotic character of her per-
formance of “The Star-Spangled Banner.” In an interview, she recalled:
If you were there, you could feel the intensity. You know, we were in the 
Gulf  War at the time. It was an intense time for a country. A lot of our 
daughters and sons were overseas fi ghting. I could see, in the stadium, 
I could see the fear, the hope, the intensity, the prayers going up, you 
know, and I just felt like this is the moment. And it was hope, we needed 
hope, you know, to bring our babies home and that’s what it was about 
for me, that’s what I felt when I sang that song, and the overwhelming 
love coming out of the stands was incredible.19
As the use of the plural personal pronouns “we” and “our” implies, Houston 
speaks of her performance as a collective experience. Not the American na-
tion-state as an abstract entity but “we” as a “country” are at war. Moreover, she 
uses the metaphor of the family to express the collective national identity. In 
spite of the strong presence of the military, Whitney  Houston recognizes the 
expression of explicit  patriotism as “overwhelming love,” fi tting within the per-
spective of the Barthesian  myth, which, in this case, means that the American 
participation in the fi rst Gulf  War remains unquestioned.
 Bombastic may be the best word to describe Houston’s performance of 
“The Star-Spangled Banner.” Rather than being dressed as the glamorous diva, 
Whitney  Houston wears a white tracksuit, with a red and blue print, an athletic 
uniform that refers to the national tricolor red, white, and blue. The connec-
tion to  patriotism and the Gulf  War is made explicit by the announcer, as he 
asks the audience to join in the honoring of “America” and “especially the brave 
men and women serving our nation in the Persian Gulf and throughout the 
world.” The emphasis on the military is reinforced by the presence of military 
personnel on the fi eld, while the athletes are notably absent. The military per-
sonnel, dressed in various uniforms to signify the solidarity among different 
army units, display the fl ags of the different American states, which emphasizes 
that the USA consists of states all unifi ed in a national war effort. Two male 
members of the military are singled out through the use of close-ups: an Afri-
can-American offi cer and a white offi cer. The second close-up of the African-
American offi cer uncannily resembles the saluting young black soldier on the 
cover of the Paris  Match magazine, as analyzed by Roland  Barthes. Similar to 
his example, the explicit inclusion of African-American military (in addition 
to Houston’s blackness) implies that there is wide support for the war effort 
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among the American population, how ethnically diverse the population may 
be. This is reinforced by the way in which the close-up of Whitney  Houston 
dissolves into the close-up of the white offi cer, and back again. For a second, 
both Houston and the white offi cer are captured within the same frame (al-
most like a split screen), a conventional way to emphasize their similarity over 
their differences. In other words, through the suggestion that Houston and the 
white offi cer are one, their shared identity as Americans is brought forward.
 The American  fl ag is omnipresent in all shots, either explicitly in the form 
of an actual American fl ag, or implicitly through the use of its colors red, white, 
and blue. In addition to the waving American fl ags, a group of people at the 
center of the football fi eld display a gigantic American fl ag, best visible when 
shot from a distance. On several occasions, the presence of the fl ag is empha-
sized through the use of close-ups in connection to the words Whitney  Houston 
sings. When she sings, “… see, by the dawn’s early light,” a close-up of an Ameri-
can fl ag dissolves in and out of the close-up of Houston. Houston does not leave 
the frame, but for a second, the image of the American fl ag is transparently 
placed over her image. At the point when Whitney  Houston sings “through the 
night that our fl ag was still there,” the camera cuts to a close-up of the American 
fl ag proudly waving at the top of the stadium – a  television convention found in 
many broadcasts of the Super  Bowl national anthem performances. 
 Perhaps most important is the way in which the audience is presented 
as a collective of American patriots who wholeheartedly support their nation’s 
war effort. Throughout the performance, there are medium shots and close-
ups of the audience waving small American fl ags. While at international  sports 
events the audience is divided between two or more competing nations, the au-
dience at the Super  Bowl supports just one: the American nation. No signs are 
shown in the support of one of the two teams competing. In fact, any mention 
of either team is absent (in 1991, the New York Giants beat the Buffalo Bills). 
Instead, rather than cheering on the individual teams, the red-white-and-blue 
signs in the audience support the American war effort. “America’s Bravest Citi-
zens: Support Our G.I.’s” reads one, followed by two other red-white-blue signs 
reading “God Bless America” and “Go USA.” Particularly the latter sign, “Go 
USA,” emphasizes the intertwinement of  sports and the military. The Ameri-
can war effort is supported in the same way as an audience cheers on a  sports 
team. In this way, the Super Bowl becomes a pep rally to cheer on the American 
military in the Gulf. Moreover, this military connection is made complete with 
four F-16 fi ghting jets from the 56th Tactical Training Wing at MacDill Air 
Force Base fl ying over as the performance’s grand fi nale.
 The intertwinement of  sports,  patriotism, and pop culture, all support-
the desert of the real 75
fabricating.indd   75 27-05-2008   16:52:50
ing the war effort, ties American  nationalism to  consumerism. Jean  Baudrillard 
has suggested that the USA is “a society that is endlessly concerned to vindicate 
itself, perpetually seeking to justify its own existence,” adding that the “Ameri-
can  fl ag bears witness to this by its omnipresence, … not as a heroic sign, but 
as a trademark of a good brand.”20 The American fl ag is not only a symbol of 
the American nation-state and its people, but an  advertising logo as well, a sign 
that refers both to the nation-state and to an endless chain of signs of Ameri-
can pop culture. Although already functioning in this manner during the fi rst 
Gulf  War, this has become even clearer after the terrorist attacks of September 
 11,  2001. As Susan  Willis shows, after 9/ 11 the American fl ag is omnipresent, 
displayed at places ranging from Ground  Zero to homes, cars, storefronts, and 
government buildings, and eventually also at Kandahar Airport in Afghani-
stan. Moreover, the fl ag functions as a patriotic fashion statement:
Emblazoned across our chests, the fl ag becomes one with the rock bands 
and  sports teams that also claim our allegiance and warrant a T-shirt’s 
stamp of approval. … With fl ags on our shirts, we express the heart-
felt desire to contribute our individual pledge to the collective endeavor, 
even while we simultaneously recognize that the American endeavor is to 
consume commodities and ensure their worldwide distribution.21
Rather than seeing the fl ag’s double function as a contradiction, Susan  Willis 
suggests that American  patriotism and  consumerism reinforce each other. In 
her introduction to The Selling of 9/ 11, Dana  Heller makes a similar argument 
by perceiving the fl ag as a “national-corporate logo,” one which does not invite 
a questioning of the American nation-state and its international politics, con-
cluding that “the fl ag erupts upon the national scene like a neurotic symptom, 
a repetition of our hysterical deafness to any criticism or any idea that might 
get in the way of our rights to unlimited consumption, and our national duty 
to employ military measures, if necessary, to protect that right.”22 The perform-
ance of “The Star-Spangled Banner” at the Super  Bowl functions in the same 
way, as the American  fl ag and the national anthem have become intertwined 
as both a conventional reference to the nation-state  USA and a free fl oating 
sign, an  advertising logo of American consumer culture. Performed by Whit-
ney  Houston, “The Star-Spangled Banner” is both a national anthem and a pop 
song, bringing  patriotism and  consumerism together.
 After the Super  Bowl performance, Whitney  Houston’s “The Star-Span-
gled Banner” was released as a single, reaching number 20 on  Billboard’s Hot 
100. The single was also released in other countries, including the Netherlands, 
but failed to make the pop charts outside of the USA. Copies of the single 
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(in addition to complementary copies of  Playboy magazine) were sent to the 
American troops stationed in Kuwait. Dressed in blue military overalls,  Hous-
ton gave another performance of “The Star-Spangled Banner” on March 31, 
2001, on her Welcome Home Heroes with Whitney  Houston HBO  television spe-
cial, recorded before an audience of homecoming soldiers and family members. 
In 2001, one month after 9/ 11, Houston’s record company Arista re-released 
“The Star-Spangled Banner” as a single, with “America the Beautiful” as an ad-
ditional song, this time reaching number 6 on  Billboard’s Hot 100. The cover 
art of the 2001 single is particularly signifi cant. While the 1991 single features a 
picture of Houston performing at the Super Bowl, the re-release merely shows 
a pop art styled picture of the American  fl ag, functioning as a conventional 
patriotic symbol signifying the nation-state  USA, but also as a trademarked 
brand of pop-cultural America and as an  advertising logo to sell Houston’s 
single, perfectly revealing how  patriotism, pop culture, and  consumerism have 
become intertwined.
America at the Super  Bowl after 9/ 11
Writing about the 2003 Super  Bowl performance of “The Star-Spangled Ban-
ner” by the Dixie  Chicks, Tobias  Peterson has argued that it was a reenactment 
of the 1991 Super Bowl, as each was “a massive wartime pep rally, cheering not 
only the players on the fi eld, but the soldiers in the Gulf and elsewhere.” He also 
compares the Dixie  Chicks’ performance to the 2002 performance by Mariah 
 Carey, claiming that the 2003 one was “far removed from last year’s pervading 
sense of victimization” and that “war and revenge are now more the focus of 
national discussion than grief and remembrance.”23 Yet, when taking a closer 
look at all performances, the similarities become striking. Not only the 2003 
performance by the Dixie  Chicks, but also the 2002 performance by Mariah 
 Carey and the 2004 performance by  Beyoncé Knowles prove to be very simi-
lar to Whitney  Houston’s 1991 performance. These four Super Bowl perform-
ances can be seen as American national rituals, which, as Rob  Kroes suggests, 
“increasingly blended mass spectator  sports with displays of military prowess 
and martial vigor that paralleled the gestation of the new [neo-conservative] 
foreign  policy views,” constituting a “trend [that] may herald a militarization 
of the American public spirit, propagated through the mass media.”24 Since the 
pivotal performance by Whitney  Houston, most of the Super Bowl perform-
ances of “The Star-Spangled Banner” have included an explicit presence of the 
military.
 At a press conference before her 2002 Super  Bowl performance, Mariah 
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 Carey explained that she, similar to Whitney  Houston, recognized the patriotic 
symbolism of the ceremony. “Defi nitely after the events of September  11, I 
think that people obviously have been much more focused on the patriotic 
nature of this event and what it’s going to mean.”25 Only a couple of months 
after 9/ 11, the Super Bowl performance was intended to remember the tragedy 
and pay respect to the 9/11 victims. However, the performance was also part 
of a larger spectacle that was more than merely an act of remembrance. As 
Douglas  Kellner has analyzed in his study Media Spectacle, the 2002 Super Bowl 
could be seen as a continuation of the display of military power and  patriotism 
as originally presented at the 1991 Super Bowl: 
Super  Bowl 2002 featured  Bush I and former US Navy and  NFL star 
Roger Stauback fl ipping the coin to decide which team would receive 
the fi rst kickoff. A hi-tech spectacle featured US troops watching live in 
Kandahar, and military personnel punching in statistical graphics, mak-
ing the screen appear like a computer in a military system. Stars of each 
team were periodically shown in front of a waving US fl ag with a graphic 
announcing that “they were proud to be a part of SB36, of this great na-
tion, and that they were thankful for the troops’ courage in Afghanistan.” 
Broadcast by the ultra-right  Fox network, the computer graphics fea-
tured red, white, and blue banners and the transition graphics involved 
the use of an exploding fi reworks scene with the triad of patriotic colors 
blasting across the screen. The Super Bowl logo in the center of the fi eld 
was in the shape of the United States, and the  Fox network used a pa-
triotic logo with the fl ag’s colors and images, imitating NBC, which had 
transformed its multicolored peacock into the fl ag’s tricolors after the 
September  11 terrorists attacks.26
I quote from  Kellner’s analysis at length, as it shows how the broadcast of the 2002 
Super  Bowl, similar to the 1991 Super Bowl, has effectively included the display 
of military power within a  sports event. Rather than merely remembering the 
9/ 11 victims, the 2002 Super Bowl proves to be another example of how the 
collectivity of the  sports event is used to bring together the nation in wartime 
 patriotism and to cheer on the army in its war effort.
 Compared to Whitney  Houston’s performance, the performance by 
Mariah  Carey seems much less bombastic. The stadium is shot in relative 
darkness, emphasizing a mood of mourning and seriousness. While the 
audience was clearly visible during the broadcast of Houston’s performance, 
here the audience is visually almost absent. Only in one shot, as the camera 
is placed among the audience in the stands, is the audience is shown, though 
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individuals are not recognizable. Without medium shots or close-ups of the 
audience, the audience is reduced to a cheering mass, for the most part hidden 
in darkness. Similar to Whitney  Houston’s performance, no athletes are shown 
and the competing teams (in 2002, the New England Patriots beat the St. 
Louis Rams) are not mentioned. Instead, the segment starts with a medium 
pan shot of fi ve uniformed offi cers of the U.S.S. Cole, the U.S. Marine Corps, 
the New York New Jersey Port Authority, and the New York City Police and 
Fire Department. The link to international  terrorism is immediately made 
explicit, as not only the victims of 9/ 11, but also the military victims of the 
terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole in the Yemen harbor are remembered. This 
not only shifts the tribute from the national into the international sphere, 
but also makes an explicit connection between the military and the civilian 
uniformed personnel. By honoring the victims among uniformed personnel, 
without explicitly including the civilian victims, the performance reduces 9/11 
to a military event of international politics, ignoring its also being a national 
civilian tragedy. Moreover, it is this shift from the national to the international, 
from the civilian to the militaristic, that makes the Mariah  Carey performance 
similar to the Whitney  Houston performance. Even though the audience in 
Houston’s performance is shown to be more active in the actual support of 
the war effort (compared to the relatively visual absence of Carey’s audience), 
both performances can be perceived as an explicit support of military action, 
respectively in the Gulf and Afghanistan.
 Similar to most Super  Bowl broadcasts of the national anthem, the 
American  fl ag is omnipresent in the performance by Mariah  Carey, again both 
explicitly through the display of the actual American fl ag, as well as implicitely 
through the use of the national tricolor red, white, and blue. For example, in 
the fi rst close-up of Carey, these three colors are dominant, in the combination 
of Carey’s blue dress, the conductor Keith Lockhart’s white shirt, and the red 
music standard (the only other color is black), which is repeated in the banner 
containing the Super Bowl logo, the  Fox logo, and Carey’s name. A group of 
children dressed in white display a gigantic American fl ag in the geographical 
shape of the United States of America. When Carey sings, “… that our fl ag was 
still there,” the camera zooms into a close-up of the American fl ag held by one 
of the fi ve uniformed offi cers. Perhaps most signifi cant, two American fl ags are 
prominently featured in two tableaux vivant: the fi rst being a live enactment 
of the Iwo  Jima monument, with fi ve soldiers in battle fatigues planting the 
American fl ag in the soil, and the second being six uniformed offi cers of the 
New York Police and Fire Department displaying – in Iwo  Jima style – the torn 
“original” American fl ag of the World Trade  Center. In both shots, the camera 
zooms into a close-up of the American fl ag.
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  The Super  Bowl performance is not the fi rst time that the imagery of the 
Iwo  Jima monument, which in its turn is based on the famous 1945 photograph 
by Joe  Rosenthal, has been used in connection with 9/ 11. Immediately after 
the attacks on September  11, photographer Thomas  Franklin shot an Iwo 
 Jima-style picture of three white fi remen raising the American  fl ag on Ground 
 Zero.27 Franklin’s picture instantly became an icon of 9/11, reproduced in many 
ways, including as offi cial stamp of the U.S. Postal Service and as life-size wax 
statue at Madame  Tussauds in New York City. The picture also inspired the 
controversial proposal for a bronze statue to be placed at the New York Fire 
 Department, which never materialized because no agreement could be reached 
on replacing the three white men with a multicultural team – white, African-
American, and Hispanic – of  fi refi ghters. The attempt to make the proposed 
statue multicultural follows the logic of Barthesian  myth, suggesting broad 
consensus among the ethnically diverse American population in perceiving 
the fi refi ghter as a positive embodiment of the nation-state  USA. Referring to 
a model version of the statue, Susan  Willis has argued: “In the guise of New 
York’s  fi refi ghters the statue embodies the nation and facilitates a shift from 
the local to the international, from the work of recovery to the work of war. As 
a sliding signifi er, the statue enables the nation’s attention to move from Lower 
Manhattan to the new Iwo  Jima in Kabul and Kandahar.”28 The two tableaux 
vivant at the Super Bowl performance reinforce this shift through the explicit 
juxtaposition of the live enactment of the “original” Iwo  Jima image with the 
live enactment of the raising of the American fl ag at Ground Zero. Again, this 
shift emphasizes the move from the national to the international, from the 
civilian to the militaristic. In this way, the performance becomes a patriotic 
support of the American war effort.
 One year later, on January 26, 2003, the Dixie  Chicks sang “The Star-
Spangled Banner” at the Super  Bowl, broadcast live by ABC. In retrospect, the 
patriotic character of their performance may seem atypical, as the Dixie  Chicks 
are now best known for their anti-war announcement made at a concert in 
London, on March 10, 2003, stating that they were ashamed that President 
 Bush is from Texas, the home state of the Dixie  Chicks. As a result, the Dixie 
 Chicks were boycotted by the major country radio channels, heavily criticized 
by fans, and shunned by fellow country singers, a backlash which has been 
documented in the fi lm Shut Up &  Sing (Barbara Kopple and Cecilia Peck, 
2006). Yet, before the controversy, the Dixie  Chicks were considered to be the 
most popular female singers of country, a music genre that has a long tradition 
of explicit pro-military  patriotism.29 At the next Super Bowl, broadcast live 
by NBC on February 1, 2004, “The Star-Spangled Banner” was performed by 
 Beyoncé Knowles. As a young African-American R&B singer,  Beyoncé was 
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immediately compared to Whitney  Houston, including by  Beyoncé herself 
on The Oprah Winfrey  Show (20 February 2004), telling the audience that 
singing “The Star-Spangled Banner” became her dream after seeing Houston’s 
performance live on  television.
 The connection to the military is made explicit immediately at the 
opening of both ceremonies. The national anthem by the Dixie  Chicks starts 
with a medium shot of the crew of the U.S.S. Preble, a guided missile destroyer 
of the U.S. Navy, with the announcer stating that the performance is “to honor 
America and our service men and women around the world.” The performance 
by  Beyoncé starts with the announcer introducing the Vice Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter  Pace, who is shown in close-up, “representing 
our sailors, soldiers, airmen, marines, and coast guards serving our nation with 
pride around the world,” followed by a word of gratitude: “To our military 
services we say thank you for your dedication and professionalism in protecting 
America’s  freedom.” Subsequently, General Pace escorts  Beyoncé to the stage, 
where she, dressed in an elegant white women’s suit, sings “The Star-Spangled 
Banner.” When  Beyoncé sings “… so proudly we hailed …,” a live connection 
is made to American soldiers stationed at Camp Freedom Rest in Bagdad, 
 Iraq, watching the performance. Similar to Whitney  Houston’s grand fi nale 
in 1991, the explicit connection to the military is repeated at the end of the 
ceremonies with military aircrafts fl ying over the stadium. The performance 
by the Dixie  Chicks ends with a fl y-over of Super Hornet strike fi ghters by the 
VFA-122 Flying Eagles from the Naval Air Station Lemoore, while the  Beyoncé 
performance ends with a fl y-over of four Apache attack helicopters by the Texas 
National Guard.
 Different than those of 1991 and 2002, however, the performances by 
the Dixie  Chicks and  Beyoncé do include the athletes of the football teams (in 
2003, the Tampa Bay Buccaneers beat the Oakland Raiders; in 2004, the New 
England Patriots beat the Carolina Panthers). In the case of the Dixie  Chicks, 
eleven close-ups of both black and white football players from both teams 
alternate with shots of military personnel, including a veteran in the audience, 
emphasizing the connection between the athletes and the military. During the 
2004 performance by  Beyoncé, the military is not present on the fi eld, with 
the exception of the uniformed fl ag bearers. Also here the main focus is on the 
athletes, with seven close-ups of football players, again both black and white 
from both teams. In addition, the American  fl ag is less prominently present 
in the performances of 2003 and 2004 than in those of 1991 and 2002. The 
Dixie  Chicks performance does include two medium shots of a giant American 
fl ag on the fi eld and one close-up of the American fl ag when the Dixie  Chicks 
sing “… of the brave.” In the  Beyoncé performance, the conventional giant 
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American fl ag on the fi eld has been replaced by the giant red-white-and-blue 
logo of the National Football  League, which does include the fl ag’s stars and 
stripes. Yet, like the Whitney  Houston performance, the audience is prominently 
visible, holding (rather than waving) American fl ags as banners in their hands, 
thereby creating a large visual sea of red, white, and blue. On the one hand, the 
performances by the Dixie  Chicks and  Beyoncé differ from the performances 
by Whitney  Houston and Mariah  Carey, as they emphasize the athletes over 
explicit signs of military prowess, suggesting that the performances of 1991 
and 2002 are stronger expressions of American  patriotism, connected to 
specifi c moments in history which warrant such support, respectively the 
Gulf  War and 9/ 11. On the other hand, however, the similarities between all 
four performances remain striking, showing that American  patriotism and 
the military presence have become generic elements of the annual Super  Bowl 
performance of “The Star-Spangled Banner.” 
 The 2004 Super  Bowl performance by  Beyoncé was overshadowed by the 
controversy of the halftime show. When pop star Justin  Timberlake tore off a 
part of singing partner Janet  Jackson’s costume, thereby exposing her naked 
right breast, the incident became a hot international news item and a topic of 
public debate about the lack of decency on American national  television. The 
Federal Communication  Commission (FCC) announced that it would inves-
tigate the incident. In a hearing before the Senate Commerce Committee, FCC 
chairman Michael  Powell stated that the “now infamous display during the 
Super Bowl halftime show, which represented a new low in prime-time  televi-
sion, is just the latest example in a growing list of deplorable incidents over the 
nation’s airwaves.” Making an explicit reference to the American nation-state, 
Powell added, “Our nation’s children, parents, and citizens deserve better.”30 
This incident is signifi cant as it exposes the lack of public discussion about the 
use of the Super Bowl as a forum for American  patriotism and support for the 
American war effort. While a nude breast at the Super Bowl can lead to heated 
public debate and senatorial investigation, the overwhelming display of mili-
tary power at the very same  sports event remains uncontested. This suggests 
that the Barthesian  myth is indeed effective, as, through the Super Bowl per-
formances, the positive representation of American military power and Ameri-
can  patriotism becomes naturalized and justifi ed, without being contested or 
countered by oppositional arguments.
 Although negotiated and oppositional readings of the four performances 
of “The Star-Spangled Banner” are possible (not all Americans watching the 
Super  Bowl will recognize themselves in the national identity that is being con-
structed, and not all non-Americans watching the Super Bowl will accept the 
presented national identity as representative of “America”), the intertwining
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of  sports, the military,  patriotism, and popular  entertainment presents a 
combination that remains diffi cult to resist. Bordering on propaganda, these 
performances of “The Star-Spangled Banner” use the double function of the 
American  fl ag as national symbol and as  advertising logo to represent Ameri-
can  patriotism, to paraphrase Roland  Barthes, as innocent and natural, not as 
an explanation, but as a statement of fact. In the end, the performances of the 
national anthem by Whitney  Houston, Mariah  Carey, the Dixie  Chicks, and 
 Beyoncé do not provide an invitation to question the role of the nation-state 
 USA in international politics, but instead justify its military action of “protect-
ing  freedom around the world” by assuring the audience that the American fl ag 
is indeed still there.
America in the Desert of  Hollywood
In Imagining America at War, Cynthia  Weber analyzes war fi lms that were 
shown in the American cinemas immediately after 9/ 11, ranging from Pearl 
 Harbor (Michael Bay, 2001) and We Were  Soldiers (Randall Wallace, 2002) to 
Black Hawk  Down (Ridley Scott, 2001) and Minority  Report (Steven Spiel-
berg, 2002), suggesting that these fi lms help to understand what it means to 
be American. As  Weber points out, while both World War II and the  Vietnam 
War are prominently present in the American cinematic discourse, the Gulf 
 War remains conspicuously underrepresented.31 Compared to the amount of 
 Hollywood movies set during War War II and the  Vietnam War, including re-
cent ones, the absence of the Gulf  War in Hollywood fi lm is indeed signifi cant. 
Exceptions include the action fi lm The Finest  Hour (Shimon Dotan, 1991), 
starring Rob  Lowe as an American Navy SEAL who goes to Iraq in search of 
biomedical weapons, and the courthouse drama Courage under  Fire (Edward 
Zwick, 1996), starring  Denzel Washington and Meg Ryan. One could also per-
ceive the science fi ction of Starship  Troopers (Paul Verhoeven, 1997) as an al-
legory of the Gulf  War. Yet, the notable exceptions are Three  Kings (David O. 
Russell, 1999), which is set in  Iraq right after the Gulf  War has ended, and  Jar-
head (Sam Mendes, 2005), based on the memoirs by former Gulf  War soldier 
Anthony  Swofford. Although the fi lms differ signifi cantly, they do share two 
important characteristics. First, both Three Kings and Jarhead present the Gulf 
 War in a surrealist setting, emphasized by the way the fi lms use visual special 
effects and saturated colors to portray the desert as an alienating space. Second, 
both fi lms use Hollywood cinema and American pop music as main points of 
reference, thereby explicitly connecting the international politics of the Gulf 
 War to the globally mediated American pop culture. 
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 Jean  Baudrillard’s notion that the Gulf  War did not take place is present 
in both fi lms. Three  Kings starts with the onscreen text “March 1991. The war 
just ended,” followed by the voice of soldier Troy Barlow (Mark  Wahlberg), 
shouting “Are we shooting?” right before he kills his fi rst and only Iraqi soldier. 
“I didn’t think I’d see someone get shot in this war,” his fellow soldier Conrad 
Vig (Spike  Jonze) dryly comments, not realizing that the war is in fact over. By 
setting all the action immediately after the war has ended, Three Kings empha-
sizes that the preceding Gulf  War in itself was a non-event.  Jarhead, in its turn, 
takes place before, during, and after Operation Desert  Storm, but most of the 
fi lm focuses on the American soldiers waiting in the desert for the war to begin, 
spending their time alternating between masturbating and cleaning their ri-
fl es, a rather obvious but effective analogy which reinforces the connection be-
tween masculinity and warfare, foregrounding the frustrating male impotence 
of not being able to fulfi ll the act of “real” sex and “real” war.  Baudrillard also 
makes such a connection by discussing the Gulf  War as a striptease inviting 
futile masturbation, “following the calculated escalation of undressing and ap-
proaching the incandescent point of explosion (like that of erotic effusion) but 
at the same time withdrawing from it and maintaining a deceptive suspense 
(teasing), such that when the naked body fi nally appears, it is no longer naked, 
desire no longer exists and the orgasm is cut short.”32 Indeed, once Operation 
Desert Storm eventually begins, the Jarhead soldiers soon realize the war is be-
ing fought – literally – over their heads, by the air force’s smart bombing. When 
Anthony “Swoff”  Swofford (Jake Gyllenhaal), trained as a Marine Corps Scout 
Sniper, is fi nally about to kill his fi rst Iraqi offi cer, he does not get permission 
to shoot, as the whole military base will be bombed soon anyway. Thus, after 
months of anticipation, Swoff does not get to fi re his rifl e. His orgasmic shot is 
cut short.
 While  Jarhead uses the non-eventness of the Gulf  War as backdrop 
to the main protagonist’s coming-of-age narrative (“every man has his own 
war” is the fi lm’s tagline), Three  Kings replaces the non-event with an excit-
ing in-search-of-the-hidden-treasure adventure which evolves into a conven-
tional American-as-savior narrative. In their search for the hidden gold, looted 
from Kuwait by the Iraqi army, Archie Gates (George  Clooney), Chief Elgin 
(Ice  Cube), Troy Barlow, and Conrad Vig encounter a group of dissident Ira-
qis who, with their families, try to fl ee  Iraq. When a dissident Iraqi woman 
is executed by the Iraqi army, in front of her husband and her children, the 
American soldiers make a choice. Although initially motivated by their greed 
for gold, the American soldiers heroically save the refugees by guiding them 
into  freedom, which, rather ironically, is found across the border in Iran. This 
storyline can be viewed as a criticism of American international policy, as the 
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fi lm suggests that the interests of the USA are based solely on securing the 
oil supply, in spite of its rhetoric of promoting  democracy around the world. 
Moreover, Three Kings explicitly states that the American government has let 
the Iraqi people down by not following up its promise to protect them. As 
Archie Gates, played by the fi lm’s main movie star George  Clooney, tells his 
soldiers (and, in extension, the audience): “ Bush told the [Iraqi] people to rise 
up against Saddam. They thought they’d have our support. They don’t. Now 
they’re getting slaughtered.” In other words, the fi lm does not criticize Ameri-
can imperialism in itself, but merely its execution by the  Bush administration. 
The choice made by Archie Gates and his fellow military men conforms to the 
 Hollywood convention of the independent hero who defi es the power of the 
authorities so he can do the right thing. In this way, Three Kings ends up rein-
forcing the image of an ideal America as the protector of  freedom and  democ-
racy, not questioning if the American presence in  Iraq was justifi ed, but why 
the USA failed to do its job. In his analysis of the fi lm, Jude  Davies suggests that 
such a reading is too limited, as Three Kings contains “ideological structures of 
sameness and difference [which] continue to play along and across the fi lm’s 
narratives to create multiple and sometimes contradictory poles of American-
ness.”33 Although at moments the fi lm does satirize its genre, thereby inviting a 
less hegemonic reading, its overall American-as-savior narrative, which favors 
an ideal America over the nation-state  USA, remains dominant.
 Compared to Three  Kings,  Jarhead is less explicit about the role the USA 
plays, focusing more on the senselessness of the war experience in general than 
on the specifi c politics of the Gulf  War. Perhaps the most critical moment of 
the fi lm is when Swoff ’s unit comes across the infamous Highway of  Death, 
the road between Kuwait and Basra that was heavily bombed by the American 
air force, leaving a long trail of burnt-out vehicles and charred corpses. On the 
one hand, the scene works as a reminder that smart bombing causes real death, 
which is emphasized when Swoff is isolated from his unit and joins a circle of 
“sitting” burned dead bodies. This scene prompted Cynthia  Fuchs to comment: 
“The effect is more harrowing than any battle sequence, underlining Jarhead’s 
anguished point: war is not heroic or rousing. It is only devastating.”34 Yet, on 
the other hand, such portrayal of devastation and, in particular, Swoff ’s identi-
fi cation with the dead Iraqi bodies, can also function as, repeating  Baudrillard’s 
earlier quoted words, “an alibi for those who do not want to have been excited 
for nothing,” an attempt to prove that “this war was indeed a war and not a 
shameful and pointless hoax.”35 The scene says more about Swoff ’s character 
development (his realization that he is involved in “real” war) than the actual 
politics of the Gulf  War, and, in extension, more about America than  Iraq.
 Here a connection can be made between  Hollywood fi lms depicting the 
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war in  Vietnam and the two Gulf  War fi lms. In America, Jean  Baudrillard ar-
gues that the  Vietnam War was won by both sides: “by the Vietnamese on the 
ground, [and] by the Americans in the electronic mental space. And if the one 
side won an ideological and political victory, the other made Apocalypse  Now 
and that has gone right around the world.”36 The signifi cant point is that the 
“real”  Vietnam War has been taken over by the  Vietnam War as mediated by 
Hollywood, as the latter has shaped its global perception. In a similar way, the 
 hyperreality of the Gulf  War, as broadcast live on  television and as fi ctional-
ized by Hollywood with Three  Kings and  Jarhead, reduces the war’s political 
reality to an American conception of the Gulf  War. Moreover, such a percep-
tion is framed by the cinematic experience of the  Vietnam War. In Three Kings, 
the American soldiers drive their Humvee through the desert, throwing foot-
balls in the air as shooting targets, referring to the scene from Apocalypse Now 
(Francis Ford  Coppola, 1979) in which the American soldiers are waterskiing 
and fi ring at  Vietnam locals while going down the river on an army patrol 
boat. In Jarhead, the soldiers clap and cheer when watching Apocalypse Now’s 
famous scene in which the American military violently attacks a Vietnamese 
village while Richard  Wagner’s “Ride of the Valkyries” is blasting out of hel-
icopter loudspeakers as form of psychological warfare.  Vietnam fi lms func-
tion like pornography for a soldier in training, “getting him ready for his First 
Fuck,” writes Anthony  Swofford in his memoirs, and thus “ Vietnam fi lms are 
all pro-war, no matter what the supposed message, what  Kubrick or  Coppola 
or  Stone intended.”37
 While during the  Vietnam War the psychological warfare by the Ameri-
can army included loud broadcasts of  Wagner, during the Gulf  War they played 
rock music of the 1960s and 1970s, such as “Beach  Boys, AC/ DC, and Jimi 
 Hendrix’s shrill ‘Star-Spangled Banner,’ repeated ad nauseam until the enemy 
submits out of sheer annoyance.”38 When in  Jarhead “Break on Through” by 
the  Doors is blasting out of a helicopter’s speakers, Swoff complains: “That’s 
 Vietnam music, man. Can’t we get our own fucking music?” In his memoirs, 
Anthony  Swofford expands on why this music does not belong in his Gulf  War. 
“It was fi ne in the movies, … but I don’t need the Who and the  Doors in my 
war, as I prepare to fi ght for or lose my life. Teenage wasteland, my ass. This is 
the other side.”39 In both Three  Kings and Jarhead the Gulf  War soldiers eventu-
ally do get their “own music,” shifting from the cinematic  Vietnam War to con-
temporary American pop culture. Countercultural rock became  Vietnam mu-
sic, African-American rap the sound of the Gulf  War. The opening sequence 
of Three Kings, after Troy Barlow has killed the Iraqi soldier, starts with Rare 
Earth’s “I Just Want To Celebrate” from 1971, a song from the  Vietnam era, 
its upbeat rhythm emphasizing the playful images of hunky bare-chested sol-
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diers sunbathing and jumping around, followed by the soldiers singing along 
to Lee  Greenwood’s patriotic country hit song “God Bless the USA,” originally 
released in 1984 and revived as a Gulf  War anthem. The celebration continues 
with the soldiers dancing to two contemporary rap and dance songs, Public 
 Enemy’s “Can’t Do Nuttin’ for Ya Man” and Snap! ’s “The Power.” In Jarhead, 
the end of the war is celebrated in a similar way. When Swoff and fellow sol-
dier Troy (Peter Sarsgaard) return from their special mission, they fi rst wander 
through the desolate desert, only to stumble upon their unit partying around 
a large bonfi re in the middle of nowhere, dancing to Public Enemy’s “Fight the 
Power,” and fi ring their rifl es into the air. The irony is not lost. The soldiers only 
get to shoot their rifl es once the war is over, while they celebrate the American 
victory by chanting along to a rap song that induces its listeners to “fi ght the 
power” of American authority and its white  patriotism as embodied by its pop-
cultural heroes Elvis  Presley and John  Wayne.
 This diegetic music, both the psychological warfare and the dance songs 
of the victory parties, enhances the surrealist quality of desert, which, as men-
tioned before, is expressed in Three  Kings and  Jarhead through the use of visual 
special effects and saturated colors. Three Kings even provides a warning that its 
“visual distortion and unusual colors” are intentional, meant “to enhance the 
emotional intensity of the storyline.” The desert functions as an empty space, in 
which the combination of surrealist visuals and overwhelming sounds evokes 
a feeling of alienation. The desert can also be perceived as a Baudrillardian  hy-
perreality, as a space without an origin. Its  hyperreality lies not so much in the 
fact that both fi lms were shot in the deserts of southern California and in  Hol-
lywood studios, thus “really” being part of the American rather than the Iraqi 
landscape. More relevant is the symbolic quality of the desert as the embodi-
ment of an imagined  America, like  Baudrillard encountered when traveling 
through the USA. Deserts are so fascinating, writes  Baudrillard, “because you 
are delivered from all depth there – a brilliant, mobile, superfi cial neutrality, 
a challenge to meaning and profundity, a challenge to nature and culture, an 
outer hyperspace, with no origin, no reference-points.”40 Applied to the Gulf 
 War, the Iraqi desert becomes a Hollywood desert, just another image in the 
endless stream of images that American pop culture mediates globally. In his 
review of Three Kings, Sight & Sound fi lm critic Jim Hoberman recognizes such 
a connection: “Operating at the far frontier of  television space, [the] heroes 
cannot help but fi nd America.”41 This America that Hoberman refers to is not 
the nation-state  USA, but an imagined  America consisting of consumer goods 
and media images. The heroes of Three Kings enter bunkers all fi lled with west-
ern consumer goods, looted by the Iraqi army during its invasion of Kuwait. 
One of the looted televisions shows footage of the Rodney  King video, contain-
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ing images of the African-American taxi driver being beaten by four white Los 
Angeles police offi cers. Shot on March 3, 1991, and televised worldwide almost 
immediately, the video sparked protests against  racism and police brutality, 
eventually leading to the Los Angeles  riots of 1992. As several scholars have 
suggested, the televised violence against Rodney  King cannot be disassociated 
from the mostly non-televised violence by the American army in  Iraq.42 In this 
way, the Gulf  War desert becomes another part of America where the Three 
Kings and Jarhead soldiers encounter a seemingly empty space that is not only 
being penetrated by the American military, but which also has been permeated 
with American media and pop culture.
 The global presence of American pop culture is made even more explicit 
when, in addition to Rodney  King, Michael  Jackson pops up in the desert of 
Three  Kings. While in 1985 Michael  Jackson (when “We Are the World” was re-
corded, as discussed in chapter one) could be viewed as an embodiment of the 
American  Dream, by 1991 his star image had become tarnished. Michael  Jack-
son came to be known as “Wacko Jacko” based on rumors about him sleeping 
in a hyperbaric chamber, the alleged whitening of his skin, and the cosmetic 
alterations to his nose and body. His controversial image intensifi ed later on 
in the 1990s with his self-proclaimed title of being the “King of Pop,” his short 
marriage to Lisa Marie  Presley, daughter of that other American “king,”  Elvis, 
and accusations of child molestation. In a 1987 Village  Voice essay, entitled “I’m 
White!: What’s Wrong with Michael  Jackson,” Greg  Tate perceives  Jackson as “a 
casualty of America’s ongoing race war – another Negro gone mad because his 
mirror reports that his face does not conform to the Nordic ideal.”43 In Three 
Kings, the issue reappears when Mark  Wahlberg’s character Troy Barlow is cap-
tured and tortured by the Iraqi army offi cer Captain Said, the latter played 
by the Moroccan-French actor Saïd  Taghmaoui. “What is the problem with 
Michael  Jackson?” asks Said, giving the answer himself: “Your country make 
him chop up his face. Michael  Jackson is pop king of sick fucking country. A 
black man make the skin white and the hair straight, and you know why? Your 
sick fucking country make the black man hate hisself just like you hate the Arab 
and the children you bomb over here.” Similar to the Rodney  King video, the 
appearance of Michael  Jackson ties the American presence in  Iraq to practices 
of  racism in the USA, thereby giving  Jackson’s initial role as an ideological am-
bassador of the American values propagated by “We Are the World” an ironic 
twist.44 Yet, the use of  Jackson to suggest that the American military presence 
in  Iraq is rooted in  racism also reinforces the global dominance of American 
pop culture, continuing to render the devastation in  Iraq invisible by shaping 
the Gulf  War within an American conception of the world.
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Conclusion: America’s Holiday from History
“Welcome to the desert of the  real,” says Orpheus (Laurence Fishburne), when 
he reveals to Neo (Keanu Reeves) that his idea of the world is actually a compu-
ter-generated virtual reality called “the matrix,” masking a complex system of 
artifi cial intelligence which uses living humans as source of energy. The desert 
of the  real, as shown to Neo, consists of a burnt and desolate landscape, an 
American city ruined by war. With this pivotal scene, the  Hollywood block-
buster The  Matrix (Andy Wachowski and Larry Wachowski, 1999) makes an 
explicit reference to Jean  Baudrillard’s concept of  hyperreality, as Morpheus is 
quoting from his Simulacra and Simulation, originally published in French in 
1981. The fi lm knowingly cites  Baudrillard, as in an earlier scene, Neo is shown 
owning a copy of the book.45 “Welcome to the Desert of the Real!” is also the 
title of an essay by Slavoj  Žižek, published right after the terrorist attacks of 
September  11, 2001, and later expanded to a fi ve-essay book edition. As  Žižek 
suggests, 9/ 11 could function as a “Welcome to the desert of the  real” moment, 
enabling American citizens to realize that they, like Neo, have been living in 
some sort of virtual reality, far removed from the reality of global politics:
Either America will persist in, strengthen even, the attitude, “Why should 
this happen to us? Things like this don’t happen here!” … or America will 
fi nally risk stepping through the fantasmatic screen separating it from 
the Outside World, accepting its arrival into the Real world, making the 
long-overdue move from “Things like this should hot happen here!” to 
“Things like this should not happen anywhere!” America’s “holiday from 
history” was a fake: America’s peace was bought by the catastrophes go-
ing on elsewhere. Therein resides the true lesson of the bombings.46
Just like Truman Burbank (Jim Carrey) in The Truman  Show (Peter Weir, 1998) 
realizes that his life so far has been a  television reality show,  Žižek suggests that 
America may come to perceive American life as a  hyperreality, as a blockbuster 
movie which has been surpassed by the reality of 9/ 11.
 Jean  Baudrillard recognizes a similar function for 9/ 11 in his essay 
“L’Esprit du Terrorisme,” written only a few days after September  11, by de-
scribing the terrorist attacks on the World Trade  Center not as a non-event (as 
he did with the fi rst Gulf  War), but as “the absolute event, the ‘mother event,’ 
the pure event that concentrates in itself all the events that never took place.”47 
This does not mean that 9/11 signifi es “a resurgence of the real,” but an acceler-
ated state of  hyperreality, taken to its fullest extreme.48 With 9/11,  Baudrillard 
suggests, reality has “absorbed fi ction’s energy, and has itself become fi ction,” 
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in the form of an absolute media event existing of the televised image, to which 
“the real is superadded … like a bonus of terror, like an additional frisson: not 
only is it terrifying, but, what is more, it is real.”49 Similar to his aforementioned 
argument that fi ction shapes imagination in the form of reality, Jean  Baudril-
lard argues that the “fi ctional” media event of 9/11, the repeated images of 
planes fl ying into the Twin  Towers, shot from many different angles, has turned 
the imagination of the  Hollywood disaster movie into images of reality.
 In retrospect, however, America seems to have taken Slavoj  Žižek’s fi rst 
option, remaining behind its fantasmatic screen of  Hollywood and  television. 
By 2006, 9/ 11 has been fi ctionalized and dramatized in fi lms like United  93 
(Paul Greengrass, 2006) and World Trade  Center (Oliver  Stone, 2006), which, 
conform the conventions of Hollywood, emphasize the heroism of individual 
Americans, such as common plane passengers and New York City  fi refi ghters. 
On  television, the controversial two-episode miniseries The Path to 9/ 11 (ABC, 
10 and 11 September 2006), although more critical of the role of the Ameri-
can government, also focused on the personalized story of the real-life John P. 
 O’Neill, played on the small screen by Harvey  Keitel, who had just started his 
job as head of security at the Twin  Towers a couple of days before being killed. 
Even counter-narratives, such as the documentary Fahrenheit 9/ 11 (Michael 
 Moore, 2004), stay behind the fantasmatic screen, using similar strategies of 
fi ctionalization and dramatization as Hollywood cinema. In spite of being crit-
ical of the politics of the nation-state  USA, these counter-narratives reconfi rm 
rather than undermine the idealism of an imagined  America.
 Although belonging to different genres, the pop-cultural performances 
that have been analyzed in this chapter all contribute to an American concep-
tion of the world, yet in distinctive different ways. The Super  Bowl perform-
ances of “The Star-Spangled Banner” by Whitney  Houston, Mariah  Carey, the 
Dixie  Chicks, and  Beyoncé turn an American national event into an expres-
sion of support of the international politics of the nation-state  USA, whereas 
fi lms like Three  Kings and  Jarhead turn the international event of warfare into 
a personalized American experience. Nevertheless, in all cases, American pop 
culture, embodied by these pop and movie stars, is used to shape the Ameri-
can conception of international politics, thereby not only reinforcing the myth 
of the American  Dream as an uncontested universal ideal but also rendering 
other perspectives invisible. In this manner, these pop-cultural artifacts can be 
perceived as being part of a hyperreal America, as they express the American 
experience as fi ction which shapes, as  Baudrillard suggests, imagination into 
the form of reality. Moreover, this hyperreal America transcends the geograph-
ical boundaries of the nation-state  USA, as it is being mediated through pop 
culture around the world.
90 fabricating the absolute fake
fabricating.indd   90 27-05-2008   16:52:54
 The global dominance of American pop culture unexpectedly became 
clear in an incident during the fi rst Gulf  War, when the female American sol-
dier Melissa Rathbun- Nealy was captured by the Iraqi army. In stark contrast 
to the widely publicized story of Jessica  Lynch, who became the face of the sec-
ond Gulf War, little attention has been paid to the Rathbun- Nealy story. Rather 
than being heroically saved by the American Special Forces, Rathbun- Nealy 
was released by the Iraqi army after the Gulf  War was offi cially over. Back in the 
USA, she did not have much to say about her experience, merely stating that 
the Iraqi offi cials had treated her well. Moreover, they had complimented her 
for being as “brave as [Sylvester]  Stallone and as beautiful as Brooke  Shields.”50 
It is this power of American pop culture, irresistible for Americans and non-
Americans alike, which will assure that America’s holiday from history is far 
from over.
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Chapter Four:
Americans We Never Were:
Dutch Pop Culture as Karaoke Americanism
“Dear wonderful, beautiful Europe. I know we’ve had our disagreements in the 
past, but I’m here to tell you, I have never stopped loving you Europe.” These 
words are spoken by President George W.  Bush on January 26, 2005, at a special 
press conference in the Netherlands, broadcast on the  television comedy show 
 Kopspijkers (VARA, 1995-2005). Then  Bush starts to sing: “Maybe I didn’t treat 
you, quite as good as I should have. Maybe I didn’t love you, quite as much as 
I could have. I’m so sorry about Abu  Ghraib, and  Kyoto I should have signed. 
But you were always on mind, Europe, you were always on my mind.” Obvi-
ously, this is not the real President  Bush singing, but a parody, performed by 
the Dutch comedian Thomas van  Luyn. Sung in American English with a slight 
country twinge and subtitled in Dutch for the viewers at home,  Bush’s rendi-
tion of the Elvis  Presley classic “Always on My Mind” plays with the stereotype 
of American ignorance versus European intellectualism. Admitting that he has 
never cared much for “those little countries you live in, with your museums and 
those books you read,” President  Bush delivers a melodramatic plea, with vocal 
harmonies provided by his bodyguards, asking Europe to “give me one more 
chance to get you on my side.” The parody works not only because American 
pop culture is used to satirize American international politics, but also because 
of the (easily overlooked) factor that the Dutch viewers must be familiar with 
American pop culture. Knowing the original version of “Always on My Mind,” 
or recognizing its genre conventions, is crucial for getting the joke. 
 “America is the original version of modernity,” writes Jean  Baudrillard in 
America, adding: “We [in Europe] are the dubbed or subtitled version.”1 His use 
of dubbing and subtitling as metaphor is striking, as the cultural  appropriation 
of “America” in European pop cultures is most explicitly visible in audiovisual 
media such as fi lm,  television, and internet. In this chapter, I will use Dutch 
pop culture as a starting point to examine how such  appropriation takes place. 
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“America” is omnipresent in Dutch pop culture, not only through the con-
sumption of products that are actually made in the USA, but also through the 
production of pop-cultural artifacts such as movies,  television programs, and 
music  videos that are made in the Netherlands and seem to imitate American 
pop culture. Even in times of renewed European anti- Americanism, American 
pop culture continues to be popular, functioning as the “original” to which 
the local “national” pop culture is compared. How should we perceive these 
“American” but “made in Holland” artifacts? Are they merely imitations, the 
one more successful than the other, or have we instead made the American 
audiovisual language and genre conventions our own to such an extent that 
we can take the comparison with the American original for granted? “We are 
always the last link in these chains of mediation, the fi nal recipients of mes-
sages from America,” suggests Rob  Kroes. “In that position we are never purely 
and only passive, gradually losing our  Dutchness while becoming even more 
American. We make room for ‘America’ in a context of meaning and signifi -
cance that is ours.”2 It is within this context of meaning and signifi cance that I 
want to explore how “we” redefi ne “America” through the  appropriation of the 
American original in Dutch pop culture.
 To address these questions, I will use the concept of “the American I nev-
er  was,” borrowed from Chris  Keulemans, the concept of the absolute  fake, as 
coined by Umberto  Eco, and the concept of karaoke  Americanism, as coined by 
Thomas  Elsaesser. These concepts can help to discuss Americanized Dutch pop 
culture as a form of hyper- Americanness without having to fall back upon too 
essentialist notions of what should be considered American or Dutch, thereby 
leaving room for more ambivalent and overlapping identities. Subsequently, 
I will apply these concepts to four different case studies of Dutch celebrities: 
singer Lee  Towers, media personalities Adam  Curry and Patricia  Paay, actress 
 Katja Schuurman, and Moroccan-Dutch rapper Ali  B. Together, these four ex-
amples of “Americans they never were” show different ways in which American 
pop culture has been translated within a Dutch pop-cultural context.
Hyper-Americanness and Karaoke Americanism
Immediately after the terrorist attacks of September  11,  2001, “we were all 
Americans,” as suggested by the famous headline of the French newspaper Le 
 Monde.3 On the political level, this transatlantic solidarity between Europe and 
the USA proved to be a short-lived sentiment, as soon it was challenged by the 
unilateral stance of the  Bush administration – with its War on  Terror and the 
subsequent war in  Iraq – resulting in a revival of European anti- Americanism. 
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As Rob  Kroes has pointed out, such anti- Americanism is not new, but rooted 
in two long European traditions. On the one hand, there is a European anti-
 Americanism which despises the alleged shallowness of American pop cul-
ture, but admires the “prowess, idealism, and optimism” of American politics, 
whereas on the other, there is a European anti- Americanism which “rejects an 
American political creed that, for all its missionary zeal, is perceived as impe-
rialist and oppressive, while it admires American culture, from its  highbrow to 
its pop varieties.”4 Politically, Europeans might no longer be Americans, but 
culturally “we” remain, to use the concept of Chris  Keulemans, “Americans we 
never were,” living within a society that is permeated with American pop cul-
ture. As Europeans, we have grown up with Walt  Disney,  Hollywood, Coca-
 Cola, and American  television programs, and we recognize these pop-cultural 
artifacts as belonging both to “America” as well as to our own culture in which 
we have lived all our lives.
 The ambivalent position of political anti- Americanism combined with 
a very personal investment in American pop culture was the focus of the art 
exhibition This is America: Visions on the American  Dream, held by the Centraal 
Museum  Utrecht in 2006. The exhibition takes as its starting point that “we 
all carry the American Dream within us, yet, similar to this dreamed America, 
we also cannot break loose from the America that we despise.”5 By bringing 
together artwork by contemporary international artists, ranging from Candice 
 Breitz and Aernout  Mik to Tom  Sachs and the Guerrilla  Girls, with American 
photorealistic paintings from the 1960s and 1970s, the exhibition emphasizes 
how images of American consumerist culture have become iconic representa-
tions of an imagined  America around the world. In addition to these works, the 
exhibition includes a book with autobiographical perspectives on the Ameri-
can Dream written by Dutch writers, journalists, and scholars. These essays 
show how, in spite of possible objections to the politics of the nation-state 
 USA, most authors remain personally connected to the pop culture of their 
imagined  America. The essay by Joost  Zwagerman, for example, argues that 
the America of one’s youth cannot be disassociated from the contemporary 
one, as there remains a strong familiarity with America, one which is rooted 
in American pop culture, and, regardless of the great distance, is not “virtual 
or imaginary,” but “intensely sensual and passionate,” inviting us to identify 
ourselves as being “American.”6
 With his multimedia project The American I Never Was, Chris  Keulemans 
shows how American pop culture, and specifi cally fi lm (West Side  Story, Taxi 
 Driver), pop music (James  Brown, Bruce  Springsteen, USA for  Africa), and 
pop-cultural icons (Batman and  Robin, Muhammad  Ali), has shaped his life 
and colored his memories.7 Although born in the Netherlands,  Keulemans grew 
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up in different international places, including Tunisia,  Iraq, and Indonesia, and 
more importantly, attended international American elementary schools where 
he was taught to be “a little American patriot, ready for Junior High.” However, 
instead of “returning” to New Jersey, the American state that had become his 
imagined home (although he never actually had been there),  Keulemans re-
turned to the Netherlands, where, eventually, he became more critical of the 
nation-state  USA: “I was raised with the stereotypical, unabashed, happy and 
heroic image that the USA could export of itself with impunity until 1968. Af-
ter that I learned, like my whole generation, the darker sides of America: from 
 Irangate to the Gulf  War, from the permanent segregation to the omnipres-
ent commercialization. Still, I never completely lost touch with that little boy’s 
paradise.”8 Once, as part of his project,  Keulemans fi nally does visit New Jer-
sey, his imaginary home, it proves to be an ambivalent experience. On the one 
hand, he recognizes “home” from all the images embedded in his memory, yet, 
on the other, the confrontation with the “real” New Jersey, especially when he 
attends a local 9/ 11 memorial, makes  Keulemans realize he is not an American 
after all.
 Even though Chris  Keulemans uses “the American I never  was” to ex-
press his own personal experience, the concept can be applied more generally 
to look at the way Dutch people have grown up with American pop culture, 
incorporating “America” within their everyday lives, histories, and memories. 
Indeed, as Rob  Kroes points out: “Generation upon generation of Europeans, 
growing up after the war, can all tell their own story of a mythical America as 
they constructed it, drawing on American advertisements, songs, fi lm, and so 
on.”9 In this sense, we are all Americans we never were, experiencing American 
pop culture as both foreign and local. The distinction between what is Ameri-
can and what is Dutch has become blurred and seemingly irrelevant.
 To grasp this blurred Dutch American pop culture, I need to go beyond 
the rigid dichotomies that traditionally mark the divide between America and 
Europe, including – but not limited to – American shallowness versus Euro-
pean depth, American artifi ciality versus European authenticity, American 
populism versus European intellectualism, and American lack of history ver-
sus European sense of history.10 In European Cinema, Thomas  Elsaesser rec-
ognizes a similar distinction in the relation between European cinemas and 
 Hollywood. Rightfully arguing that we should move beyond such dichotomies, 
 Elsaesser identifi es them to show how the divide between Europe and Holly-
wood continues to be applied:
Europe stands for art, and the US for pop; Europe for high culture, 
America for mass  entertainment; Europe for artisanal craft, America for 
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industrial mass production; Europe for state (subsidy),  Hollywood for 
studio (box offi ce); European cinema for pain and effort, Hollywood for 
pleasure and thrills; Europe for the auteur, Hollywood for the star; Eu-
rope for experiment and discovery, Hollywood for formula and market-
ing; Europe for fi lm festival circuit, Hollywood for Oscar night; Europe 
for the festival hit, Hollywood for the blockbuster.11
Although seemingly antagonistic, the two poles of this rigid distinction ac-
tually complement each other, being two sides of the same coin. As Thomas 
 Elsaesser shows, European national cinemas develop not so much in opposi-
tion to, but in relation with  Hollywood, “existing in a space set up like a hall 
of mirrors, in which recognition, imaginary identity and mis-cognition enjoy 
equal status, creating value out of pure difference.”12 Applied to pop culture in 
general, the distinction between a  highbrow Europe versus a  lowbrow America, 
defi ned in opposition to each other, sustains the cultural industries on both 
sides of the Atlantic.
 How this divide works is shown by the way both American and Dutch 
fi lm critics review the Dutch fi lm  Antonia (Marleen  Gorris, 1995), internation-
ally released as Antonia’s Line, which celebrates female independency with a 
story of four generations of women living in a small Dutch village. American 
fi lm critics tend to perceive Antonia as a European art fi lm. The Boston Review, 
for example, recognizes Antonia as “Mozartian in its beauty – so artfully made 
that we are carried along by the surprising fl ow of the narrative without be-
ing forced to recognize the intellectual daring and craft of the fi lmmaker.”13 
Dutch fi lm critics, on the contrary, and writing after the fi lm has won the Acad-
emy Award in the best foreign language fi lm category, accuse Antonia’s direc-
tor Marleen  Gorris of having made a  Hollywood movie. In his article “Why 
Americans love Antonia,” Hans  Kroon suggests that Americans love the escap-
ism which Antonia provides, as its simplistic and folkloric portrayal of life in 
an imaginary countryside enables its spectators to fi nd temporary relief away 
from their own hectic existence. Tom  Ronse sees the American popularity as 
proof of Antonia’s American shallowness, claiming that its one-dimensional 
character makes the fi lm “ready to eat, easily digestible.” According to Ab van 
 Ieperen, Antonia is a Dutch feminist version of the American pioneer west-
ern, including its convention of letting the plot prevail over character develop-
ment.14 Regardless of whether or not these fi lm critics, both the American and 
the Dutch ones, are correct in their judgments, they all reinforce the traditional 
distinction between America and Europe. However, they also reveal its limita-
tions, as Antonia embodies, on the American side, European depth, and, on the 
Dutch side, American shallowness. 
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 This traditional Europe versus America divide is further undermined 
by the “American” pop culture produced in Europe. Throughout the twenti-
eth century, Europeans often have denounced American pop culture as empty 
and shallow, as superfi cial and artifi cial. However, simultaneously, Europeans 
have denounced European expressions of pop culture – particularly pop music 
and commercial “feel good” cinema – as weak imitations of the American “real 
thing.” The result is a peculiar reversal. Although American pop culture con-
tinues to be perceived as artifi cial, when discussing European commercial pop 
culture, the American artifi ciality suddenly becomes American authenticity. 
As discussed in chapter one, the perception of American pop culture as being 
authentic is based on its initial role as a rebellious form of expression for Euro-
pean youth subcultures, which recognized that it was not empty and shallow, 
but open to new meanings and liberating values.15 Winfried  Fluck suggests that 
“even the most conventional and maligned symbols of American consumer 
culture such as Coca- Cola or  McDonald’s bear a connotation of informality 
that can still be experienced as liberating by young people in many parts of 
the world.”16 The attractiveness of American pop culture and the recognition 
of its authenticity are today no longer limited to youth subcultures (although 
new forms of American popular culture, like hip- hop, may still function in this 
way), but tend to be widely accepted among different generations. Especially 
when compared to Dutch pop-cultural artifacts, American pop culture has be-
come the authentic standard.
 To understand how a pop culture that traditionally had been perceived 
as shallow and artifi cial can become a sign of authenticity, it is helpful to use 
the concept of  hyperreality. Based on their travels in the USA, Umberto  Eco 
and Jean  Baudrillard both have used  hyperreality to describe how they have 
experienced “America.” Yet, these two European intellectuals use  hyperreality 
in signifi cantly different ways.  Eco, in his Travels in Hyperreality, focuses on 
how American culture consists of perfect copies of original cultural artifacts. 
Citing  Disneyland and Las  Vegas as well as the full-scale copy of the Oval  Of-
fi ce in the LBJ  Library and the copy of the Manhattan Purchase  Act (in English 
rather than in its original Dutch) at the Museum of the City of New York,  Eco 
shows that these artifacts are not merely copies, but are even more perfect than 
the originals. “To speak of things that one wants to connote as real, these things 
must seem real. The ‘completely real’ becomes identifi ed with the ‘completely 
fake.’ Absolute unreality is offered as real presence.” It is this search for “real-
ness” – or better, as  Eco recalls the Coca- Cola slogan, “the real thing” – that 
makes American popular culture hyperreal. According to  Eco, “the American 
imagination demands the real thing and, to attain it, must fabricate the abso-
lute  fake.”17 The absolute fake is not merely an imitation, but a hyperbole of the 
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original, more “real” and “authentic” than the original. Umberto  Eco’s  hyper-
reality differs signifi cantly from  Baudrillard’s, as  Eco’s still refers to an original, 
while  Baudrillard perceives the hyperreal America as living “in perpetual simu-
lation, in a perpetual present of signs.”18 In  Baudrillard’s America, as discussed 
in chapter three, the original no longer exists, as it is already a copy of a copy, 
a  simulacrum, just another sign in an endless chain of signs that only refer to 
each other. 
 Rob  Kroes rightly points out that both  Eco’s and  Baudrillard’s notion 
of American  hyperreality remains quintessentially European. Whereas, on the 
one hand, Europeans tend to perceive American culture as “empty” (thus shal-
low, superfi cial, lacking the historical and artistic depth that allegedly consti-
tutes traditional European culture), on the other, the “emptiness” of America 
enables Europeans to fi ll up this space with their own images of America, an 
imagined  America, often using the images provided by American pop culture. 
In this way, America functions as a mirror image of Europe, as an empty screen 
on which such “liberating” concepts as lack of history and lack of signifi cance 
can be projected.19 Yet, the concept of  hyperreality proves useful when discuss-
ing the  Americanization of Dutch pop culture and the  appropriation of Ameri-
can pop-cultural signs in Dutch pop-cultural production.  Eco’s  hyperreality 
may turn out to be the most effective, as it still recognizes the “original” – in 
this case the American pop-cultural artifacts that, as  hyperreality, are perceived 
by the Dutch public as “the real thing.” Dutch pop-cultural artifacts that imi-
tate American pop culture, on the contrary, are easily recognized as “fakes.” To 
paraphrase  Eco, “the Dutch imagination demands the real thing and, to attain 
it, must fabricate the absolute  fake” through presenting a hyperreal imitation 
of American pop culture. I use the term “hyper- Americanness” to describe 
this Dutch absolute fake, which is, after all, a hyperreal copy of an American 
original that, in its turn, is also a hyperreal copy. Hyper-Americanness is so 
“American” that Dutch people may recognize it as “really American,” while 
Americans may not recognize it as “American” at all. Again, an ironic twist of 
argument is the result, as now Europe signifi es artifi ciality, while America is 
its authentic original. By naming America the “original version of modernity,” 
even Jean  Baudrillard had to admit that in this case an original copy does exist. 
“We merely imitate them, parody them with a fi fty-year time lag, and we are 
not even successful at that.”20
 Yet, the perception of Dutch pop-cultural artifacts as absolute fakes, 
rather than mere imitations or parodies, makes room for interpretations that 
rely less on the question of whether or not the dubbed or subtitled version is a 
successful copy of the American “original” one. Instead, the focus shifts to how 
American pop culture – its genre conventions and audiovisual language – can 
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function as an international lingua franca in the shaping of national or other 
cultural identities. By recognizing the hyper-American character of the abso-
lute  fake, its explicit Americanness can be analyzed as part of a larger pop-cul-
tural discourse, without getting trapped in the Europe versus America divide. 
Moreover, by approaching Dutch pop culture in this way, both sides of the 
 Americanization debate – emphasizing either its being a form of cultural  im-
perialism or instead a form of cultural  appropriation – can be acknowledged, 
as well as the ambiguity between anti- Americanism and a personal investment 
in American pop culture. A similar approach is suggested by Thomas  Elsaesser, 
who defi nes what I call hyper- Americanness as a discourse of karaoke  Ameri-
canism. As  Elsaesser explains, “besides the discourse of anti- Americanism and 
of counter-Americanism, we may have to fi nd the terms of another discourse: 
let me call it, … the discourse of karaoke- Americanism – that doubly coded 
space of identity as overlap and deferral, as compliment and camoufl age.”21 
The use of the karaoke metaphor – which places much more emphasis on the 
performative character of Americanization than  Baudrillard’s metaphor of 
subtitling or dubbing does – may appear to be rather pejorative, but is actually 
an effective tool to grasp the ambiguities captured within the absolute  fake. As 
a performance based on clichéd pop-cultural conventions yet inviting crea-
tive participation, karaoke signifi es both faithful imitation and playful parody, 
both mimicking and mockery, enabling a cultural  appropriation of American 
pop culture in which “fakeness” is its most defi ning characteristic.
 To explore this notion of hyper- Americanness in Dutch pop culture 
further, I will apply the concepts of the absolute  fake and karaoke  American-
ism to four specifi c examples of Dutch stardom. As discussed in chapter one, 
American stars can be viewed as ideological ambassadors of American pop 
culture, embodying many different and often contradictory values. Building 
on Richard  Dyer’s notion that the star  myth is heavily invested in the American 
 Dream, I want to explore how Dutch celebrities fi t within such an American-
inspired star  myth.22 The focus on stars rather than (only) on specifi c fi lms, 
 television programs, or music  videos has the advantage of recognizing the val-
ues of Americanness that the star  myth embodies. The four case studies of 
Dutch stardom – Lee  Towers, Adam  Curry and Patricia  Paay,  Katja Schuurman, 
and Ali  B – are all related to American pop culture, albeit each in a different 
way. By approaching them as “Americans they never  were,” as examples of hy-
per-American absolute fakes performing karaoke  Americanism, I am able to 
analyze how these Dutch stars appropriate the signs, genre conventions, and 
audiovisual language of American pop culture in their performances and in 
the construction of their star images. Without suggesting that these particular 
stars present the only way in which American pop culture has been appropri-
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ated in the Netherlands, or that they are representative of the whole of Dutch 
pop culture, these four case studies of Dutch “Americans they never  were” do 
present telling examples of pop-cultural  appropriation.
Lee  Towers: Living the American  Dream
The ultimate American he never  was in Dutch pop culture is undoubtedly singer 
Lee  Towers, whose stage name in itself is a reference to American pop culture. 
The Dutch National Pop Institute describes him as “the Dutch cross between 
Frank  Sinatra, Tony  Bennett, and Elvis  Presley in his Las  Vegas years.”23 Always 
dressed in a black tuxedo and black tie, and holding a golden microphone, Lee 
 Towers has appropriated the American image of the Las Vegas crooner as an 
easily recognizable trademark. His repertoire consists primarily of cover ver-
sions of American show tunes and evergreens, including “You’ll Never Walk 
Alone,” “I Can See Clearly Now,” and “New York, New York.” In the 1980s,  Tow-
ers became widely credited for being an “un-Dutch” performer with an inter-
national style and grandeur, being the fi rst national pop artist to perform in 
large stadiums like the Rotterdam Ahoy’, which previously had hosted only 
international stars. In 1995,  Towers received the  Graceland Award from the 
Estate of Elvis  Presley (and the honor to call himself “one of the King’s men”) 
for his album Lee  Towers Sings Elvis (1994). When, in 2002, former President 
Bill  Clinton visited Rotterdam, the hometown of the Holland-America Line, 
Lee  Towers performed especially for him, singing Neil  Diamond’s “America,” a 
song celebrating America as the “sweet land of liberty” for immigrants coming 
from all over the world. In spite of not being an American immigrant himself, 
Lee  Towers has made the American rhetoric his own to such an extent that his 
praise of America as the Beacon of Freedom and  Democracy almost naturally 
befi ts his star image. 
 Lee  Towers is a signifi cant example of  Americanization, not only because 
his imitation is so explicit that it becomes almost like a parody, a  pastiche, but 
also because his star  myth is based on American iconography, and the American 
 Dream in particular. In his biography entitled “Why he believed in his dream,” 
published on his offi cial website,  Towers is described as the “Rotterdam realist 
who fulfi lled his American Dream.”24 His American Dream is a rags-to-riches 
story of “the singing crane operator” Leen Huyzer who becomes the famous 
star Lee  Towers. The website makes an explicit distinction between “the star” 
and Leen Huyzer, “the man behind Lee  Towers … [who] has remained an 
ordinary human being,” reinforcing the notion that his hyper- Americanness is 
an imitative performance. When, on March 25, 2002, he is the celebrity guest 
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on the Dutch  television talk  show Kevin  Masters Starring Tom  Rhodes (Yorin, 
2001-2003), Lee  Towers exclaims that he is living his own American Dream 
right here in the Netherlands. That  Towers makes his exclamation on Kevin 
Masters is fi tting, as this talk  show can also be perceived as hyper-American. 
Hosted by the American stand-up comedian Tom  Rhodes and his side-kick 
E- Life, a Dutch black hip- hop artist, Kevin Masters can best be described as an 
– almost literal – imitation of the Late Show with David  Letterman (CBS, 1993–
present). Although both the audience and the celebrity guests are Dutch, the 
whole show is done in American English, with Dutch subtitles for the viewers 
at home. The show’s premise is based on the interaction between American and 
Dutch culture, playing with the stereotypes of both. Its imitative character is 
emphasized by the talk  show’s title: Kevin Masters is not a real-life person, but a 
fi ctional American talk  show host being performed by an American comedian. 
But it is Lee  Towers who makes the show’s hyper- Americanness most visible, 
appearing to be more “American” than its host. As Tom  Rhodes later recalled: 
“Lee learned how to speak English from Elvis  Presley. This guy is who Elvis 
should have been. ‘I believe in my dreams,’ he said that about three times. ‘How 
did this happen for me? I believe in my dreams, Tommy.’ I’m like sitting there 
talking to Elvis, man.”25
 More than merely imitating American pop culture, however, Lee  Tow-
ers translates his hyper- Americanness into a local and national idiom. His live 
shows may be “American,”  Towers remains the “Rotterdam realist” who lives 
his Dutch American  Dream. As his nickname “the singing crane operator” em-
phasizes, his star image is strongly rooted in Rotterdam working-class culture, 
exemplifi ed by his identifi cation with the Rotterdam harbor and the local soc-
cer club Feyenoord, for which he recorded the club song “Mijn Feyenoord” 
(1997). Lee  Towers starred in a 1999  television commercial for the local brand 
of Van Nelle coffee, sipping coffee on a tugboat in the Rotterdam harbor. On 
his album My Port of Rotterdam (2003), he pays tribute to Rotterdam with 
American classics like Tina  Turner’s “The Best” and Otis  Redding’s “(Sittin’ on) 
The Dock of the Bay,” as well as with original songs, including the album’s title 
track and “Rotterdam Is the City.” In his bombastic Las  Vegas style,  Towers 
sings, with a strong American English accent, “I’ve seen the land of good old 
Uncle Sam, … but to tell the truth, no matter where I am, wherever I roam, my 
home sweet home is Rotterdam.” In this manner, Lee  Towers does not merely 
imitate but appropriates American pop culture, in a hyper-American form, to 
express his local identity. 
 That the hyper- Americanness of  Towers is translated not only into a lo-
cal but a national idiom as well is shown by his performance of “One Moment 
in Time,” originally recorded by African-American pop diva Whitney  Houston 
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for the 1988  Olympic games. Lee  Towers sang his rendition of the song at his 
fi nal “Legendary Gala of the Year” in the Rotterdam Ahoy’ stadium in October 
2000. As the music starts,  Towers gives a speech in Dutch: “Not that long ago, 
we were glued to our  television screens during the  Olympic games. We watched 
our heroes win gold medals. We were crying with pride as the Dutch fl ag was 
raised. We are such a tiny country. An absolute all-time record for Holland.” 
Lee  Towers is referring to the 2000  Olympic games in Sydney, where the Dutch 
athletes won a relatively large number of medals. He continues to talk about 
how great “our heroes” are and how long it takes to prepare for such an event. 
Then  Towers shifts into English, stating: “At that moment in time, you got it.”26 
During his subsequent bombastic performance of “One Moment in Time,” a 
large screen behind him on stage shows images of the Dutch athletes, alter-
nated with images of the Dutch fl ag. The combination of American pop music, 
 sports, and  patriotism makes this  Towers performance very similar to the an-
nual Super  Bowl performances of “The Star-Spangled Banner,” albeit without 
the presence of the military. Yet, while the Super Bowl celebrates the “greatest 
nation in the world,”  Towers used the genre conventions and audiovisual lan-
guage of American pop culture to celebrate the extraordinary achievement of 
“our tiny country,” thereby effectively translating the generic American origi-
nal into a specifi cally Dutch national context.
 Five years later, Lee  Towers gives another performance which combines 
American pop culture with Dutch  patriotism, this time connecting the Dutch 
national  soccer team to the Dutch royal family, both of which are symbol-
ized by the national and royal color orange, explaining why Dutch  patriotism 
is often referred to as the “orange sentiment.” During the national  television 
broadcast to celebrate the twenty-fi fth anniversary of Queen  Beatrix as the 
reigning monarch of the Netherlands (TROS, 30 April 2005),  Towers performs 
“You’ll Never Walk Alone,” surrounded by a group of young children dressed 
in the orange uniform of the Dutch national  soccer team. The song, which was 
a hit single for  Towers back in 1976, is originally from the American Rodg-
ers & Hammerstein musical  Carousel (1948), but, as  television host Ivo Niehe 
reminds the viewers, is now best known as, rather paradoxically, “the interna-
tional soccer national anthem.” While Lee  Towers is giving his trademark Las 
 Vegas style performance, the camera zooms in on individual audience mem-
bers, waving their arms to the beat of the music, including Crown Prince Wil-
lem  Alexander and his wife Princess  Máxima. In one sweeping performance, 
Lee  Towers connects the love for the national  sports team to an uncontested 
support of the Dutch monarchy, using American pop culture to join the audi-
ence in a collective orange sentiment, an unbridled expression of Dutch  patri-
otism. Thus, Lee  Towers can use the same American conventions and rhetoric 
americans we never were 103
fabricating.indd   103 27-05-2008   16:52:58
to praise “America” in front of former President Bill  Clinton, to express his 
local identifi cation with the city of Rotterdam, and to celebrate Dutch  patriot-
ism in front of Queen  Beatrix, all based on his being an embodiment of the 
American  Dream in the Netherlands.
Adam  Curry and Patricia  Paay: The Glamour of America
One evening in early 2003, on the Dutch talk  show Barend & Van  Dorp (RTL4, 
1990-2005), two wars are being discussed. The main discussion is focused on 
the pending war in  Iraq. Should the Dutch politicians support or oppose the 
American military intervention? Subsequently, the second topic is introduced 
as the “War of the Divas.” The only female guest, Connie Breukhoven, a former 
pop singer better known as  Vanessa, has been invited to express her heartfelt 
discontent about the reality  television show Adam’s  Family (SBS6, 2003), based 
on the daily life of former  MTV veejay Adam  Curry and singer Patricia  Paay 
(who, like  Vanessa, is often referred to as a “diva” – hence the topic’s title). Ac-
cording to  Vanessa, the main problem of Adam’s Family, in addition to being 
an absolute bore, is its fakeness. Not only are  Paay’s hair extensions fake, but 
also the way  Curry and  Paay talk, a peculiar mixture of Dutch and Ameri-
can English. The talk  show’s juxtaposition of these two very different “wars” 
is striking, revealing how easily  television can make a connection between the 
seriousness of international warfare to something trivial like hair extensions 
and fake accents. Eventually both discussions focus on American dominance, 
in international politics as well as in Dutch pop culture. Supporting the war in 
 Iraq means giving into the pressures of the USA, the talk  show’s hosts suggest, 
while Adam  Curry and Patricia  Paay are pretentious fakes because they act 
American rather than Dutch. 
 In the pilot episode of Adam’s  Family (SBS6, 28 December 2002), Adam 
 Curry and Patricia  Paay are sitting on the couch watching the Top of the Pop 
 Awards on  television. Seeing the young British pop stars perform makes  Paay 
remark that stardom surely has changed over the years. “There isn’t a difference 
anymore between an ordinary person and a star,” she tells  Curry in Dutch. “In 
the old days, you didn’t become a star unless you were really special, different 
than the others.”  Paay is referring to the 1970s and 1980s, when she herself was 
a Dutch pop star, with hit singles such as the disco song “Who’s that Lady with 
My Man” (1976), the ballad “Tomorrow” (1982) from the Broadway musical 
Annie, and, with the Star  Sisters, “Stars on 45 Proudly Presents” (1983), a med-
ley of songs made famous by the Andrew  Sisters. As radio deejay and  television 
host, Adam  Curry also has a background in pop stardom, both in the Nether-
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lands, where, in the 1980s, he hosted the pop music  television show Countdown 
(Veronica), and, subsequently, in the USA as veejay on  MTV. Born in the  USA 
but raised in the Netherlands,  Curry quite easily fi ts in his role of being a “real” 
American, which was reconfi rmed, at least for Dutch viewers, by his cameo ap-
pearance in the  Madonna documentary Truth or  Dare (Alek Keshishian, 1991). 
For Patricia  Paay, being the American she never was contributes to the authen-
tication of her star  myth, her being a “real” star.
 Throughout her singing career, Patricia  Paay has made explicit refer ences 
to American pop culture in her songs and in the way she presented herself as a 
pop singer. The compact disc Patricia  Paay: Good for Gold (1996) contains all 
the hit singles  Paay released during the 1970s and 1980s, many being cover ver-
sions of American pop songs, ranging from a disco rendition of Walt  Disney’s 
“Someday My Prince Will Come” to Neil  Sedaka’s “Solitaire.” However, Good 
for Gold also contains original songs, some co-composed by  Paay, which close-
ly follow the American pop conventions. In one of the self-composed songs, 
called “Take Me Back to Denver,” Patricia  Paay sings that she wants to go back 
to Colorado, “the place where I was born.” In “The Best Friend I Know,” a duet 
with her sister Yvonne  Keeley,  Paay recalls how they used to create a “fantasy 
world” based on  Hollywood movies, pretending that her sister was Clark  Gable 
and she was Marilyn  Monroe. Patricia  Paay reinforces the  Monroe connection 
by releasing the single “A Tribute to Marilyn  Monroe” (1984) and by posing 
nude for the Dutch edition of  Playboy magazine three times (September 1984, 
November 1986, and May 1996), including one cover shot reminiscent of the 
fi rst American  Playboy featuring  Monroe in 1953.27  Paay’s album Time of My 
Life (1995) consists of her renditions of Hollywood movie themes, including 
the title track, the theme of Dirty  Dancing (Emile Ardolino, 1987), sung in 
duet with the American  television star David  Hasselhoff from  Baywatch (NBC, 
1989-1999). With her pop repertoire, her overall presentation as a sexy starlet, 
and, arguably, her marriage to  MTV veejay Adam  Curry, Patricia  Paay recre-
ates a fantasy world of American stardom in the Netherlands, tapping into the 
American star  myth.
 When, in 1987, Adam  Curry and Patricia  Paay migrate to the USA, their 
American  Dream materializes. In an interview with the Dutch edition of  Play-
boy magazine,  Paay explains that living in the USA offers them the opportunity 
to fulfi ll their ambitions, while in the Netherlands their potential was curtailed 
by a prevailing attitude of Dutch parochialism. “I love America and I have al-
ways known that I would end up here, one way or another.”28 From the perspec-
tive of the Dutch audience, however,  Curry and  Paay’s American life remains 
a fantasy world, an imagined  America of glamour and luxury. The Dutch tab-
loids report stories about their New York jet-set life and their socializing with 
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American stars such as  Madonna,  Cher, and Jon Bon  Jovi. Adam  Curry’s career 
move from  MTV veejay to internet entrepreneur is described by the tabloids 
as a classic American Dream narrative, the self-made man who became a mil-
lionaire. Even the birth of their “love child” Christina in September 1990, fea-
tured on the covers of all Dutch tabloids, is presented as a glamorous American 
experience, as their baby is reported to have been delivered under anesthetic by 
Caesarean section in an expensive private hospital, with classical music play-
ing in the background. By portraying the couple as examples of how the rich 
and famous live, the Dutch tabloids made Adam  Curry and Patricia  Paay into 
embodiments of American glamour. For example, the Dutch glossy magazine 
Avant  Garde (October 1995) devotes its cover story to “Patricia  Paay’s Ameri-
can Dream: A House Full of Love with Adam and Christina,” showing  Paay 
in a seven-page photo spread, shot by Dutch photographer Govert de  Roos, 
posing in and around “her American dream house,” located in New Jersey, a 
half-hour drive away from New York City. One photo shows Patricia  Paay next 
to her kidney-shaped swimming pool, which, as the byline reads, is an exact 
replica of Elvis  Presley’s original one at  Graceland. Another photo shows  Paay 
leaning against the hood of her luxurious Lincoln limousine (with the license 
plate reading “CURRY 1”) in the streets of Manhattan, while her private chauf-
feur stands nearby. Whereas Lee  Towers translates his American Dream into 
an identity that encompasses the local and the national, the glamorous fantasy 
world of Adam  Curry and Patricia  Paay remains an explicit American experi-
ence, reinforced by their living in the USA.
 That their American  Dream is not confi ned to the geographical bounda-
ries of the USA, however, becomes clear when, after twelve years, Adam  Curry 
and Patricia  Paay return to Europe. Like Avant  Garde, the Dutch glossy maga-
zine Beau  Monde (27 July 2001) presents a seven-page photo spread, again shot 
by Govert de  Roos, featuring “glamour queen” Patricia  Paay posing in haute 
couture dresses in and around her luxurious mansion. Although the mansion 
is located in Belgium rather than the USA, the depicted glamorous lifestyle is 
identical to the one in Avant  Garde. As  Paay makes clear in the accompanying 
interview, she intends to bring American glamour to the Netherlands, using 
the association with her imagined  America to promote her La  Paay cosmetic 
line. “Americans are very happy people,” Patricia  Paay explains. “Always posi-
tive, always complimentary. That is no act, that’s the way they are. They are less 
realistic. Dutch people are so down-to-earth. Americans believe in dreams and 
they love fantasy.”29 Rather than including the American glamour within her 
defi nition of being Dutch,  Paay uses her position of the American she never 
was as a quality that makes her stand out and thus exceptional within Dutch 
pop culture.
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 Perhaps it is this implicit claim of being exceptional that prompted  Va-
nessa to denounce  Curry and  Paay’s reality  television series as a fake. True or 
not, the same American fantasy world that Adam  Curry and Patricia  Paay have 
showcased throughout their careers also forms the basis of Adams Family. 
Although its title refers to the American  television series The Addams  Family 
(ABC, 1964-1966) and the later fi lm version (Barry Sonnenfeld, 1991), Ad-
am’s  Family is inspired by the American reality  television series The  Osbournes 
( MTV, 2002-2005), which follows the daily life of hard rock star Ozzy’s Os-
bourne’s “dysfunctional family” (Ozzy and his wife Sharon, daughter Kelly, and 
son Jack) in Los Angeles. Edited according to the conventions of the situa-
tion comedy, The  Osbournes presents “real life” in a fi ctionalized form, thereby 
blurring the lines between actual living persons and the fi ctional characters 
they portray.30 Similar to The  Osbournes, Adam’s Family provides a behind-the-
scenes look at the way celebrities live their everyday lives as members of a fam-
ily, facing the same problems that ordinary families do. Instead of performing 
as famous stars, Adam  Curry and Patricia  Paay play the role of husband and 
wife, as parents of teenage daughter Christina. In this way, an illusion of reality 
is created through the suggestion that the viewers get a glimpse of the “real” 
person behind the façade of the famous star. Such a perspective is supported 
by  Paay, who, in an interview promoting Adam’s Family, announced that “I 
believe the time is right for the people in the Netherlands to come to know the 
real Patricia  Paay, as obviously at home I’m not the glamorous diva.”31 How-
ever, conform to Richard  Dyer’s stars theory, the “real” Patricia  Paay as shown 
on  television is actually part of her star image, which reconfi rms rather than 
exposes the construction of the star  myth. 
 Whereas other Dutch celebrity reality shows such as Patty’s  Posse (Yorin, 
2003-2004) and De  Bauers (RTL4, 2003, 2007) emphasize the ordinariness of 
celebrity life, thereby downplaying the importance of glamour, Adam’s  Fam-
ily showcases the lifestyle of the rich and famous. Living in their luxurious 
Belgian mansion dubbed  Curry’s Castle, Adam  Curry and Patricia  Paay are 
shown driving their expensive  sports cars, preparing lavish dinner parties, fl y-
ing in their private helicopter, and going on holiday to the Bahamas. As the 
show’s grand fi nale, also featured on the covers of all Dutch tabloids,  Curry 
and  Paay renew their wedding vows with a romantic ceremony set in a small 
Italian village, which, as one of the tabloids notes, is “such an American thing 
to do.” The show’s hyper-American character is enhanced by the use of classic 
American pop songs as soundtrack, including “Happy Together” by the  Tur-
tles as the show’s opening tune, Aretha  Franklin’s “(You Make Me Feel Like) 
A Natural Woman” when  Paay is shown doing her make-up, and the theme of 
the  television series  Dynasty (ABC, 1981-1989), underscoring the establishing 
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shots of  Curry’s Castle. By showing the glamorous lifestyle that Dutch viewers 
will recognize from  Hollywood and  television series like Dynasty, Adam’s Fam-
ily reconfi rms the American fantasy world that Adam  Curry and Patricia  Paay 
have come to personify.
Costa! and  Katja: Embodying Pop Culture
The Dutch teenage romantic comedy Costa! (Johan Nijenhuis, 2001) takes 
place in Spain, telling the story of a group of Dutch youth who work at Costa, 
a trendy discothèque that primarily caters to Dutch teenage tourists. When 
 MTV’s annual dance contest comes to town, the youngsters are determined 
to win, desperate to beat their rivals, the dancers of the discothèque Empire. 
Although the majority of the fi lm’s dialogue is in Dutch, in one scene the Scan-
dinavian discothèque owner Ian, sitting in his wheelchair, gives a motivational 
speech in English to his young employees, ending with two rhetorical ques-
tions: “Do you wanna hold on to the dream? Do you wanna work hard to keep 
it alive?” At fi rst glance Ian’s foreign nationality seems rather arbitrary and un-
necessary, as all the other characters are Dutch and speak Dutch. Moreover, the 
part is played by a Dutch actor (Victor Löwe) who speaks an unidentifi able 
English with a heavy Dutch accent. The only reason for his foreign national-
ity seems to be the content of his motivational speech: the discothèque owner 
is encouraging his young employees to believe in the dream of  meritocracy, 
so they can escape their working-class backgrounds by working hard to make 
their dreams come true as winners of the  MTV dance contest. Obviously, the 
message of the American  Dream is better expressed in English, as a literal 
Dutch translation loses it connotations, or “just doesn’t sound right.” To justify 
his delivering these remarks in English rather than Dutch, Ian has to be a for-
eigner, enabling him to evoke the rhetoric of the American Dream, even if he 
speaks English with a heavy, fake accent.
 Costa! is only one of many Dutch commercial fi lms that appropriate the 
genre conventions and audiovisual language of  Hollywood. Some of these fi lms 
are explicitly targeted at an international mainstream audience, such as Do Not 
 Disturb (1999) and Down aka The  Shaft (2001), both directed by Dick  Maas 
and starring Hollywood actors like William  Hurt and Naomi  Watts, and the 
fi lms by Roel  Reiné, The  Delivery (1999) and  Adrenaline (2003).32 As Thomas 
 Elsaesser points out, only a few European fi lms have “the budgets, stars and 
production values even to try to reach an international mainstream audience,” 
concluding that “often enough these fi lms fail in their aim, not least because 
they have to disguise themselves to look and sound as if they were Ameri-
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can.”33 That the abovementioned fi lms by Dick  Maas and Roel  Reiné proved 
to be commercial and critical failures may be explained by the plausible factor 
that their disguises as “real” American movies are obvious to such an extent 
that the fi lms become less convincing to audiences and critics alike. The Dutch 
self-acclaimed “feel good” movies like Costa!, on the contrary, are targeted at 
a national and often younger audience and tend to be commercially success-
ful, including romantic comedies like Phileine zegt  Sorry (Robert Jan Westdijk, 
2003) and Het  Schnitzelparadijs (Martin  Koolhoven, 2005), teenage comedies 
such as All  Stars (Jean van de Velde, 1997) and Shouf Shouf Habibi! (Albert ter 
 Heerdt, 2004), and action fi lms such as  Lek (Jean van de Velde, 2000) and Vet 
 Hard (Tim Oliehoek, 2005). Even though these fi lms also rely heavily on the 
often clichéd genre conventions of Hollywood cinema, they do not disguise 
themselves as American, but instead explicitly emphasize their national or lo-
cal character, thereby often using actors from national  television who are well 
known by the larger Dutch audience. In this way, these fi lms appropriate Hol-
lywood within their own national context, rather than being mere imitations 
of the American original. 
 Although also referring to popular American fi lms like West Side  Story 
(Jerome Robbins and Robert Wise, 1961) and  Grease (Randal Kleiser, 1978), 
Costa! is most of all an updated Dutch version of Dirty  Dancing (Emile Ar-
dolino, 1987), the latter being the romantic story of a young shy teenage girl, 
played by Jennifer  Grey, who, while on holiday, experiences her sexual awaken-
ing and becomes a confi dent woman after competing in a dance contest with 
her hunky lower-class dance instructor, played by Patrick  Swayze. In Costa!, 
the young shy teenage girl Janet, played by former soap opera actress Georgina 
 Verbaan, is on holiday in Spain, where she meets Rens (Daan  Schuurmans), the 
leader of the Costa dancers. Similar to the plot of Dirty Dancing, their romance 
blossoms when Rens’ regular dance partner cannot perform and is replaced by 
Janet, who transforms into a wonderful dancer. Particularly the scene in which 
Rens, who, like Patrick  Swayze’s character, teaches Janet the dance’s choreogra-
phy in the water at a desolated beach is almost identical to the Dirty Dancing 
original. Conform to the genre convention of the happy ending, Rens and Janet 
win the  MTV dance contest. However, Costa! does differ from Dirty Dancing 
in one signifi cant aspect. While the role of the former dance partner Penny in 
Dirty Dancing is of minor importance, the role of Frida, the sexy young woman 
who is replaced by Janet, is played by the fi lm’s biggest star,  Katja Schuurman. 
Simply known as  Katja, her star appeal is emphasized by her recording of the 
movie’s main love theme, “Lover or Friend,” which became a big hit on the 
Dutch pop charts. One could even argue that it is  Katja’s star image which con-
nects Costa! to the  Hollywood star  myth, albeit one which is implicitly rather 
than explicitly American.
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 Similar to most young stars of the Dutch “feel good” cinema,  Katja ini-
tially started out as a  television actress, being one of the most popular charac-
ters on the fi rst Dutch daily soap Goede Tijden, Slechte  Tijden (Good Times, Bad 
Times, RTL4, 1990–present), in which she played from 1995 to 1999. Her cred-
ibility as “serious” actress increased when she appeared in the low-budget fi lm 
No Planes, No  Trains (Jos Stelling, 1999). Since the fi lm’s director had no clue 
who she was, he was surprised to see that  Katja was treated as a true movie star. 
Although she only played a minor role, the fi lm’s distributor Warner  Brothers 
promoted No Planes, No Trains by emphasizing the star image of  Katja. More-
over, interviews with  Katja were only granted if the magazine would feature 
the new movie star on its cover, prompting the Dutch fi lm magazine de  Film-
krant to note that, while beyond the borders of the Dutch small towns no one 
actually knew her, Warner Brothers was letting  Katja “play  Hollywood in Hol-
land” anyway.34 In other words,  Katja “plays” the Hollywood starlet she never 
was, using the star  myth traditionally associated with the American  Dream. 
Throughout her acting career in both  television and fi lm,  Katja has toyed with 
her sexy starlet image. Like many other Dutch female celebrities, including Pa-
tricia  Paay, she has posed nude in the Dutch  Playboy (September 2002). How-
ever, rather than posing as her personal self,  Katja poses as Thera, the nightclub 
dancer she portrays in the Dutch fi lm Oesters van Nam  Kee (Pollo de Pimentel, 
2002). In contrast,  Katja plays “herself” in the fi ctional reality  television series 
BNN  Family (BNN, 2003), a parody of Adam’s  Family and Patty’s  Posse. In this 
way, the boundaries between the “real”  Katja and  Katja the Hollywood starlet 
she never was are continuously crossed.
 This blurred distinction between the “real”  Katja and her star image as 
projected in Dutch pop culture is the starting point of the Dutch low-budget 
fi lm  Interview (Theo van  Gogh, 2003). In Interview,  Katja plays the soap ac-
tress  Katja who is being interviewed at home in her Amsterdam apartment 
by the political correspondent of a Dutch quality newspaper, Pierre Peters, a 
role played by the renowned stage actor Pierre  Bokma. The casting of the most 
popular starlet in combination with a serious actor is reminiscent of the classic 
 Hollywood fi lm The Prince and the Showgirl (Laurence  Olivier, 1957), starring 
Laurence  Olivier and Marilyn  Monroe, a connection which is emphasized by 
a large picture of  Monroe hanging in  Katja’s apartment. The suggestion that 
 Katja is playing “herself” is enhanced by the fact that the fi lm has been shot in 
the apartment of the “real”  Katja and by references to her “real” life, including 
the ring tone of her cell phone which, ringing several times during the fi lm, 
plays the tune of Goede Tijden, Slechte  Tijden. At the same time, however,  Katja 
is also presented as a fi ctional character, made clear by the fi ctional  Katja be-
ing blond, conform to the stereotype of the dumb blonde starlet, rather than 
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having the manes of dark curly hair which have become a trademark of the 
“real”  Katja. Moreover, in one scene  Katja is watching herself on  television, the 
daily episode of her soap, in which she is crying hysterically. The fi ctional soap 
scene is overacted to such an extent that it becomes a parody, not only pok-
ing fun at the melodrama of soap, but also emphasizing that  Katja is giving a 
performance. In this way, the fi lm suggests that, similar to the fi ctional  Katja 
in the fi ctional soap, the fi lm’s fi ctional  Katja is performing the act of being a 
stereotypical soap actress by portraying  Katja as an overindulgent, coke-snort-
ing, man-seducing starlet, thereby mocking the way the Dutch tabloids tend to 
present the “real”  Katja in their gossip stories.
 With the contrast between the serious newspaper correspondent and 
the frivolous soap actress,  Interview presents a clash between  highbrow and 
 lowbrow culture. Pierre embodies  highbrow culture, being masculine, mature, 
arrogant, yet boring, focused on serious issues such as warfare and politics. 
 Katja, on the contrary, embodies  lowbrow pop culture, being feminine, young, 
exciting, yet less naïve than she appears at fi rst sight, focused on frivolous issues 
such as  entertainment and gossip. Perhaps most important, through  Katja pop 
culture is presented as a sex bomb, dangerously seductive and hard to resist. 
The contrast between  highbrow and  lowbrow culture echoes the rigid dichoto-
mies which make up the Europe versus America divide, as discussed earlier 
in this chapter. In this way,  Katja could be perceived as signifying American 
pop culture, whereas, in such a comparison, Pierre would signify European in-
tellectualism. However, in Interview, pop culture is never explicitly connected 
to Americanness, with the exception of the Marilyn  Monroe picture in  Kat-
ja’s apartment. As the  Hollywood starlet she never was,  Katja embodies pop 
culture, regardless of whether or not her star  myth is still associated with the 
American  Dream.
 That the star image of  Katja (and other Dutch stars) does not travel eas-
ily across geographical boundaries becomes apparent with the American re-
make of  Interview (Steve  Buscemi, 2007). While the role of Pierre is played 
by the fi lm’s American director Steve  Buscemi,  Katja has been replaced by the 
 Hollywood actress Sienna  Miller, who, unlike  Katja, does not play “herself” 
but a character named Katya, thereby losing the play with reality and fi ction 
which is such a signifi cant element of the Dutch version. The “real”  Katja does 
make a cameo appearance in the American fi lm as “the lady in the limo,” show-
ing that, outside of the national context, Dutch Hollywood starlets they never 
were remain anonymous. Five years earlier,  Katja made a one-second cameo 
appearance in the Hollywood fi lm The Rules of  Attraction (Roger Avary, 2002), 
based on the novel by Bret Easton  Ellis, as “a Dutch  television actress” drinking 
absinthe in an Amsterdam bar with one of the fi lm’s characters. In the Dutch 
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comedy Shouf Shouf Habibi! (Albert ter  Heerdt, 2004), also discussed in chap-
ter fi ve, one of the Moroccan-Dutch characters tells his friends that he wants to 
marry a virgin who is as beautiful and sexy as  Katja. In the fi lm’s international 
edition, the English subtitles translate his comments as “Horny as J- Lo, but a 
virgin.” For the implied international viewers,  Katja has been translated as the 
American star Jennifer Lopez. They both embody the sexy starlet, yet J- Lo’s 
star image travels globally, whereas  Katja continues to “play Hollywood in Hol-
land,” appropriating the star  myth within a limited national context.
Ali  B: In the Dutch Ghetto
“President, stupid fucking moron / now listen, a child must go to school / 
through rebellion I reach my goal / I use a mike, you a gun / boom pow, just 
shoot me down / in your nightmares you will see me again / I will not leave you 
alone / … motherfucker.”35 These words, in Dutch, are rapped by the Moroc-
can-Dutch hip- hop artist Ali  B, featured in the music  video “Fok de Macht” 
(2005) by the Dutch rap duo the  Opposites. Like the song’s title, which trans-
lates as “fuck the power,” the performance is inspired by classic African-Ameri-
can rap songs like N.W.A. ’s “Fuck tha Police” (1988) and Public  Enemy’s “Fight 
the Power” (1989). In this way, Ali B appropriates not only the rhetoric and au-
diovisual language of African-American rap, but also its provocative message 
of rebelling against the authorities and protesting against  racism, police brutal-
ity, and poverty in the American urban ghettos. However, Ali B is not rapping 
about the social-economic conditions in his home country the Netherlands. 
Featured in the Dutch  MTV’s Rap Around the  World documentary series, “Fok 
de Macht” is a protest against the practice of child labor in Ecuador. In fact, 
the song is part of a political awareness campaign by the charity foundation 
Plan Nederland, formerly known as the Dutch chapter of Foster Parents Plan. 
Thus, quite peculiarly, the Moroccan-Dutch Ali B, as the African-American 
rapper he never was, uses oppositional African-American pop culture to criti-
cize the politics of a South American country, with a rap song commissioned 
by a Dutch charity organization.36
 Ever since his fi rst hit single in 2004, Ali  B has become the most popular 
and commercially successful hip- hop artist of the Netherlands. Not only does 
he succeed on the pop charts, he is also spokesperson for several charities, ap-
pears in  television commercials, and is the fi rst Dutch rapper to have his own 
statue in the Amsterdam Madame  Tussauds wax museum. His reputation of 
representing “the voice of the street” is reconfi rmed on October 26, 2006, when 
he verbally challenges the Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter  Balkenende on the 
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talk  show Pauw &  Witteman (VARA, 2006-present). Yet simultaneously, Ali B 
is included within the Dutch national discourse, as shown in August 2007 with 
the announcement by the Amsterdam Rijksmuseum that Ali B will be featured 
in its exhibition on heroes, commemorating the four-hundredth birthday of 
the Dutch sea admiral Michiel de  Ruyter. Being the fi rst Moroccan-Dutch star 
in Dutch pop culture, Ali B is often read as a success story of ethnic integra-
tion, which can be perceived as a star  myth, prompting the question of how 
American pop culture, and in particular African-American hip- hop, helps to 
construct Ali B’s star image.
 Although his full name is Ali Bouali, Ali  B uses only the fi rst initial of his 
last name to mimic, as explained on his website, “the way in which the Dutch 
media refer to Moroccan criminals.”37 By doing so, Ali B challenges the conno-
tation of the negative media depiction, as “Ali B” now no longer immediately 
evokes the negative image of Moroccan-Dutch youth as potential criminals (or 
worse, as potential terrorists), but rather the positive image of a successful rap-
per. Yet, the connotation of a life of crime remains, and thus “Ali B” also implies 
authenticity and street credibility, which is part of the image that he presents 
with his Ali B vertelt het leven van de straat album and theater show (2004), 
an assumingly autobiographical account of Moroccan-Dutch youth street life. 
Heavily inspired by the imagery of African-American “ gangsta” rap, Ali B takes 
on the persona of the tough and streetwise rapper, or “ thugmarokkaan” (“thug 
 Moroccan”), as he identifi es himself. This street image is enhanced by the pic-
tures on his fi rst album cover and its promotional material. Ali B is pictured in 
a gloomy urban landscape, which seems closer to the American urban ghetto 
as featured in African-American ’hood fi lms and hip- hop music  videos than 
Ali B’s relatively mundane Dutch hometown Almere. However, in addition to 
boasting about his being an authentic  gangsta, Ali B raps about being refused 
entrance to a local disco because he is Moroccan, a common practice of dis-
crimination that has become a recurring theme in Dutch pop culture. More-
over, Ali B addresses his newfound popularity as Moroccan-Dutch hip- hop 
star, receiving the attention of white Dutch women who previously avoided 
him because they assumed he was a criminal. By doing so, Ali B translates the 
image of the African-American hip- hop  gangsta into a specifi c local context, 
using its rebellious rhetoric to express his anger about occurrences of struc-
tural  racism in Dutch society.
 That Ali  B can be perceived as the African-American rapper he never was 
becomes clear with the song “Ghetto” which he and his cousin Yes- R recorded 
with the African-American rapper  Akon. Peculiarly subtitled “the internation-
al mix” (the song was only released in the Netherlands), this version consists of 
Akon’s original American one with overdubs by Ali B and Yes-R in Dutch. In 
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the original version, Akon raps about the hard life in American ghettos. Akon’s 
original music  video makes a connection between ghetto life in a black inner 
city in New Jersey, a white trash trailer park in New Mexico, and the Native 
American Navajo Nation reservation in Arizona, thereby explicitly suggesting 
that the hardship of ghetto life is not an African-American experience, but 
rather a social-economic condition shared by a diverse group of underprivi-
leged Americans. The Dutch version of the music  video adds images of ghetto 
life in Amsterdam Zuidoost (South-East), also known as the Bijlmer. Recogniz-
ing that such a comparison may seem a bit farfetched, Ali B raps: “Look, I don’t 
want to say that the Bijlmer is like New York / but a lot of people treat it as if it 
were a village / where nothing ever happens while the apartment buildings are 
occupied by junks on crack / you are fooling yourself.”38 By translating Akon’s 
ghetto to the Dutch situation, Ali B suggests that there is an international 
similarity and potential solidarity not only among the underprivileged in the 
USA and the Netherlands, but also among the different ethnic groups living in 
the ghetto of the Amsterdam Bijlmer. Tellingly, it is the image of ghetto life as 
represented by American pop culture, in African-American ’hood fi lms and 
hip- hop music  videos, through which such solidarity is expressed; this is thus 
rooted in an imagined America, rather than the USA. 
 In interviews, Ali  B stresses his social and economic success, being a role 
model for other Moroccan-Dutch teenagers, while simultaneously maintain-
ing his “ghetto” background: “I’ve always kept to the straight and narrow and 
never was a hanger-on. I’m really proud of that. The boys in the neighborhood 
accepted me for who I was. A lot of my friends weren’t so lucky. One is doing 
time for murder, another for burglary, and some are still hanging around on 
the streets and delivering pizzas.”39 Again, the image of the American urban 
ghetto is evoked, although in a local version, with the stereotypical image of the 
Moroccan-Dutch teenage boy on a moped delivering pizzas replacing the ster-
eotypical image of the African-American drug dealer. Moreover, in some inter-
views, Ali B’s success story is told using the rhetoric of the American  Dream, yet 
without making its Americanness explicit. For example, in the special “Dutch 
 Dream” issue of LINDA. (February 2005), a glossy magazine based on the me-
dia personality of Linda de  Mol, Ali B is featured as one of the “ethnic” Dutch 
celebrities who are being showcased as examples of successful integration. As 
will be discussed in chapter fi ve, LINDA. appropriates the connotations of the 
American Dream to present these success stories of non-white stars, suggesting 
that Dutch  multiculturalism has not failed. Conform to the American rhetoric 
of self-reliance and  meritocracy, Ali B is portrayed by LINDA. magazine as a 
proud, hardworking, and determined individual, who hopes that his peers will 
follow his example. 
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 His increasing mainstream popularity, however, has challenged the street 
credibility of Ali  B’s image as a thug  Moroccan rapper. Especially his 2005 duet 
with the popular white Dutch singer Marco  Borsato “Wat Zou Je Doen” (“What 
Would You Do”), recorded for the charity organization War Child and, in that 
same year, his widely publicized encounter with Queen  Beatrix, with whom he 
did the hip- hop handshake before hugging her, have made Ali B susceptible to 
criticism of tokenism, suggesting that Al B has become the “pet Moroccan” of 
the white Dutch establishment.40 In the popular media, such criticism of token-
ism tends to be explained as a confl ict between being an “authentic” rapper or a 
“sellout,” suggesting that commercial success endangers hip- hop authenticity. 
In her essay on Dutch hip- hop, Mir  Wermuth confi rms that in the Dutch hip-
 hop subculture, “there is a tendency to stick to the dichotomy of commercial 
versus anticommercial.”41 However, another explanation might be the incom-
patibility of the image of the thug  Moroccan rapper with the image of being 
a commercially successful rapper, revealing a signifi cant difference between 
the star myths of African-American rappers and those of their Dutch coun-
terparts. The African-American role models of Ali B, such as rapper 50  Cent, 
can sustain their image as ghetto  gangsta while simultaneously embodying the 
rags-to-riches star  myth of the American  Dream, as is exemplifi ed by 50 Cent’s 
fi lm Get Rich or Die  Tryin’ (Jim Sheridan, 2005), loosely based on his “real” life, 
in which he plays a drug dealer in the ghetto who succeeds in becoming a ma-
jor hip- hop star. In stark contrast, to become accepted as a rapper who enjoys 
mainstream success, Ali B has to distance himself from his reputation as thug 
 Moroccan rapper, an image that remains connected to the negative media rep-
resentation of Moroccan-Dutch youth as potential criminals. Decriminalizing 
his image by emphasizing a “softer” image of the huggable pop star enables Ali 
B to be embraced by the white Dutch establishment, ranging from Queen  Bea-
trix to Linda de  Mol, as an embodiment of the Dutch  Dream success story.
Conclusion: The Real Thing
“This is really cool, the Universal  logo. … When I saw that I thought ‘wow, a 
real movie.’ … It’s the best part of the fi lm.” These are comments, originally 
in Dutch, made by the actors of the Dutch hit comedy Het  Schnitzelparadijs 
(2005), who, together with its director Martin  Koolhoven, give frame-by-frame 
commentary on the DVD edition of the fi lm. Before the movie actually starts, 
the screen shows the revolving globe of the Universal fi lm studio, which stops 
at the moment the American continent is on front, with “Universal” stamped 
in big letters on the screen. Although undoubtedly meant to be funny, the com-
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ments bring to the foreground two important elements of Dutch pop culture 
which is based on the American example of  Hollywood. First, American pop 
culture is often perceived as being “universal,” an audiovisual language that 
can be globally interpreted and appropriated. Second, American pop culture 
can function as a sign which can provide authentication. Het  Schnitzelparadijs 
may not have been shot in the “real” Hollywood, yet the Universal trademark 
provides the association with Hollywood and thereby makes the hit comedy a 
“real” movie.
 Similar to the way the Universal trademark provides Het  Schnitzelparadijs 
with a suggestion of authenticity, the hyper- Americanness of the four exam-
ples of Americans they never  were – Lee  Towers, Adam  Curry and Patricia  Paay, 
 Katja Schuurman, and Ali  B – makes them just like “the real thing.” Each of 
them appropriates similar elements of American pop culture, but with differ-
ent aims and different results. With his bombastic performances, Lee  Towers as 
the Las  Vegas crooner he never was uses the rhetoric of the American  Dream 
to express both his local identity, rooted in the working-class culture of Rot-
terdam, and his national identity, based on a rather patriotic and traditional 
interpretation of  Dutchness. Adam  Curry and Patricia  Paay, on the contrary, 
appropriate American pop culture not to express a local or national identity, 
but instead to present themselves as living examples of a fantasy world of the 
rich and famous, in which hyper- Americanness signifi es the glamour tradi-
tionally associated with  Hollywood. Being the Hollywood starlet she never was, 
 Katja Schuurman embodies pop culture, translating the American star  myth 
within a specifi c national context by “playing Hollywood in Holland.” Yet, in 
contrast to Lee  Towers, Adam  Curry, and Patricia  Paay, the star  myth of  Katja is 
no longer explicitly American. Finally, the Moroccan-Dutch rapper Ali B uses 
the genre conventions and audiovisual language of African-American hip- hop 
and  gangsta rap to comment not only on Dutch  multiculturalism, but also on 
international politics, suggesting that African-American hip- hop can result in 
international solidarity among different ethnic groups which fi nd themselves 
in similar social-economic conditions. However, Ali B is trapped between the 
image of being a thug  Moroccan and the image of being a commercially suc-
cessful star accepted by mainstream white society. In spite of their differences, 
these four case studies share the  appropriation of American pop culture to 
express their specifi c local and national identity by performing karaoke  Ameri-
canism as Americans they never  were.
 By perceiving them as absolute fakes, I am not suggesting that Lee  Towers, 
Adam  Curry and Patricia  Paay,  Katja Schuurman, and Ali  B are fake Americans. 
It is neither my intention to judge whether or not they succeed in presenting 
a convincing imitation of American pop culture, nor to claim that Dutch pop 
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culture has been taken over by American pop culture or that we are all becom-
ing global Americans. On the contrary, subtitled or dubbed, karaoke  Ameri-
canism enables Dutch artists in pop music, fi lm, and  television to form and 
express their cultural identity by appropriating American pop culture within a 
local and national context. Moreover, I am interested instead in those moments 
in Dutch pop culture when its Americanness is taken for granted, when it no 
longer seems obvious to question why American pop culture is being imitated. 
The metaphor of karaoke  Americanism enables a perception that goes beyond 
imitation, as karaoke implies an active performance of mimicking and mock-
ery, based on the clichéd conventions of pop culture, yet also paying tribute to 
the original in a specifi c local or national manner. In this way, American pop 
culture proves to be a source of signs that provides us with a lingua franca to 
create our own “America,” which is not an identical copy, but an  appropriation, 
often expressed with a heavy, “fake” accent. However, it is the space where the 
imitation is slightly off, where the copy becomes a hyperbole of the original, 
an example of hyper- Americanness, which enables the creation of new mean-
ings. As a form of active cultural  appropriation, American pop culture is nei-
ther merely a form of American cultural  imperialism, nor merely a liberating 
source of agency. Instead, the signs provided by American pop culture are part 
of our own pop culture as we live it day by day, and while we still may recognize 
them as “American,” or ascribe more meaning to them because we view them 
as being “American,” they remain “Dutch” at the same time.
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Chapter Five:
The Dutch  Dream:
 Americanization, Pop Culture, and National Identity
On July 27, 2005, the day after Mohammed B. , the convicted murderer of the 
controversial Dutch fi lmmaker and columnist Theo van  Gogh, was sentenced 
to life imprisonment, the Boomerang company released a free postcard featur-
ing graffi ti by Van  Gogh’s teenage son.1 Inspired by urban American hip- hop 
culture (often defi ned as African-American), the graffi ti uses American iconog-
raphy – the text “Theo Forever” in English, Donald  Duck, and the prominently 
pictured American  fl ag with the name Theo spelled out in little stars – to pro-
vide a very personal expression of both remembrance and protest. On the one 
hand, the graffi ti can be interpreted within a post-9/ 11 political discourse, in 
which Samuel  Huntington’s polarizing thesis of the “Clash of  Civilizations” has 
been accepted by many as self-evident. By connecting him explicitly to Ameri-
can symbolism, Theo van  Gogh is placed on the side of the USA in its War on 
 Terror, against the Muslim extremists who took his life. On the other hand, the 
graffi ti can also be perceived as an example of American iconography as an 
international lingua franca, which is no longer connected to a specifi c Ameri-
can context but free to be appropriated and interpreted on local levels.2 In that 
case, the American fl ag does not function as a symbol of the nation-state  USA, 
but instead has become a sign of “America,” connoting, in this example, the 
 freedom of expression.
 The two interpretations of the Van  Gogh graffi ti do not contradict each 
other, but they do show how a distinction can be made between the nation-
state  USA and an imagined  America. The fi rst interpretation fi ts the unilateral 
stance of the nation-state  USA, best exemplifi ed by the now-famous words 
of President George W.  Bush, spoken in a televised address to the American 
Congress nine days after 9/ 11: “Either you are with us, or you are with the ter-
rorists.”3 The second interpretation fi ts the notion of an imagined  America as 
a symbol of the  freedom of expression, thereby suggesting that the American 
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conception of such a value has come to be accepted as universal. In this chapter, 
I will discuss specifi c Dutch pop-cultural artifacts which appropriate elements 
of American pop culture – images, genre conventions, and audiovisual lan-
guage – to comment on the Dutch political reality since 9/11, and, in particular, 
the assassinations of the controversial Dutch politician Pim  Fortuyn on May 
6, 2002, and of Theo van  Gogh on November 2, 2004. As has been suggested 
in the Dutch media, the horrifying murders of  Fortuyn and Van  Gogh can be 
perceived as “our 9/11,” a connection which was immediately recognized by 
conspiracy theorists who pointed out that Van  Gogh was murdered exactly 911 
days after  Fortuyn. More important, just as 9/11 prompted debates in the USA 
about redefi ning what it means to be American, the murders of  Fortuyn and 
Van  Gogh have been interpreted as marking a drastic change in the Dutch po-
litical climate, shifting from the celebrated principle of multicultural tolerance 
towards a renewed  patriotism and a more restrictive view on Dutch national 
identity.4 Similar to the post-9/11 debates in the USA, there is a strong call 
for a return to the history of the nation-state as the foundation of a collective 
national identity, often envisioned, evoking Benedict  Anderson’s concept, as a 
Dutch imagined  community.
 To explore how an Americanized Dutch pop culture adds to the post-
9/ 11 political discourse about national identity in the Netherlands, I will 
present fi ve case studies: an episode of the  television talent show  Idols present-
ing national identity as a theme in pop culture, the pop tributes to Pim  Fortuyn 
remembering him as the Dutch  Kennedy, hip- hop songs by Moroccan-Dutch 
and white Dutch rappers commenting on Dutch society, the special “Dutch 
 Dream” issue of the glossy magazine LINDA. featuring successful “ethnic” ce-
lebrities, and the movies Shouf Shouf Habibi! (2004) and  Kicks (2007), both 
directed by Albert ter  Heerdt, which use  Hollywood conventions to address 
Dutch  multiculturalism. By analyzing these specifi c pop-cultural artifacts, I 
suggest that “America” can function as a shared point of reference, connecting 
different positions within the political debate through the common language 
of American pop culture, rather than falling back upon an imagined  commu-
nity based on Dutch national history. 
Pop Culture and National Identity
Similar to its counterparts in other countries, the Dutch version of the  televi-
sion talent show  Idols (RTL4, 2003-present) consists of contestants performing 
cover versions of classic, most often American, pop songs, which can be seen 
as a literal form of karaoke  Americanism. Each broadcast is centered around 
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one particular theme, ranging from “The 1980s” and “ Motown” to “Disco” and 
“Top 40 Hits.” Although themes may vary during each season, the “Dutch Hits” 
theme always returns, as one broadcast is dedicated to the contestants singing 
original Dutch pop songs, either in Dutch or English. In this manner,  Dutch-
ness is just another theme among others, which is reconfi rmed by the way Idols 
presents the theme in its opening segment. During the second season, for ex-
ample, the “Disco” episode (27 March 2004) shows the contestants dressed in 
platform-soled shoes, bellbottom pants, and big Afro wigs. In the “Dutch Hits” 
episode (3 April 2004), they are wearing traditional Dutch costumes. At fi rst 
sight, the black Columbian-born contestant  JK wearing a folkloristic Dutch 
costume looks particularly out of place, giving the impression of a drag per-
formance, as his blackness contradicts the traditional whiteness of Dutch folk-
lore. However, JK’s hypervisibility actually reveals that the same could be said 
of the white Dutch contestants, showing that they too are in “drag” by donning 
traditional Dutch dress. In the global pop  television format of Idols, there is no 
real difference between disco revivalism and Dutch national folklore, as both 
offer just another occasion to dress up in fancy costumes. 
 The “Dutch Hits” episode of  Idols is signifi cant because it shows how 
through pop culture the presentation of national identity can be reduced to the 
clichéd and stereotypical images of global tourism. As host Reinout  Oerlemans 
tells the audience, to “get into the right mood,” the contestants are placed in a 
“typically Dutch setting” as they are being tested on their knowledge of Dutch 
national heritage. In addition to the contestants wearing traditional Dutch cos-
tumes, this “typically Dutch setting” is created through the use of the color 
orange in combination with the red-white-and-blue of the national fl ag and 
images of Dutch tourism: tulips, windmills, wooden shoes, and cheese. The 
conventional orange sentiment is evoked with footage of the national  soccer 
team and the Dutch royal family. That such a stereotypical expression of na-
tional identity should not be taken too seriously becomes clear when the con-
testants are quizzed about Dutch national history. None of them recognize the 
name of national hero Michiel de  Ruyter, the famous Dutch sea admiral of the 
seventeenth century, jokingly suggesting instead that he must be a fi shmonger 
or a bicycle repairman. Since the general frame of reference of both Idols and 
its contestants, in all the episodes, is pop culture – and American pop culture 
in particular – it is not surprising that the depiction of Dutch national iden-
tity conforms with the clichéd images that pop culture provides. Moreover, 
the performance of  Dutchness fi ts within the overall karaoke  Americanism of 
Idols, in which Dutchness is treated as just another theme, in spite of being 
performed by Dutch contestants on a Dutch  television show.
 By perceiving this particular performance of  Dutchness on  Idols as a form 
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of karaoke  Americanism, I am not suggesting that any stereotypical expression 
of pop culture is by defi nition American or should be considered as such. Also 
the question of whether or not Idols (based on an originally British format) 
is American is beside the point. The signifi cance of this particular example is 
found in the notion that the Dutch edition of Idols uses its international format 
to present a national identity which is based on clichéd images of Dutchness 
taken from a global, yet American-dominated, pop culture. In this way, Idols 
does not present Dutchness as an explicit local or national form of self-depic-
tion but rather as a  pastiche based on how Dutchness is believed to be globally 
perceived. The Dutchness as presented on Idols may be an extreme example of 
how pop culture reduces a national identity to such a clichéd image. Neverthe-
less, it is telling that in a time when the redefi nition of national identity has 
become a topic of political urgency, the depiction of Dutch nationality on Idols 
is taken for granted.
 Since 9/ 11 and the assassinations of  Fortuyn and Van  Gogh, the political 
debate on Dutch national identity is predominantly focused on the danger of 
Muslim extremism and the issue of ethnic integration. The fear that the na-
tional identity could be undermined by the cultural  imperialism of  Americani-
zation has conspicuously disappeared from the political agenda. Quite the con-
trary, now the USA is often mentioned as a successful multicultural society to 
be emulated.5 As Peter van der  Veer has argued, the political debate says more 
about a changing Dutch culture than about  Islam, even if most discussions 
are limited to the issue of Muslim  fundamentalism. Particularly the assassina-
tions challenged preexisting notions of  Dutchness, as these “events did not fi t 
the Netherlands’s global image and tourist brand as a wealthy, tolerant, and 
perhaps excessively liberal society.”6 A catchphrase in the debate is “the multi-
cultural  drama,” based on an infl uential essay of the same name, published on 
January 29, 2000 (thus before 9/11) by left-wing intellectual Paul  Scheffer.7 In 
the essay,  Scheffer argues that the seriousness of the situation has been under-
estimated. The Dutch policy of  multiculturalism has resulted in ethnic segre-
gation and the exclusion of ethnic minorities from a collective Dutch history 
and identity, comparable to  Anderson’s notion of imagined  community. The 
celebrated Dutch principle of tolerance through respecting ethnic, cultural, 
and religious diversity often turned out to be an indifference toward the immi-
grant population instead. As a result, fi rst-generation immigrants have recreat-
ed their homeland cultures separately from mainstream Dutch society, leaving 
second-generation immigrants torn between the traditional culture of their 
parents and an indifferent Dutch mainstream culture. Although Paul  Scheffer 
wrote the essay before 9/11, he believes that the multicultural  drama has been 
reconfi rmed by 9/11 and the assassinations of  Fortuyn and Van  Gogh. “Once 
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you accept that multicultural argument against teaching them our history, you 
are excluding them from collective memory, from an enormous chance for 
renewal,” as Scheffer explained the Dutch multicultural  drama to a reporter of 
The New  Yorker in 2006, adding that “September 11th gave many of them their 
narrative.”8
 While “The Multicultural  Drama” can be credited for exposing some of 
the actual problems facing Dutch  multiculturalism, including the possibility of 
ethnic segregation and the social exclusion of ethnic groups from mainstream 
society, the essay does imply a rigid distinction between “our” and “their” cul-
ture, and thereby limits “our” culture to an identity which is predominantly 
formed by a collective national history. Even though national history is im-
portant, such a perspective, including the added comments after 9/ 11, is prob-
lematic for two reasons. First, the multicultural  drama perspective presents the 
collective national identity as an uncontested given, suggesting that both “our” 
and “their” culture are fi xed entities. Second, such a perspective tends to ignore 
that 9/11 and the assassinations of  Fortuyn and Van  Gogh not only gave “many 
of them their narrative” but also “us” a range of narratives, including ones that 
polarize the debate, as well as others that instead challenge the rigid “us” ver-
sus “them” divide. This wide range of narratives can be found in the political 
and public debates, but also in literature, the arts, academic discussions, and 
in pop culture. I focus specifi cally on pop culture, as within this realm, the 
notion of national identity (including the question of who belongs to “us” 
and who belongs to “them”) is often expressed through the  appropriation of 
American genre conventions and audiovisual language. Inspired by popular 
African-American hip- hop, national identity has been addressed in Dutch hip-
 hop songs by both “white” and “ethnic” rappers, including Ali  B,  Brainpower, 
Lange Frans & Baas  B,  Raymzter, and  Postman.9 On  television, drama series 
such as Najib en  Julia (AVRO, 2002), directed by Theo van  Gogh, and Dunya 
&  Desie (NPS, 2002-2004) deal with romance and friendship between white 
Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch teenagers, whereas sitcoms like  Bradaz (NPS, 
2001-2002) and Shouf  Shouf (VARA, 2006-2007) take the multicultural soci-
ety as the setting for amusing cultural misunderstandings among characters of 
different ethnic backgrounds, only to return to a state of ethnic and national 
harmony. Popular Dutch movies like Shouf Shouf Habibi! (Albert ter  Heerdt, 
2004), Het  Schnitzelparadijs (2005), and ’n Beetje  Verliefd (2006), the last two 
directed by Martin  Koolhoven, use the genre conventions of the  Hollywood 
comedy to present the “funny” side of Dutch  multiculturalism, showing that it 
is not always a multicultural  drama, but often a multicultural comedy as well. 
 As Thomas  Elsaesser has suggested, Theo van  Gogh – and, to a lesser 
extent, Pim  Fortuyn – also operated within the realm of pop culture, as he 
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used  television, fi lm, the internet, and the popular press as “fi elds of symbolic 
action, deploying a language of signs, clichés and stereotypes as the common 
code of a culture that lives its differences in the realm of discourse, rather than 
by force.”10 Although the assassinations of  Fortuyn and Van  Gogh may sug-
gest that these fi elds of symbolic action no longer provide space for a pop-
cultural discourse, having been replaced by the political “reality” of Muslim 
extremism, both 9/ 11 and the assassinations also operate within these fi elds of 
symbolic action. The murder of Pim  Fortuyn, for example, inspired Van  Gogh 
to make the political thriller 06/ 05, released posthumously in 2005, in which 
actual news footage of  Fortuyn’s political rise, his assassination, and its after-
math are combined with a fi ctional conspiracy narrative. Dutch fi lm reviewers 
immediately made the rather obvious comparison between Van  Gogh and the 
American fi lmmaker Oliver  Stone by perceiving 06/05 as a Dutch version of 
 JFK (1991), the  Hollywood fi lm about the conspiracy behind the assassina-
tion of President John F.  Kennedy. Moreover, the assassination of Theo van 
 Gogh too can be interpreted within the fi elds of symbolic action as, suggested 
by  Elsaesser, “the murder itself, with its ritualistic overtones and easily decod-
able symbolism, had the performative dimension of other acts of barbarity 
deliberately staged to produce shocking media images and atrocity events.”11 
Without denying the political reality of these events, one can also perceive the 
assassinations of  Fortuyn and Van  Gogh as part of a pop-cultural discourse on 
Dutch national identity, functioning as symbolic references in fi lms,  television 
programs, websites, and pop songs.
 Like the depiction of  Dutchness on  Idols, the pop-cultural artifacts that 
I will discuss below can be analyzed as performances of karaoke  American-
ism, in which American pop culture is being appropriated to provide commen-
tary on Dutch national identity since 9/ 11. Starting with the appraisal of Pim 
 Fortuyn as the Dutch  Kennedy, I will analyze how the genre conventions and 
audiovisual language of American pop culture are applied to discuss notions 
of belonging in Dutch society, questioning the explicit or implicit “us” versus 
“them” divide which all these artifacts address. Operating within fi elds of sym-
bolic action that are heavily inspired by the American original, these pop-cul-
tural objects tend to refer to an imagined  America, rather than the nation-state 
 USA or a Dutch imagined  community, thereby possibly opening up space for a 
shared sense of belonging across different cultural and ethnic identities.
The Pop Sentimentality of the Dutch  Kennedy
In the  television program De Waarheid (SBS6, 2002-2003), the Dutch pop sing-
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er Gerard  Joling visits national celebrities to check whether or not the stories 
in that week’s tabloids are telling the truth. In the episode broadcast on May 4, 
2002,  Joling interviews politician Pim  Fortuyn, the controversial independent 
candidate whose sudden popularity is dominating the national elections cam-
paign at that moment. Running on a populist anti-immigration and anti- Islam 
platform,  Fortuyn seems to attract the votes of a “silent majority” fed up with 
traditional politics. Yet,  Joling and  Fortuyn are not talking about politics. Both 
men are openly and quite fl amboyantly gay, and they frankly discuss the lack 
of romance in their lives, concluding that, if neither of them fi nds Mister Right, 
they might have to grow old together. Two days later, Pim  Fortuyn is assassi-
nated at the Hilversum Media Park, the center of Dutch media, shot to death by 
a white Dutch animal rights activist. “Everyone is sad, the message was so bad, 
 democracy has died, and everybody cried,” sings Gerard  Joling in English on 
his single “At Your Service,” paying tribute to the slain politician he had inter-
viewed so recently. “At 6.09, the sixth of May, became an awful day.”
 That Pim  Fortuyn was shot at the center of Dutch media emphasizes the 
notion that  Fortuyn was a media phenomenon. As Ian  Buruma suggests,  Fortuyn 
not only used “showbiz as a political tool” (in the tradition of politicians such 
as Silvio  Berlusconi, Arnold  Schwarzenegger, and Ronald  Reagan), he also used 
“his instinct for pop sentimentality.”12 Peter van der  Veer compares  Fortuyn 
to Dutch “campy, extroverted gay entertainers,” suggesting that his gayness 
enabled him to “say things in a strident manner and [to combine] a feminine 
vulnerability with a sharp and entertaining irony.”13 Unlike most other Dutch 
politicians, Pim  Fortuyn fi tted easily within the realm of pop-cultural stardom, 
using not only the serious press but also the tabloids (including a photo session 
of  Fortuyn relaxing in his luxurious bathroom at home) to present himself to 
the larger public. His death led to a massive collective mourning, reminiscent 
of the death of Princess  Diana and befi tting his charismatic star image. In 
both the serious and popular press,  Fortuyn’s death was also immediately 
compared to the assassination of John F.  Kennedy. Although  Kennedy had 
been shot four decades earlier (and several European political leaders had been 
assassinated in the intervening years), the  Kennedy assassination has become 
part of the global audiovisual collective memory, through the Zapruder fi lm 
and  Hollywood movies like Oliver  Stone’s  JFK (1991). Moreover,  Fortuyn also 
has been compared to  Kennedy as the symbol of a political promise that could 
not be fulfi lled. Dutch  television repeatedly showed a fragment of an interview 
with  Fortuyn in which he pointed at a portrait, hanging in his own living 
room, of John F.  Kennedy, saying that he took the American president as one 
of his role models. The Dutch tabloids quickly picked up this connection by 
remembering Pim  Fortuyn’s attempt to confront conventional politics as “the 
guts of the Dutch  Kennedy.”14
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 The day after  Fortuyn’s assassination, the Dutch commercial radio 
channel Yorin  FM broadcast an adapted version of Tom  Clay’s “What the World 
Needs Now Is Love.” The original version, released by  Motown in 1971, is an 
audio collage of live radio coverage of the assassinations of John F.  Kennedy, 
Martin Luther King, Jr. , and Robert  Kennedy played over the music of Burt 
 Bacharach’s “What the World Needs Now Is Love” and  Dion’s “Abraham, 
Martin, and John.” By adding  Fortuyn’s voice and audio fragments of the live 
news coverage of his death to this melodramatic plea for peace and racial 
harmony, Yorin FM places Pim  Fortuyn alongside these American political 
martyrs. However, this connection is not based on the political beliefs of those 
who were assassinated, but on the similarities in the way they were assassinated, 
in the way the media portrayed their assassinations, and what they have come 
to mean in cultural history. Just like Robert  Kennedy, Pim  Fortuyn was shot 
during an election campaign, and just like the assassination of John F.  Kennedy, 
the death of Pim  Fortuyn tends to be perceived as the end of innocence. In 
this way,  Fortuyn’s death is framed within a specifi c American pop-cultural 
context, yet one which is used to articulate an equally specifi c Dutch collective 
experience. The comparison of Pim  Fortuyn to President  Kennedy is reinforced 
by the aforementioned fi lm 06/ 05, the Dutch  JFK directed by Theo van 
 Gogh, suggesting that the conspiracy behind the death of  Fortuyn reveals the 
corrupted nature of politics.
 A similar sentiment is expressed by Gerard  Joling on his tribute single, as 
he sings: “Our future went so wrong, our innocence was gone.” The song’s title 
refers to the English slogan “At Your Service” which  Fortuyn used to express that 
he represents the voice of “the common people.” Singer Connie Breukhoven, 
better known as  Vanessa, also released a tribute single. Instead of singing an 
original composition,  Vanessa reworked “When You Say Nothing At All,” an 
American country song originally recorded by  Keith Whitley, which had become 
a global hit song in the versions by the American country singer Alison Krauss 
and by the Irish, former Boyzone singer Ronan Keating. In  Vanessa’s version, 
“You say it best when you say nothing at all” is changed into “You said it best, 
but now you say nothing at all.” One may wonder why Dutch singers decide to 
pay tribute to a slain Dutch politician by singing in English. When these songs 
were released, however, this question never arose. A possible explanation may 
be that the Dutch audience expects and thus accepts such songs to be sung 
in English, as both songs build upon the themes, rhetoric, and melodrama 
expressed in songs like USA for  Africa’s “We Are the World” and Elton  John’s 
“Candle in the Wind” (both his original tribute to fi lm star Marilyn  Monroe 
and the adapted version in honor of Princess  Diana). With these songs as 
original examples, singing in English may sound more convincing, sincere, and 
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authentic. Moreover, echoing the rhetoric of these originals,  Joling and  Vanessa 
take  freedom of speech and racial harmony as starting points. “They can never 
explain what we hear when you just say your thing” sings  Vanessa, a reworking 
of the original line “They can never defi ne what’s been said between your heart 
and mine.” Similar to “We Are the World,” Gerard  Joling calls upon “the people 
in the street, black or white” to fi ght together to create a peaceful and respectful 
society. “As one country we’ll go on, together, together, we are strong.”
 As performances of karaoke  Americanism, both tribute singles imitate 
the American original to such an extent that, if we did not know better, one 
might think that they are parodies rather than genuinely meant tributes (which 
could explain why both singles were commercial failures). Nevertheless, they 
do reinforce the pop sentimentality which has come to defi ne the  Fortuyn phe-
nomenon, fi tting the depiction of  Fortuyn as the Dutch  Kennedy, a martyr who 
not only embodies the good of society, but most of all its unfulfi lled promise. 
In this way,  Fortuyn’s political agenda of anti-immigration and anti- Islam is 
pushed to the background, being replaced by the allegedly universal values of 
an imagined  America such as  freedom of expression, individual liberty, and 
racial harmony, all expressed in the hollow rhetoric of the pop-cultural cliché.
The Land of… F___ing Moroccans??!
“It may sound simple what I say, but they look at me as if I fl ew into the Twin 
 Towers,” raps the Moroccan-Dutch hip-hopper  Raymzter in Dutch.15 Released 
in October 2002, his hit single “Kutmarokkanen??!,” translated by Time  maga-
zine as “F___ing Moroccans,” addresses the negative way in which Moroccan-
Dutch youth are represented in the Dutch media, particularly since the terrorist 
attacks of 9/ 11.16 The song takes its title from the infamous slip of the tongue by 
the white left-wing Amsterdam alderman Rob  Oudkerk. When he whispered 
to the mayor of Amsterdam to complain about those “kutmarokkanen,” he did 
not realize that his words were being recorded by  television. Although never 
intended to be broadcast,  Oudkerk’s use of such a pejorative term shows that, 
in the then-current political climate, the overt stigmatization of Moroccan-
Dutch youth was not limited to the rhetoric of right-wing politicians like Pim 
 Fortuyn. By appropriating the pejorative term, Raymzter effectively counters 
this negative representation, as the term no longer merely refers to Moroccan-
Dutch youth as potential criminals or terrorists, but also to a popular hit single 
by a rising Moroccan-Dutch hip- hop star.
 Similar to other Moroccan-Dutch hip- hop, “Kutmarokkanen??!” – both 
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the song and the accompanying music  video – combines the sounds and im-
agery of African-American hip- hop with local Dutch youth street culture and 
Arabic pop music. While the Dutch lyrics emphasize how the negative me-
dia representation has led to the stigmatization of Moroccan-Dutch youth, 
the music  video presents an alternative scenario by showing white Dutch girls 
being barred from entering the disco, whereas Moroccan-Dutch girls are al-
lowed to enter and join  Raymzter in his performance of the song. The single’s 
cover art presents an even more explicit criticism of the negative media repre-
sentation. Mocking the front page of the Dutch daily newspaper De  Telegraaf, 
known for its alleged sensationalist and populist coverage of ethnic minori-
ties, the cover presents the front page of De Raymzter, with a tough-looking 
Raymzter pictured in close-up under the headline “Kutmarokkanen??!” with 
the blurb “Moroccans are now also terrorizing the pop charts.”17 The fi ctional 
article reports that more and more Moroccan youth are making pop music, 
much to the dismay of the established radio channels, which, as the quote by an 
anonymous deejay reveals, may appreciate that Moroccans are making western 
music, but also claim that there is no room for them on the play lists. The radio 
channels clearly represent mainstream Dutch culture at large, which tends to 
tell Moroccan-Dutch youth to actively participate in society, while simultane-
ously excluding them from the job market. Eventually, “Kutmarokkanen??!” 
broke through the barrier that it criticizes, at least in the music industry, as the 
song was included on the play lists of the radio and music  television channels, 
becoming the fi rst Moroccan-Dutch hit single and setting an example for fu-
ture Moroccan-Dutch pop stars to follow.
 That a Dutch rap song about exclusion succeeds in being included with-
in mainstream pop culture befi ts its hip- hop genre. “Kutmarokkanen??!” can 
be perceived as a cultural  appropriation of African-American hip- hop, a music 
genre and initial subculture which fi nds itself in a paradoxical position. On 
the one hand, hip- hop can be seen as the rebellious voice of a marginalized 
group within American society, whereas, on the other, hip- hop has become 
one of the most dominant and profi table genres in American commercial pop 
culture.18 As such, hip- hop can be simultaneously rebellious and mainstream, 
representing positions of both exclusion and inclusion, eventually becom-
ing part of the culture that it criticizes. On the global scale, hip- hop is a very 
powerful form of  Americanization, providing the language and imagery 
for youth subcultures to shape their rebellion against authority, quite similar 
to the way rock ’n’  roll functioned fi ve decades earlier.19 Yet, simultaneously, 
hip- hop is a profi table commodity, selling American pop culture around the 
world.
 Whereas  Raymzter appropriates the rebellious rhetoric of African-Amer-
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ican hip- hop to protest against structural discrimination in Dutch society, the 
white Dutch hip- hop duo Lange Frans & Baas  B use rap to protest against so-
called “senseless violence” in general. Released in October 2004, their number-
one hit single “Zinloos” (“Senseless”) pays tribute to four different victims who 
all were killed for no apparent reason and as such became symbols of senseless 
violence. Immediately after the assassination of Theo van  Gogh, with “Zinloos” 
still on the pop charts, Lange Frans & Baas B added a verse about Van  Gogh, 
wishing that their “homie” Theo may rest in peace. One year later, they released 
another number-one hit single, “Het Land Van…” (“The Land of…”), an am-
biguous ode to their homeland. Presenting the Netherlands as the land of Pim 
 Fortuyn and Volkert van de G. (the convicted assassin of  Fortuyn) and of Theo 
van  Gogh and Mohammed B. , Lange Frans & Baas B depict a nation of uncer-
tainty: “[We] come from the land with the most cultures per square meter / yet 
where people are afraid to have dinner with their neighbors / and integration 
is a wonderful word / but shit is fucking bitter when nobody listens.”20 Even 
though they recognize the country’s confused state after the assassinations and 
its uncritical support of “Uncle  Bush” in his War on  Terror, Lange Frans and 
Baas B. also depict the Netherlands as a country which cherishes  freedom and 
where everyone is included within the patriotic orange sentiment when the 
national  soccer team plays.
 Through their use of hip- hop to comment on Dutch society, Lange Frans 
& Baas  B are comparable to  Raymzter, appropriating African-American hip-
 hop within a local context. However, by explicitly defi ning identity on the basis 
of nationality, the Netherlands as “the land of Lange Frans & Baas B” invites 
ambiguous interpretations. On the one hand, the nation is presented as a mul-
ticultural society, providing a home to people from different ethnic and cultur-
al backgrounds. Yet, on the other hand, the song also can be interpreted as im-
plying that Lange Frans & Baas B still perceive the Netherlands as their home, 
in spite of its multicultural character. Here ethnicity proves to be signifi cant. 
Since Lange Frans & Baas B are white, their  Dutchness is uncontested, mak-
ing their expression of a confused yet hopeful Dutch national identity seem-
ingly representative of the collective Dutch state of mind. Such a perspective is 
reconfi rmed by the music  video, which shows Lange Frans & Baas B, dressed in 
designer suits rather than typical hip- hop attire, performing “Het Land Van…” 
live at the Amsterdam Uitmarkt in front of a large outdoor audience. Shots of 
their performance alternate with shots of the audience, showing close-ups of 
individual audience members listening tentatively, only to erupt in approving 
cheers at the song’s fi nale. With a few exceptions, like the close-up of a young 
black woman, the shown audience members are white, emphasizing the white-
ness of the traditional Dutch national identity. Moreover, different than “eth-
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nic” rappers, Lange Frans & Baas B do not need to account for their ethnicity, 
as their Dutchness is taken for granted. One can only wonder, had “Het Land 
Van…” been performed by a Moroccan-Dutch rapper, whether or not such an 
explicit expression of a collective Dutchness would have received the same ap-
proving response, including the number-one spot on the pop charts.
  “Het Land Van…” gets a provocative response with another song en-
titled “Het Land Van…,” rapped in Dutch by the Moroccan-Dutch hip- hop 
artist Salah  Edin, released in 2007. The song can be seen as a counter-narrative, 
presenting a far more negative perspective on Dutch society. In the song,  Edin 
denounces the Netherlands as a capitalist and materialistic country in which 
covert  racism prevails: “The land where I was born … / the land which calls 
me the fucking Moroccan.”21 Moreover, the song samples audio fragments of, 
among others, Pim  Fortuyn and Theo van  Gogh defending  freedom of expres-
sion, suggesting, placed within the song’s context, that  freedom of expression 
has resulted in hatred against Dutch Muslims. The song’s music  video shows 
a conventional white Dutch family whose cozy home is being infi ltrated by 
the media images of Muslim  terrorism. Simultaneously, Salah  Edin is shown 
slowly transforming from a mainstream young man into a Muslim extremist, 
eventually dressed in orange overalls as worn by the prisoners of Guantánamo 
 Bay. The orange overalls signify both the global and the local, as the image of 
the Muslim terrorist is explicitly connected to the politics of the nation-state 
USA, whereas the color of the overalls connotes the Dutch orange sentiment.
 Although explicitly commenting on Dutch society, both the song as 
well as the album it’s from, Nederlands grootste nachtmerrie (“Holland’s Worst 
Nightmare”), can be seen as appropriations of African-American pop culture. 
The album’s promotional material emphasizes the role of its American pro-
ducer  Focus, who is a protégé of the famous African-American  gangsta rap 
producer Dr. Dre. In this way, Salah  Edin obtains authenticity as being a real 
 gangsta rapper. However, instead of the stereotypical image of the tough  gang-
sta rapper,  Edin adopts the image of the stereotypical Muslim terrorist. His 
picture on the album cover mimics the widely publicized mug shot of Mo-
hammed B. , the convicted assassin of Theo van  Gogh.  Edin has denied that 
the cover art is intended as a provocation, saying that instead the imitation of 
the mug shot is meant to emphasize the tendency in the media to portray all 
Moroccan-Dutch young men as potential terrorists: “This is the way the aver-
age white Dutch citizen sees me, as a young Moroccan Muslim radical. That’s 
why I chose to do this picture and use it for the front cover of my album. It is 
in no way supporting the deeds of Mohammed B.”22 Yet, as a hip- hop persona, 
 Edin’s impersonation of Mohammed B. functions quite similarly to the  gang-
sta image of African-American rappers like 50  Cent, both as a commercial sign 
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of street credibility and hip- hop authenticity as well as a provocative political 
statement.
 Taken together, the rap songs by  Raymzter, Lange Frans & Baas  B, and 
Salah  Edin show how the genre conventions and audiovisual language of Afri-
can-American hip- hop have been translated and appropriated into a specifi c 
Dutch context, providing perspectives not only on Dutch national identity 
but also on the experience of structural  racism and the negative depiction of 
Moroccan-Dutch youth in the Dutch media. However, the songs differ greatly 
in the messages that they convey. The two versions of “Het Land Van…” can 
be perceived as the two oppositional poles of the “us” versus “them” divide, 
in which the Dutch “us” perspective is represented by Lange Frans & Baas B 
and the Moroccan “them” perspective by Salah  Edin. Perhaps tellingly, the fi rst 
became a number-one hit single on the pop charts, whereas the second was 
banned from the Dutch music  television channels  MTV and  TMF. Moreover, 
the divide is reinforced by Lange Frans & Baas B explicitly identifying them-
selves with their “homie” Theo van  Gogh, and Salah  Edin with Mohammed 
B. With his single “Kutmarokkanen??!,” on the contrary, Raymzter challenges 
the rigid “us” versus “them” divide, as he counters  racism by not only protest-
ing but also crossing the media’s ethnic boundaries that have kept Moroccan-
Dutch rappers from commercial success. Nevertheless, although coming from 
different perspectives along the lines of the “us” versus “them” divide, the three 
songs are signifi cantly similar in the way they appropriate the genre conven-
tions of African-American hip- hop. They may have different stories to tell, yet 
Raymzter, Lange Frans & Baas B, and Salah  Edin have the language of Ameri-
can pop culture in common.
Linda’s Dutch  Dream
In February 2005, the monthly LINDA. magazine published a special issue on 
the success of ethnic integration in the Netherlands, using the English title 
“Dutch  Dream” as its main theme. Introduced a year earlier, LINDA. is a life-
style glossy magazine based on the star persona of Linda de  Mol, one of the 
most popular  television hosts of the Netherlands. Known as just Linda, she is 
also an actress, starring in the  television drama series Gooische  Vrouwen (Talpa/
RTL4, 2005-present), often described as a Dutch “remake” of the American 
 television series Desperate  Housewives (ABC, 2004-present). Her initial image 
of being Holland’s favorite daughter-in-law evolved into the far more glamor-
ous image of a “real” star, a transformation which runs parallel to the role she 
plays in the Dutch fi lm comedy Ellis in  Glamourland (Pieter Kramer, 2004). By 
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starring alongside Joan  Collins, most famous for her glamorous role as Alexis 
in  Dynasty (ABC, 1981-1989),  Linda, like her character in the fi lm, has become 
part of the glamour that defi nes movie stardom, appropriating the star  myth 
of  Hollywood. It is Linda’s star persona that forms the basis of LINDA. maga-
zine, which is clearly modeled after the American glossy O  magazine, based 
on the star persona of the African-American talk  show host  Oprah Winfrey. 
Like  Oprah, Linda is featured on the cover of each issue, and, also like  Oprah, 
she always emphasizes her personal experience and interest in specifi c topics 
– ranging from cosmetic surgery, fashion, and dieting, to love, religion and 
 multiculturalism – to help her predominantly female readership relate to these 
themes.
 As  Linda explains in her editorial, the idea for a special “Dutch  Dream” 
issue came up in May 2004, as a response to the negative media representation 
of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. Although she mentions neither 9/ 11 
nor the popularity and subsequent assassination of Pim  Fortuyn, she clearly 
suggests that these events helped to shape the popular assumption that ethnic 
integration has failed. To counter such a negative perception, LINDA. would 
focus on the success stories of ethnic minorities and on ethnic products, such 
as food and fashion, that have enriched Dutch culture. But then, writes Linda, 
“all went wrong.” Theo van  Gogh was murdered and everything changed. “I 
discovered that I had thoughts I’d never had before, and of which I am defi nite-
ly not proud. Suddenly it was my Netherlands and they better not think they 
can tell us to shut up or tell us how to live.”23 By recognizing and expressing her 
blunt fi rst reaction,  Linda opens up to her readers, enabling them to have their 
own possible feelings of intolerance acknowledged, a typical  Oprah Winfrey 
strategy.24 Then, countering her own initial reaction, Linda returns to the need 
for a more positive perspective on ethnic integration, focusing both on the 
“facts” (in the form of an article based on a report by the Dutch government’s 
Social and Cultural Planning Offi ce) and on the “fun” side: “the success stories, 
the infl uence on fashion, culture, and eating habits.”
 By using the title “Dutch  Dream” to highlight the positive side of ethnic 
integration, LINDA. evokes the symbolic rhetoric of the American  Dream, in-
cluding its focus on the economic and social-cultural success of individuals, 
which is embodied by the featured “ethnic” Dutch celebrities. The magazine’s 
cover shows a festive dinner table, with  Linda as the white media queen sit-
ting in the middle, fl anked by, on one side, the Moroccan-Dutch rapper Ali  B 
and the Surinamese-Dutch stand-up comedian Jörgen  Raymann, and on the 
other, the Surinamese-Dutch  sports anchorman Humberto  Tan and the Suri-
namese-Dutch  television host Sylvana  Simons. When unfolding the foldout 
cover (similar to the cover of Vanity  Fair), the dinner table is extended to in-
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clude eight more “ethnic role models,” symbolizing that ethnic integration in 
Dutch society can be successful: the Algerian-Dutch actor Hakim  Traïdia, fa-
mous for his role on the Dutch Sesame  Street, the Moroccan-Dutch singer and 
former  Idols contestant  Hind, the Surinamese-Dutch musical star Stanley  Bur-
leson, the Surinamese-Dutch member of Dutch parliament Laetitia  Griffi th, 
the Argentinean jewelry maker Rodrigo  Otazu, the Surinamese-Dutch singer 
Ruth  Jacott, the Moroccan-Dutch actor Mimoun  Oaïssa of Shouf Shouf Ha-
bibi! fame, and the Moroccan-Dutch soccer player Mohammad  Allach. With 
the exception of Ali B, who wears “his own clothes,” all are dressed in designer 
outfi ts, befi tting the magazine’s celebratory focus on social-economic success. 
Although several white Dutch men are featured inside the magazine, they are 
conspicuously absent from its cover, or at least visually – they are present in 
three of the four blurbs printed on LINDA. ’s cover. Moreover, most of the 
featured ethnic celebrities are either Moroccan-Dutch or Surinamese-Dutch, 
while the Antillean-Dutch, the Turkish-Dutch, and the Chinese-Dutch, among 
others, are not represented.
 Inside the magazine, all featured celebrities are interviewed about their 
individual success. Staying within the rhetoric of the American  Dream, most 
of them stress the importance of hard work and believing in one’s destiny. For 
example, Sylvana  Simons argues that there is no relation between one’s ethnic 
background and what one can achieve in life: “You can become successful by 
working hard, by clearly setting your dreams and goals.” Humberto  Tan sug-
gests that young “ethnic” men can avoid a life of crime by climbing the social 
ladder, which requires discipline, stamina, self-criticism, and a support net-
work of family and friends. According to Hakim  Traïdia, everyone has the same 
opportunities to become successful, at least in acting: “Whether you are Dutch 
or ethnic, your success is determined by the audience.” Only the Moroccan-
Macedonian-Dutch actress Touriya  Haoud (not featured on the magazine’s 
cover) mentions that she has been treated differently because of her ethnic 
background, as in Dutch fi lms she tends to be typecast as “the headscarf-wear-
ing Moroccan girl.” She explicitly states that in that respect the Netherlands is 
totally different from the USA as, claims  Haoud, there is far less typecasting 
in American fi lms, enabling non-white actors to play a wide range of roles. 
In none of the interviews are the aftermath of 9/ 11 or the assassinations of 
 Fortuyn and Van  Gogh mentioned. With the exception of the comment about 
typecasting in Dutch fi lm, the individual success stories do not refer to broader 
social-political issues like discrimination. Instead, echoing the American rhet-
oric of  meritocracy, the successful “Dutch  Dream” as embodied by these Dutch 
celebrities is presented as a personal achievement which is solely based on in-
dividual talent and effort. The use of the English term “Dutch Dream” rather 
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than a literal translation into Dutch (“de Nederlandse droom”) is signifi cant, 
as it not only makes an explicit connection to the American Dream and its 
connotations, but also shows that the social-economic success story (“making 
your dreams come true”) is based on an American conception of achievement. 
Similar to  Oprah Winfrey, as discussed in chapter two, Linda de  Mol functions 
as an embodiment of the star  myth, her Dutch  appropriation of the American 
Dream. As such, Linda includes the ethnic Dutch celebrities within her “glam-
our land” – her own imagined  America – by letting them join her at the festive 
dinner table on the cover and by interviewing them inside her magazine, and 
so celebrating Dutch  multiculturalism.
 However, that the inclusive range of such an imagined  America proves to 
be limited is shown by the other articles in LINDA. magazine. While the ethnic 
celebrities are included within Linda’s success story, thereby crossing the “us” 
versus “them” divide of the Dutch political discourse, the other articles rein-
force the rigid distinction instead. The opposition between two cultural identi-
ties is present in almost all articles: a fashion photo spread entitled “Morocco 
meets Holland,” six photo portraits of gay Muslim men who “love Allah and 
men,” and an interview with the Surinamese-Dutch female politician Laeti-
tia  Griffi th by the white Dutch male journalist Jort  Kelder, whose impertinent 
question “Are you a Bounty?” (referring to a candy bar that is chocolate brown 
on the outside and white on the inside) is used as the interview’s title. In the 
interview,  Kelder tells Griffi th that she is not as sensual as he expected a Suri-
namese woman to be, before asking her whether or not it is true that black men 
are more sexually promiscuous than white men. The feature on “full color” 
make-up for women with darker skin is not addressed to potential non-white 
readers, but rather informs white female readers about the diffi culties non-
white women face in their search for the right make-up. In the explicit Sex and 
the City-style column “Angelique,” the columnist claims she cannot be xeno-
phobic, as otherwise she never would have “enjoyed” Baba, a twenty-fi ve-year-
old Nigerian black man with a penis of twenty-fi ve centimeters. In this way, 
although seemingly ethnic boundaries are being crossed, they are reinforced 
instead, as non-white cultures are reduced to a “colorful,” “sensual,” or “exotic” 
quality that enriches white Dutch culture. Moreover, in contrast to the inclu-
sion of the ethnic celebrities, LINDA. excludes non-white readers by continu-
ously addressing an implied (and sometimes explicit) white Dutch audience.
The Multicultural Comedy
In Shouf Shouf Habibi! (Albert ter  Heerdt, 2004), a comedy about a group of 
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young Moroccan-Dutch friends which became the box offi ce hit of the year, 
there is one reference to 9/ 11. Main character Abdullah (Mimoun  Oaïssa), 
called “Ap” by his friends, is shooting pool at his local Amsterdam bar, together 
with his best buddies: the Moroccan-Dutch Mustafa or “Mussi” (Mohammed 
Chaara), the Moroccan-Dutch Rachid (Mimoun Ouled Radi), and the white 
Dutch Robbie (Leo Alkemade). Suddenly Ap tells Mussi, “You look like  Atta,” 
and then repeats to the others, “Mussi looks like  Atta.”25 That Ap refers to the 
face of Mohammed  Atta, the terrorist who piloted the fi rst plane into the Twin 
 Towers, is not coincidental. With the obvious exception of Osama bin  Laden, 
Mohammed  Atta has been the most extensively discussed 9/11 terrorist in the 
media, and specifi cally the oft-published picture of  Atta’s face has become an 
emblem of 9/11.26 However, the importance of 9/11 is downplayed immedi-
ately by a comic exchange between Ap and Rachid. “ Atta?” Rachid asks; “The 
hijacker of September  11,” Ap says; “September  11?” Rachid asks; “Those tow-
ers, man,” Ap says, to which Rachid responds, “Oh, those towers!” By observing 
that Mussi looks like  Atta, Ap mirrors the practice of the white Dutch popula-
tion of looking at Moroccan-Dutch youth, paraphrasing  Raymzter, “as if they 
fl ew into the Twin  Towers,” yet without resulting in the racial  profi ling and 
objectifi cation that stigmatizes them as potential terrorists.
 This comic reference to 9/ 11 and the objectifi cation of Moroccan-Dutch 
youth is intensifi ed by Ap’s suggestion that looking like  Atta provides a great 
career opportunity. There are hardly any Arab actors in  Hollywood, which 
means that once the events of 9/11 are turned into blockbuster action movies, 
Ap and his friends will be in great demand to star as the terrorists. Envisioning 
a glamorous Hollywood life with beautiful women, private swimming pools, 
big convertibles, and millions of dollars in his pocket, Ap tells his friends: “Not 
one! Not a single Arab actor left in America. It might take them a little while 
but once they start: one war movie after another. Action in Afghanistan I, Action 
in Afghanistan II, Action in Afghanistan III. Who will play them? Who will play 
 Atta? I’ll tell you, those towers will go down at least thirty more times.” Another 
comic exchange between Ap and Rachid follows. “Saving Private Saddam,” Ra-
chid jokes, pointing at Mussi, to which Ap responds, “They can use a crazy ape 
like you too. They’re not all handsome,” suggesting that Rachid, unlike Mussi 
and Ap himself, does not have the conventional good looks of a Hollywood 
leading man. Rachid shoots back, “If you say so, Brad  Pitt.” The joke works, be-
cause Rachid’s comment exposes the fl aw in Ap’s dream scenario. Even if they 
would be able to become actors in Hollywood 9/11 blockbusters, portraying 
the terrorists thanks to racial  profi ling, they could never become the leading 
men, let alone Hollywood stars like Brad  Pitt – a joke that, as Thomas  Elsaesser 
rightly observes, “would fall fl at indeed were it not contradicted by the fi lm 
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itself, which briefl y did make Mimoun  Oaïssa into a star.”27 Although the fi lm 
takes the objectifi cation of Dutch-Moroccan youth after 9/11 out of its local 
Dutch context into an imaginary Hollywood setting, eventually, as the scene 
suggests, there is little difference between being looked at as if you are a po-
tential terrorist or being a potential Hollywood actor cast as a terrorist because 
you look like one. 
 The 9/ 11 scene is typical for the fi lm in its entirety, as Shouf Shouf Habibi! 
literally can be considered as a form of comic relief in the debate about nation-
al identity and  multiculturalism. The movie pokes fun at common stereo types 
of both Moroccan immigrant culture and white Dutch mainstream society, 
although no explicit jokes are made about religion, neither about  Islam nor 
about Christianity.28 In its opening sequence, Shouf Shouf Habibi! presents a 
parody of the “Clash of  Civilizations” on the local level. Traditional Moroccan 
culture is presented as naïve and backward. Ap and his brothers are shown on 
holiday in an isolated Moroccan country village, where their father was born. 
The village is presented as a romantic pre-modern cultural space, where the 
single  television does not work properly and the villagers cannot believe that 
people have been on the moon. In stark contrast, the Netherlands is shown as 
an impersonal modern space, where it is always grey and raining.  Consumer-
ism and seductive sexuality are omnipresent, as signifi ed by the scarcely clad 
female models pictured on the H&M fashion billboards which are dominat-
ing the cityscape. Ap’s voiceover reveals his love-hate relationship with both 
cultures, as he complains about both Moroccan traditionalism and Dutch 
superfi ciality. Yet, rather than presenting a conventional second generation’s 
caught-in-between-two-cultures dilemma, Ap seizes its opportunities. If he 
ever strikes it rich in the Netherlands, he will move to Morocco where the sun 
always shines.
 Marketed as an “oer-Hollandse” (“typically Dutch”) comedy, Shouf Shouf 
Habibi! appears to be the opposite, suggesting that this self-acclaimed label 
should be taken ironically. The movie closely follows the genre conventions 
of the  Hollywood comedy to comment on  multiculturalism in Dutch society. 
Shot in both Dutch and Arabic, Shouf Shouf Habibi! is one of the fi rst Dutch 
mainstream fi lms which prominently features ethnic minorities as its main 
characters. Being an American-style multicultural comedy, the movie seems 
atypical rather than typical of Dutch mainstream cinema. The “oer-Hollands” 
label, however, can also be read as a statement, suggesting that the multicultur-
al society which the fi lm depicts is “typically Dutch,” challenging pre-existing 
notions of national identity by using the Hollywood genre to present a Dutch 
identity in which the inclusion of Moroccan-Dutch youth culture is uncon-
tested. By the exaggerated portrayal of both the traditional Moroccan immi-
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grant culture of Ap’s parents and mainstream white Dutch society consisting 
of responsible adults, a multicultural space is created for Ap and his friends for 
whom pop culture constitutes their main frame of reference. In stark contrast 
to Ap’s older brother, a respectful police offi cer embodying the conventional 
image of successful integration, Ap and his friends are a group of opportun-
istic losers who continuously fail to achieve their goal of getting rich without 
too much effort. Yet, instead of repeating the dominant media image of Mo-
roccan-Dutch youth as being potential criminals, Shouf Shouf Habibi! depicts 
them as just “regular” young men rebelling against the normative responsibil-
ity of mainstream society. In this manner, the fi lm challenges the “us” versus 
“them” divide, as the alliance created among Ap and his friends is formed along 
the lines of generation rather than nationality or ethnicity, with Hollywood as 
their shared point of reference.
 At a conference discussing the necessity of self-censorship among Dutch 
fi lmmakers, held two weeks after the murder of Theo van  Gogh, Shouf Shouf 
Habibi! ’s director Albert ter  Heerdt announced that the fi lming of its sequel 
Shouf Shouf Barakka! would be postponed, because, as he explained, “at this 
moment, I can’t make a comedy about these issues.” In the tense political cli-
mate that pervaded Dutch society immediately after Van  Gogh’s murder, a 
comedy about Dutch-Moroccan ethnic relations could be misinterpreted. 
Moreover, the director revealed, “I don’t want a knife in my chest.”29 The pro-
duction company of Shouf Shouf Habibi! confi rmed the postponement of the 
sequel, adding that Ter  Heerdt and co-writer Mimoun  Oaïssa, before returning 
to comedy, wanted to address the issues faced by Dutch multicultural society in 
the form of a realistic drama. As Ter  Heerdt told The New York  Times: “Before 
I can go on in a funny way, I fi rst have to do another fi lm dealing with the seri-
ous side of the problem – this time with many more [white] Dutch characters 
in it.”30 Two years later, the team of Shouf Shouf Habibi! produced  Kicks (Albert 
ter  Heerdt, 2007), a realistic drama starring Mimoun  Oaïssa as the Moroccan-
Dutch kick boxer Saïd whose younger brother is shot to death by a white Dutch 
policeman, leading to social tensions between the different ethnic groups of the 
population. The fi lm’s plot develops along various storylines in which the both 
white Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch main characters are connected through 
chance encounters, prompting many Dutch fi lm reviewers to perceive Kicks as 
a Dutch version of  Crash (Paul Haggis, 2005), the  Hollywood movie which uses 
a similar network-based narrative to address social problems related to race 
relations in Los Angeles. Kicks focuses on the social tensions between the white 
Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch population in the aftermath of the fatal shoot-
ing, yet also emphasizes the coming together of both sides through personal 
interaction, suggesting that ethnic harmony is eventually possible. Although 
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based on different Hollywood genres, Shouf Shouf Habibi! and Kicks are similar 
in the way they appropriate the genre conventions of Hollywood to present an 
optimistic picture of  multiculturalism in which the Moroccan-Dutch presence 
is an uncontested element of Dutch national identity. 
 The decision by the makers of Shouf Shouf Habibi! and  Kicks to turn to 
realistic drama rather than staying with comedy reinforces the assumption that 
lightweight pop culture, such as “feel good” cinema, cannot deal suffi ciently 
with the “serious” side of the debate on national identity but merely, as comic 
relief, provides a welcome distraction. As these two fi lms show, however, the 
“fun” and “serious” character of the debate compliment each other. More over, 
in spite of the postponement of its offi cial sequel, the commercial success and 
popularity of Shouf Shouf Habibi! resulted in other multicultural comedies 
focused on white-Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch cultural interaction, including 
the popular spin-off  television situation comedy Shouf  Shouf (VARA, 2006-
2007) starring most of the fi lm’s original actors. The romantic comedy Het 
 Schnitzelparadijs (Martin  Koolhoven, 2005) is set in the typical Dutch coun-
tryside and tells the story of the Moroccan-Dutch teenager Nordip Doenia 
(Mounir Valentyn) who works at a cheap roadside restaurant and falls in love 
with Agnes (Bracha van Doesburgh), the pretty white Dutch niece of his boss. 
As an updated version of the Romeo and Juliet love story, yet with the happy 
ending conform to the genre conventions of the  Hollywood romantic com-
edy, Het  Schnitzelparadijs suggests that true love and friendship have no ethnic 
boundaries. This message of ethnic harmony is repeated in ’n Beetje  Verliefd 
(Martin  Koolhoven, 2006), which focuses on the Moroccan-Dutch teenager 
Omar, played by the popular rapper Yes- R, who arranges a blind date for his 
white Dutch grandfather, whereas he himself falls in love with a Turkish-Dutch 
girl. Staying closer to the American original, the  television  sitcom Shouf  Shouf 
and the two fi lms by Martin  Koolhoven turn out to be even more generic and 
predictable than Shouf Shouf Habibi!. Nevertheless, together they show how 
the multicultural comedy has become a popular Dutch subgenre, thereby con-
tinuing to provide a counterweight to the multicultural  drama perspective. 
Conclusion: The Promise of Pop Culture
Although a strict distinction is often made between the  entertainment of pop 
culture on the one hand and the seriousness of political discourse on the other, 
both American as well as Dutch pop culture show that in specifi c cases the 
two realms can become intertwined. In this chapter, I aimed to explore how 
Dutch pop culture appropriates elements of its American example to comment 
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on a political reality. The focus on national identity is then the most obvious 
choice as, particularly after 9/ 11 and the assassinations of Pim  Fortuyn and 
Theo van  Gogh, the discussion about national identity – specifi cally in rela-
tion to the issues of  Islam and  multiculturalism – has come to dominate Dutch 
political discourse. Specifi cally the idea that a common sense of belonging is 
to be found in a collective national history, forming an imagined  community 
that provides a clear expression of  Dutchness, appears to be widely accepted. 
Moreover, a traditional fear of  Americanization as a form of cultural  imperial-
ism which could threaten national culture and identity seemingly has disap-
peared, partially replaced by a fear for the growing infl uence of Islam, which 
may imply that the omnipresence of American pop culture is now perceived as 
a buffer rather than a threat.
 Yet, as my discussion of the Dutch pop-cultural artifacts suggests, other 
senses of belonging can be found in the shared experience of American pop 
culture. All the examples – the  Idols “Dutch Hits” episode, the Pim  Fortuyn 
tribute singles by Gerard  Joling and  Vanessa, the hip- hop songs by  Raymzter, 
Lange Frans & Baas  B, and Salah  Edin, the special “Dutch  Dream” issue of 
LINDA. magazine, and the fi lms Shouf Shouf Habibi! and  Kicks – translate an 
American original into a specifi c local and national context. Although Ameri-
can pop culture is viewed as a model to emulate, none of these Dutch pop-
cultural artifacts makes connections to the nation-state  USA or to a historical 
Dutch imagined  community, but instead should be perceived as part of an 
imagined  America which transcends geographical boundaries. In other words, 
here American pop culture provides a common language to discuss political 
issues as national identity, ethnic integration, and  multiculturalism, with the 
potential of creating alliances among different cultural identities within the 
Netherlands.
 As performances of karaoke  Americanism, each of these case studies 
shows that Dutch pop culture is not merely an imitation of American pop cul-
ture, but instead is made up of active cultural appropriations in which mim-
icking and mocking often go together, presenting different perspectives on the 
notion of national identity in the Netherlands. The depiction of  Dutchness on 
the “Dutch Hits” episode of  Idols, based on the worn-out clichés of global tour-
ism, does not only express national identity, but also undermines its authentic-
ity, because it is such a cliché that one cannot take it too seriously. The tributes 
to Pim  Fortuyn use American pop culture to glorify the assassinated politician 
as the Dutch  Kennedy, thereby mystifying his political agenda and implying 
that collective mourning equals national unity. The Moroccan-Dutch rappers 
 Raymzter and Salah  Edin successfully make the stereotypical image of the Af-
rican-American  gangsta rapper their own, using the rebelliousness of hip- hop 
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to critically assess Dutch society. Lange Frans & Baas  B, in their turn, use the 
same language of hip- hop to present an ambiguous yet affi rmative ode to the 
Dutch nation. LINDA. magazine borrows the rhetoric of the American  Dream 
to present “ethnic” success stories as examples of the Dutch  Dream, intending 
to prove that ethnic integration can be successful. In this way, the American 
conception of achievement is introduced to celebrate Dutch  multiculturalism. 
Finally, Shouf Shouf Habibi! and its successors apply the genre conventions of 
 Hollywood to present a promising and inclusive perspective on national iden-
tity. Yet, although American pop culture functions as a common language, its 
connotations differ from one pop-cultural artifact to another, thereby ques-
tioning its alleged  universalism.
 As the case studies show, the potential to create alliances among different 
cultural identities is not always fulfi lled. The intention to challenge the “us” 
versus “them” divide by appropriating the rhetoric of the American  Dream 
and so celebrating Dutch ethnic success stories, as done by LINDA. magazine, 
is undermined by the magazine’s continuously reinforcement of the otherness 
of “their” ethnic culture in opposition to “our” white Dutch culture. Also the 
two different versions of “Het Land Van…” by Lange Frans & Baas  B and Salah 
 Edin suggest that the distinction between white Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch 
cultural identity is reinforced rather than challenged. Gerard  Joling’s call for 
“the people in the street, black or white” to come together is a generic cliché, 
reducing the message of racial harmony to hollow rhetoric. In the end, the 
ethnically mixed group of young losers in Shouf Shouf Habibi! seems to be the 
most promising in creating an alliance among “our” and “their” culture. Ex-
posing the ambivalence of the American Dream – and, by extension, the Dutch 
 Dream – by being anti-heroes who, within the fi lm’s fi ctional setting, fail to 
succeed, they simultaneously have become success stories in their own right by 
being actors in a commercially successful and critically acclaimed movie.
 Sometimes, the promise of multicultural alliance can be found where 
one expects it the least. In the fi nal scene of 06/ 05, Theo van  Gogh’s politi-
cal thriller about the conspiracy behind Pim  Fortuyn’s assassination, the white 
Dutch main character Jim de Booy (Thijs Römer) is playing soccer on the 
beach with his teenage daughter and her Moroccan-Dutch boyfriend, who she 
endearingly describes as “my very own kutmarokkaan.” With the bittersweet 
pop song “Broad Day Light” as soundtrack, the camera presents a pan shot of 
the beach, moving from the soccer-playing trio to the broad horizon, a typical 
 Hollywood convention that symbolizes an uncertain yet optimistic future. In 
06/05, a multiethnic Dutch national identity is presented as an uncontested 
given, embodied by two young teenagers in love playing soccer together.
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Conclusion:
Let’s Make Things Better
“Let’s Make Things Better” (best pronounced with a heavy Dutch accent) is 
the former  advertising slogan of the Dutch-based multinational company 
Royal  Philips Electronics, used in its global  advertising campaign. Allegedly, 
the Dutch Philips executive Cor  Boonstra himself invented the slogan to in-
spire his employees on the work fl oor. Like its successor “Sense and Simplicity,” 
“Let’s Make Things Better” is hyper-American, not so much because it is coined 
in English, but because it refers to the American promise of a better, improved 
world, that American rhetoric of perpetual progress and positive change which 
works so well in  advertising.1 At the same time, I cannot help but read the 
Philips slogan as an attempt to sound American, as an imitation of American 
rhetoric that just misses a beat. American slogans tend to emphasize that they 
are already better than the real thing; Philips is merely trying to get better. This 
– admittedly very subjective – reading seems to be confi rmed by the Ameri-
can company American Satellite, owned by RCA, which on its website gives an 
American “translation” of the slogan: “Let’s make things better is the Philips 
slogan and they’ve done it with this DIRECTV System.”2 Now Philips is no 
longer just trying; they have proven that they are better. By focusing on the 
Philip’s slogan missing a beat, I am not suggesting that Philips “got it wrong” 
or failed to be “authentically American.” Rather,  Americanization consists of 
imitation and  appropriation, and it is precisely at the point where the slogan is 
slightly off that its hyper- Americanness becomes most visible.
 At a session of the 2002 Salzburg Seminar “The Politics of American 
Popular Culture: Here, There, and Everywhere,” attended by participants from 
all over the world, we were asked to give an ultimate example of  Americaniza-
tion. When a participant from China named the  Philips slogan “Let’s Make 
Things Better,” my fi rst reaction was to protest. Like many people in the Neth-
erlands, I grew up with the notion that Philips is part of our national heritage, 
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as are other “Royal Dutch” multinationals such as  Heineken,  KLM, and  Shell. 
As such, we were told, their global visibility exemplifi es “our” presence in the 
world. Luckily I did not protest out loud, as I realized in time that my fi rst 
reaction repeated a false sense of  patriotism, based on an installed pride in 
Dutch entrepreneurship which is still strongly present in the Dutch national 
discourse. On second thought, the example given by my Chinese colleague 
made sense. Instead of exemplifying a Dutch presence in the world, the adver-
tisement campaign by Philips shows that the language of American  advertising 
transcends the geographical borders of the nation-state  USA into the realm of 
global pop  culture. As Rob  Kroes points out: “America has replicated itself into 
icons, clichés of itself that leave their imprint everywhere, on T-shirts, in com-
mercial images, and in our heads. They have lost their lifelines to America and 
circulate as a free-fl oating visual lingua franca.”3 The Philips slogan belongs to 
such a global language, based on an American original, yet open to different 
interpretations. Moreover, whereas I may read “Let’s Make Things Better” as an 
imitation that’s slightly “off,” my Chinese colleague clearly perceived the slogan 
as authentically American, revealing the inherent subjectivity of interpreting 
“American” pop culture.
 That any interpretation of such a free-fl oating pop culture is by defi ni-
tion subjective, however, should not keep one from trying to grasp its possible 
meanings. Although defi nite conclusions about what “America” represents or 
how it functions within a global pop  culture cannot be made, close readings of 
actual pop-cultural artifacts do provide an opening for analysis, enabling the 
making of concrete observations about how pop culture could work. Yet too 
often in the analysis of pop culture, the object is taken for granted, as broad 
claims are made without including the object itself. If indeed pop culture is 
a bombardment of  signs, as Jean  Baudrillard has suggested, a good way to 
make sense of it is by starting with a specifi c object, even though the choice 
of what one analyzes will always be arbitrary and open to discussion. For ex-
ample, America First, a fascinating essay collection that examines how Ameri-
can national identity has been depicted in  Hollywood cinema, takes the use of 
“American” in the fi lm’s title as a selection criterion, yet still leaves out obvious 
choices like American  Beauty (Sam Mendes, 1999) and American  Psycho (Mary 
Harron, 2000).4 Because pop culture is omnipresent and intertextual, and con-
tinuously refers to other artifacts that one may recognize or not, any selection 
is problematic. The most effective alternative may be to pick an object at ran-
dom and start analyzing.
 The two points of entrance of Fabricating the Absolute Fake – a picture by 
the Dutch photographer Erwin  Olaf and USA for  Africa’s “We Are the World,” 
a pop song and music  video made to raise awareness of famine in Africa – are 
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two distinctively different objects, yet they both refer to an imagined  America, 
an imagined  community that goes beyond the geographical boundaries of the 
nation-state  USA. The picture by  Olaf enabled me to recognize an America 
that is made up of images presented by the media. Like myself, Erwin  Olaf is an 
“American he never  was,” who grew up outside of the USA yet within a culture 
which is permeated with American pop culture through  Hollywood, American 
 television, pop music, and advertisements. His photograph, a telling example 
of how such images can be appropriated, depicts a pre-9/ 11 America based on 
its mediated representations, which  Olaf uses to make a statement about the 
importance of the  freedom of expression. A close reading of USA for  Africa’s 
“We Are the World” enabled me to question the dominant presence of America 
in global pop  culture, thereby revealing the explicitness of its ideological con-
tent which promotes an American conception of the world based on allegedly 
universal values such as individual liberty and  freedom of choice within a free 
market economy, an overt message which we easily take for granted because 
“We Are the World” is just another cheery pop song. 
 An important thread that runs throughout Fabricating the Absolute Fake 
is the distinction between the nation-state  USA and an imagined  America. Al-
though both Americans and non-Americans may oppose the actual politics 
of the nation-state  USA, that does not necessarily lead to a questioning of the 
idealism embodied by an imagined  America. Particularly after the terrorist at-
tacks of September  11,  2001, this distinction became explicitly visible. In spite 
of the controversial policies of the  Bush administration (the Patriot  Act, the 
War on  Terror, Guantánamo  Bay), “America” still remains to many the Bea-
con of Freedom and  Democracy, which, as  Bono told  Oprah, is “an ideal that’s 
supposed to be contagious.” Specifi cally the American  Dream – the belief that 
with talent and hard work all individuals can achieve their goals – is overtly 
present in American pop culture, forming the basis of the star  myth personi-
fi ed by celebrities. The American Dream can be considered as a myth in the 
 Barthesian sense: not necessarily true or false, but often uncritically accepted 
as self-evident. The suggestion by Jean  Baudrillard that America is an utopia 
achieved is based on the same myth. By perceiving America (rather than the 
USA) as a  hyperreality,  Baudrillard does not claim that America is not “real” 
but argues instead that its fi ctional character, such as the American Dream as 
well as  Hollywood, makes the American way of life real, as “it is a transcending 
of the imaginary in reality.”5
 Recognizing the distinction between the nation-state  USA and an im-
agined  America is also signifi cant when discussing  Americanization, as the 
pop-cultural  appropriation of “America” is predominantly based on the lat-
ter. To analyze such an  appropriation, I have applied Umberto  Eco’s concept 
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of the absolute  fake. Like  Baudrillard, although using a different defi nition of 
 hyperreality,  Eco emphasizes the fi ctional character of American pop culture, 
which, as he suggests, consists of absolute fakes that succeed as “the real thing” 
by being improved copies of the “real” originals. As stated before, fakeness in 
this sense is not a value judgment, questioning the quality or authenticity of 
a specifi c object. Instead, the concept of the absolute  fake makes it possible to 
specify pop-cultural  appropriation by perceiving the object as a copy of an 
original. Even though  Eco only recognizes absolute fakes in American culture, 
I have shown that Dutch pop culture – or, more specifi cally, those pop-cultural 
artifacts which are based on an American original – can be analyzed using  Eco’s 
concept. However, to avoid the unproductive question of whether or not an ob-
ject is a successful imitation, I have added Thomas  Elsaesser’s concept of kara-
oke  Americanism, which is an effective tool for grasping the slippery distinction 
between sheer imitation and active  appropriation. As performances of karaoke 
 Americanism, the wide variety of analyzed Dutch pop-cultural artifacts show 
that, when translated into specifi c local or national contexts, “America” can be 
appropriated in many different ways, ranging from explicit hyper- American-
ness to implicit mimicking of an American original in which the association 
with “America” is almost lost.
 Fabricating the Absolute Fake foregrounds the intertwinement of pop 
culture and politics, arguing that, despite pop culture being “only entertain-
ment,” it cannot be separated from politics. All pop-cultural artifacts analyzed 
either explicitly or implicitly refer to a political reality, centered around 9/ 11 
and its aftermath. Recognizing the distinction between the nation-state  USA 
and an imagined  America does not imply that the two exclude each other. As 
the American case studies show, the idealism of an imagined America can be 
used to justify or even mystify the political actions of the nation-state. Yet, pop 
culture also can translate the political into a popular and personal experience 
of the political, bringing the political into people’s everyday lives, thereby cre-
ating possible room for dissenting voices or oppositional readings. Pop culture 
can be both manipulative and empowering.
 The intertwinement of pop culture and politics is also signifi cant in the 
debates on  Americanization. Whereas the fi rst half of the book deals with the 
way American pop culture relates to the political reality of 9/ 11 and its after-
math, the second half deals with the way “American” pop culture made in the 
Netherlands relates to post-9/11 Dutch politics, and in particular the assas-
sinations of Pim  Fortuyn and Theo van  Gogh. 9/11 has prompted discussions 
around national identity both in the USA and the Netherlands. Just as in the 
USA, in the Netherlands pop culture can translate the political into a popular 
and personal experience of the political. Moreover, as a form of Americaniza-
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tion, the Dutch  appropriation shows that American pop culture can function 
as a shared language, with the potential of connecting different cultural identi-
ties within the Netherlands and so enabling alliances that are based on other 
senses of belonging besides solely national identity. This does not mean that 
one should be uncritical of the dominant American presence in global pop  cul-
ture, but that one can recognize the potential of “America” as an international 
lingua franca. Admittedly, that may be a far too optimistic assessment of how 
pop culture could work, but after all, I too am an American I never  was, trying 
to make things better.
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American pop culture – Hollywood cinema, television, pop music – 
dominates the rest of the world through its hegemonic presence. 
Does that make everyone a hybridized American, or do these 
elements find mediation within the other cultures that consume 
them? Fabricating the Absolute Fake applies concepts of postmodern 
theory – Baudrillard’s hyperreality and Eco’s “absolute fake,” among 
others – to this globally mediated American pop culture in order to 
examine both the phenomenon itself and its appropriation in the 
Netherlands, as evidenced by such diverse cultural icons as the 
Elvis-inspired crooner Lee Towers, the Moroccan-Dutch rapper Ali B, 
musical tributes to an assassinated politician, and the Dutch reality 
soap opera scene. Fabricating the Absolute Fake is a fascinating 
exploration of how global cultures struggle to create their own 
“America” within a post-9/11 media culture.
Jaap Kooijman is Associate Professor in Media & Culture and 
American Studies at the University of Amsterdam.
“A brilliant, thoroughly enjoyable work of cultural critique, Fabricating the Absolute 
Fake takes seemingly exhausted concepts like ‘Americanization’ and turns them on 
their head. Refusing simple binaries between the fake and the authentic, or between 
cultural imperialism and native resistance, Kooijman demonstrates just how flexible 
the signifiers of Americanness can be when they circulate globally.”
Anna McCarthy, Cinema Studies, New York University
“Most daring and persuasive is Kooijman’s ability to move between and connect the 
most delicious pop and the most searing political events (9/11, the murder of Pim 
Fortuyn), never evading the seriousness of entertainment nor the spectacle of politics. 
A book that is a pleasure for what it conveys of its subject and for its intellectual rigor, 
managing to be at once subtle and straightforward, complex and lucid.”
Richard Dyer, Film Studies, King’s College London
“Fabricating the Absolute Fake shows that pop culture is more 
than ephemeral entertainment. When looked at with Kooijman’s 
cosmopolitan eye, pop culture can be seen as a continuing ritual 
in celebration of national identities, America’s identity for sure, 
but also, intriguingly, a Dutch or even European sense of self.”
Rob Kroes, American Studies, University of Amsterdam
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